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Introduction 
1.1. Introduction to the Problem 
 
     The present essay is a phenomenological analysis of a fundamental human characteristic. 
The phenomenon, which serves as the focus of our investigation, is man’s openness and what 
is, in the final analysis, man’s God-directedness. There have been many philosophers who 
dealt with this phenomenon in the history of philosophy after Max Scheler who was the first 
to introduce the term “world-openness” (Weltoffenheit). We are tempted to identify the 
somewhat wider concept of man’s openness with world-openness. At least what Scheler’s 
concept of man’s world-openness seems more or less to cover what we generally mean by the 
phenomenon of man’s openness. In this sense, by saying that man is open to the world 
(weltoffen), we do not imply merely one single form or interpretation of man’s openness (that 
is, we don’t single out one specific object such as the ‘world’ and describe man’s openness 
toward it), but we refer to the whole of the phenomenon of man’s (general) openness. In my 
view and understanding of the term, man’s openness to the world and his God-openness are 
not two separate phenomena. I shall argue in this essay that God-directedness (God-openness) 
is the ultimate and full understanding of world-openness. World-openness is a many-faceted 
term: it entails a structural metaphysical essential trait of man as a finite person, which has no 
proper opposite except the absence of it in animals and in other non-personal beings; it has a 
contradictory opposite but lacks any contrary opposite. Every human person is characterized 
by this structural world-openness regardless of his acts and attitudes. In other words, world-
openness in this sense constitutes man’s ontological structure. World-openness can also mean, 
however, something else that indeed requires human intellectual and volitional or affective 
conscious acts and culminates in the attitude of world-openness, an attitude which is free and 
which not every human person possesses actually and which is opposed to many forms of 
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closedness. With this in mind, we will analyze different acts, attitudes, etc., in which man can 
be open or closed. 
My analysis aims at being a classical analysis in the sense that the character of its 
argumentation is of a classical phenomenological nature. By this I mean the method of the 
early phenomenological movement (Munich-Göttingen-circle or Münchener 
Phänomenologie) and its later development. One of its main characteristics is that which Max 
Scheler emphasized in his seminal essay “Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition” as 
“radical empiricism”. By the term radical empiricism he understands an immediate contact 
with different phenomena as they are given to us, and their detailed analysis, that is, a radical 
differentiation of one phenomenon from the other. The main difference between the 
phenomenological empiricism and the so-called classical empiricism is that, for classical 
empiricism, experience means sense experience and modes of consciousness that result from 
the stimulation of the five senses. As a final result of this, classical empiricisms generally end 
up in materialism or sensualism. For Scheler and for the majority of the thinkers of the early 
phenomenological movement “lived experience” (taken again in a fundamentally empirical 
sense) is exceptionally important. As Scheler says: 
A philosophy based on phenomenology must be characterized first of all by 
the most intensively vital and most immediate contact with the world itself, 
that is, with those things in the world with which it is concerned, and with 
these things as they are immediately given in experience, that is in the act of 
experience and are “in themselves there” only in this act.1 
 
From this it follows, that this essay is empiricist in the sense that it goes through and lists 
different aspects and appearances of the phenomenon of the openness of man. On the other 
hand, however, the most important issue of this thesis involves the application of whatever 
method in obtaining knowledge of essence(s) of the phenomenon of world-openness. The first 
method of the thesis is like the “empiricist” method of a classical religious scholar, who 
                                                 
1 Max Scheler, “Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition” in: Max Scheler, Selected Philosophical Essays. 
Evaston: Northwestern University Press, 1973: 138. 
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exploring the notion of “holy place”, goes through all occurrences and typical features of holy 
places in the world from Japan to Patagonia – geographically as well as theoretically. This 
method must not be misunderstood as a mere empirical surveying of facts and conceptions of 
things, nor as an empiricist inductive method in the normal sense of the term. Rather, such as 
survey and multitude of examples should help us to reach an experience of the intelligible 
authentic essence of a “holy place.” Only after having gained access to the intelligible nature 
of the specific form of “sacredness” that can be attributed to a place is one able to tell what 
the phenomenon of “holy place” is in itself; what its characteristics look like; in what sense 
different types of “holy” places differ from each other and from less holy places, unholy, or 
desacralized places.  
In short, this essay intends to be traditional-phenomenological in the sense that it takes 
every intelligible form of openness into consideration from openness as the curiosity of a 
tourist to openness as God-openness. After completing this project are we able to enlighten 
what openness is in itself and to conclude that there are significant, less important and false 
understandings of man’s openness and many levels and kinds of this phenomenon. 
Nevertheless, the ultimate understanding of man’s openness reveals itself only after such 
fundamental and all-surveying analyses. There are in fact countless understandings and forms 
of man’s openness. The reason why we have to go through all these forms is that even false 
forms of openness can teach us something about the real form and ultimate understanding of 
man’s openness. Returning to our previous example, investigating a 21st century profane 
place, which, as a matter of fact, bears only few external resemblances to holy places such as 
a traditional church but still is intended to serve the same end of a sanctuary, may at least 
aesthetically speaking be whole profane. We must distinguish here two quite distinct 
phenomena: the objective holiness of a place that for example the empty tomb of Christ 
possesses in the light of the faith even if a horrendously profane thing such as a train station 
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were built around it, and a holiness of place which depends on aesthetic moments and on the 
atmosphere of the place. In the face of a modern Church that looks like a dentist office we 
may at least be led to the conclusion that this is precisely a place, which has nothing to do 
with holiness, that is, that this is not how a holy place looks like, even if in the light of the 
Catholic faith the holy mass being celebrated there makes it objectively a holy place. Its 
aesthetic profanity cannot cancel its objective holiness but creates a deep contradiction 
between the appearance and the reality of the place. It cannot be an adequate embodiment of a 
holy place even if sometimes the fact that not only a holy religious event took place there 
(which makes it a holy place in spite of the profanity of its looks), but that also a sacred image 
is present there that shapes this place, may to some extent reestablish the holiness of the place 
even in an incarnate human and aesthetic way. Thus even if the rolling floor and electric 
transportation of visitors or our Lady of Guadalupe stand in stark contrast to the atmosphere a 
holy place ought to radiate, the deeply inspiring image gives it an experienced sacred 
atmosphere. 
This observation is not a useless intellectual survey of one insignificant appearance of 
the phenomenon of a sacred place, but its “incarnate” “visible” or audible sacredness plays a 
minor, but decisive tune in the whole “symphony” of the phenomenon itself. With the help of 
such – apparently pointless – survey (or sequence of surveys) we are closer to the thing that 
we want to identify philosophically. 
Our thesis aims to be a classical phenomenological analysis also in the sense that it 
seeks to engage in pure thinking about things themselves. Now, turning to pure thinking 
requires the change of our spiritual attitude and the consciousness of this change. It requires 
readiness, continuous attention to concentration in that new attitude. This change of attitude 
does not consist primarily in the serious concentration on the objects of our thinking and acts, 
but in the return to the question of how we act and think, and how the object in question is 
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given to us as lived experience. Turning to lived experience means to break with all 
prescientific, everyday understandings of the phenomenon. In other words, this essay is 
phenomenological in the sense that it requires a radical restart from the writer as well as from 
the reader: not keeping distance, but reflecting in certain inwardness on his own experiences 
and their intelligible objects in order to be able to deepen his self-awakening, which, however, 
will help us “to fix our minds on the authentic essence of thing[s]”.2 
This thesis includes three parts. In the first part, I shall offer a short introduction to the 
problem of the phenomenology of world-openness. I will argue that it is basically 
anthropology that we wish to do here: its main focus is human existence or, more precisely, 
an essential characteristic of the human person. In the second part, I shall try to shed light on 
the phenomenon of openness. In the third part, I shall make clear the proper object of man’s 
openness differentiating between different possible objects.  
                                                 
2 For the many possible forms of gaining knowledge of essences and philosophical methods see Josef Seifert, 
Discours des Méthodes. The Methods of Philosophy and Realist Phenomenology. Frankfurt / Paris / Ebikon / 
Lancaster / New Brunswick: Ontos-Verlag, 2009.  
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1.2. The Notion of Openness in Anthropologies of the 20th Century 
 
“The epoch of humanity is that when men rarefy.” 
(Ernst Jünger: Tagseite Nachtseite)  
 
Because of falsely grounded metaphysical views of man, the past century can be 
considered rather as the epoch of “inhuman” anthropologies.3 Sartre, referring to Marxism 
(although his remark can be applied without any restriction to National Socialist ideology and 
many other ideologies such as the neo-liberal ideology), says that: “Marxism will become an 
inhuman anthropology if it does not integrate man as its ground.”4 He goes on to say that: 
“The Marxism of today suffers in a deficiency [...] since it completely disregards the 
understanding of human reality.”5 According to the proponents of Marxist ideology, there is 
strict determinism in the world that leaves no room for chance and freedom. They say that 
man is only a finely composed machine. In this mechanistic materialist view, the role of the 
subject (and of subjectivity) is minimized and the concept of man is distorted. In this sense, 
the 20th century can be viewed from a philosophical point of view as the questioning of the 
integrity of man, subject and person. This is, I think, one of the origins of the widely accepted 
views of “death” and “crisis” and of theories of the “end” of art, of history, of the whole 
present order, of culture, mankind, ´the world, etc. (I do not wish to deny, however, that each 
of these theories of the “end” deserves a careful investigation nor do I overlook the fact that 
some of these theories have very reasonable roots that cannot be reduced to a distorted image 
of man, nor that a great risk of the destruction of the whole humanity through misused atomic 
power indeed exists. Nor can it be overlooked that the end of this world is also repeatedly 
prophesized by Christ and is thus the object of a religious belief.) 
                                                 
3 Sartre was the first who used this rather paradoxical expression, since classical anthropology is either “human” 
or not anthropology at all. Nevertheless “inhuman anthropology” expresses that there are anthropologies of the 
20th century whose aim is to deprive anthropology from its “human” character. The question is whether we can 
call those views without any restriction philosophical or anthropological of any kind? On the other hand, I don’t 
use the term in its Heideggerian sense (unmenschlich; he published his famous article earlier than Sartre, in 
1946.), which means “man’s being-out-of-his-essence”.  
4 Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason. Verso Press USA, 2004: 279. (First edition in 1960.) 
5 Jean-Paul Sartre, op.cit. 278. 
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There is, however, another view that arises in sharp contrast to the anti-anthropology 
of totalitarian ideologies. Within the intellectual decline “a certain discovery of subjectivity, 
or [...] turn to subjectivity, in modern philosophy” is detected.6 In a certain sense, turning to 
the subject in philosophy can be identified as a paradoxical consequence of inhuman 
anthropology. But this is not simply a counter-reaction. Rather, the situation of the 
philosophical world has also drastically changed in the last century. Turning to personal 
subjectivity, rather than a dethronement or displacement, has become a genuine philosophical 
act, whose value rests, however, on a sharp distinction between the subject understood as 
person, as a “subject of rational nature,” as a self-conscious and free being that exists no less 
really and objectively than the material cosmos, and subjectivity as that which only exists as 
object of conscious acts or as a judgment that does not correspond to objective reality but is 
only seeming true to a subject. While also these intentional objects solely constituted by a 
subject, such as the world of Don Quijote, also can bear high values and stand in intimate   
relation to reality, the claim that the latter sense of subjectivity, a world that does not exist in 
itself but solely is object of human subjectivity, is all we can reach is a relativism and 
subjectivism that must be considered to be a most fundamental error. 
Although authentic personalism calls for the recognition of absolute personal being, 
doing philosophy as anthropology, however, presently is of the utmost importance, but not 
exclusively because of historical facts. Now, there are a number of philosophers who can be 
regarded as leading figures of the anthropological renaissance of the 20th century. Scheler, 
Heidegger, Wojtyla, Maréchal, Rahner, von Hildebrand, Pannenberg, Seifert and Crosby and 
many others considered in many respects man as the center of their philosophical interest, 
even though the majority of them do not consider man but God to be the supreme personal 
being. No doubt, there are significant differences between these thinkers; though I think that 
                                                 
6 John F. Crosby, The Philosophical Achievement of Dietrich von Hildebrand. Concluding Reflections on the 
Symposion. Aletheia An International Yearbook of Philosophy (5.) 1992: 321. 
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they share at least two common points: the general turning to the person and the investigation 
of the person through his acts. By turning to the person I mean that in the 20th century the 
human being came into prominence for many philosophies, which tried to understand the 
phenomenon of man non-reductionistically. By ‘investigating the person through his acts’, I 
mean an attempt for a new type of definition of man, which can rather be considered organic 
than static. When, for example, John F. Crosby characterizes Dietrich von Hildebrand’s 
philosophy, he refers to the same project (this however can be applied to all philosophers 
named above). Crosby says:  
In the thought of von Hildebrand, too, there is a turn to personal 
subjectivity; he takes very seriously the characteristic acts of the person, 
such as knowing, responding, and most of all, loving, and tries to 
understand the nature of the person through his many analyses of the acting 
of the person.7 
  
In this sense, we can say that Hildebrand’s philosophical turn to subjectivity is in fact a 
turning to the acts of the person. But this is only one point of view out of many. Now, I will 
not engage in an (anyway futile) effort to list here all definitions ever formulated in 
anthropology regarding man. One thing however clearly stands before us and will be in the 
center of our interest. I think basically there are two kinds of anthropology: anthropologies of 
closedness and anthropologies of openness. Anthropologies of closedness 
(Endlichkeitsanthropologien) deny man’s capacity to surpass every finite being (the capacity 
of man to transcend himself in forms of acts, or transcendence in respect of his absolute origin 
and ultimate aim) and reduce man to certain finite phenomenon (physical or psychological) of 
the world. Anthropologies of openness (Offenheitsanthropologien), in contrast, hold that 
man’s existence is fundamentally open to the world and to the whole of being. 
Anthropologists of openness investigating the basic structure of human nature discover that 
                                                 
7 Ibidem 
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“man is in search of infinity”,8 and, in the final analysis, understand the fact of the 
phenomenon of being open to the world (Weltoffenheit) in terms of God-directedness. Now, I 
claim that the above mentioned thinkers belong to this latter group. They differ, however, in 
the final interpretation of man’s openness. Martin Heidegger, for example, couldn’t accept 
explicitly that man is open to God, and some interpreters even attribute to his thought a 
structural and absolute atheism and anthropological relativism that sharply contrasts with the 
anthropology and metaphysics of the person implied by others.  
Anthropologies of openness share a common, incomparably deep interest in the 
phenomenon of the human being and discover an unparalleled access to the treasury of the 
human world through his acts. The center of their interest is the peculiar, transcendent 
character of human acts. As von Hildebrand says “The specifically personal character of man 
as a subject manifests itself in his capacity to transcend himself.”9 Transcendence is the most 
fundamental characteristic, which I believe comprises all other characteristics. In my view, 
transcendence gives the possibility for man to go beyond or even against his very nature. 
Now, one can give various interpretations to the phenomenon of transcendence. 
Independently of the abundance of interpretations, however,  it is remarkable that they all 
agree – implicitly or explicitly – that the most important attribute of man is his fundamental 
openness. I have to make clear that if I say man is transcendent, I do not mean that man can 
transcend God, for instance. To hold this would be simply absurd. In the case of human 
beings, by ‘transcendence' I mean that man’s acts, attitudes, emotions, etc., have objects 
beyond themselves and beyond the person who is their human subject; cognitive acts cannot 
be reduced to a kind of immanent self-consciousness, and free acts and love cannot be 
reduced to a mere self-actualization that considers all things as means to one’s own happiness. 
                                                 
8 It is Scheler’s point. In addition to this, Scheler says that the sense of infinity is before every experience or 
assertion about the world and the self: “Hence, it is a complete mistake to assert that I exist (as in Descartes) or 
that there is a world (as in St. Thomas Aquinas) before asserting the general proposition that there is an absolute 
Being – in other words, to derive the sphere of absolute Being from the other modes of being.” Scheler 1979: 90.  
9 Dietrich von Hildebrand, Christian Ethics. New York: David McKay Company, 1953: 218. 
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Moreover, many personal acts point to a higher reality, and at the same time show the 
contingent character of their human subject. I think we rightly apply the word 
“transcendence” to man if we do not mean by this that man is “over”/beyond history, social 
connections, connections with the factual world, etc. Nevertheless, the correct use of the word 
also requires that by this we do not mean that man is only historicity, sociality, factuality, etc. 
The principal aim of this thesis is to analyze by the philosophical method of 
phenomenology the phenomenon of openness of man. This task at first sight seems to be 
simple, but after all comprises almost all the most important problems of philosophy, and as a 
result puts man into a new perspective. Since world-openness is present in many ways in 
man’s acts, behavior, attitudes, and constitutes his basic structure, it can easily pass 
unmarked. In spite of this, many philosophers have discovered it, but often failed to give a 
proper name and special emphasis to the significance of the phenomenon. They emphasized 
man’s transcendence concentrating mainly on the (transcendent) processes of the human acts. 
In my view, however, (world-)openness is the origin of man’s transcendence whatever form it 
has.  
There has been a relatively small number of thinkers who dealt thematically with the 
phenomenon of openness, wherefore there is plenty of room for a new investigation into this 
phenomenon or the different phenomena that can be intended by this term. There are, namely, 
three main alternative modes of understanding openness. Here we cannot discuss in detail any 
of these forms – they will be discussed in later chapters. Instead, we will just give a short 
summary. The first understanding is close to the views of Arnold Gehlen. Gehlen consistently 
refers to the openness peculiar to man as world-openness. I think, however, that Gehlen’s 
term world-openness doesn’t add sufficient clarification to the concept of openness. For 
Gehlen world-openness is not a sub-division of the more general term of openness. Now, 
according to Gehlen’s understanding, world-openness is a learnt behavior. He says that man is 
 14 
physically not as developed as animals are.10 To compensate for his “instinctual deficiencies”, 
man is compelled to draw on other faculties. For the evolutionary process that left him 
instinctually non-specific also imbued him with intelligence, self-consciousness, and an 
adaptable nature; this is what Gehlen called man’s world-open character. According to 
Gehlen, in order to overcome his deficiencies, man developed a so-called second nature 
(zweite Natur). For Gehlen culture is man’s second nature. In my view, Gehlen’s 
understanding of openness remains within the framework of biology and biologism. He 
rightly says that man’s responses to external stimuli are not automatically-instinctually 
programmed by earlier responses, but are based on deliberation and hence are open to change 
and reconsideration, that is, they are open to the world. Later, however, openness plays no 
role in the build-up of culture and man’s life. In other words, for Gehlen the notion of 
openness helped to outline man’s biological structure, but later he used it for nothing else. 
Gehlen’s view has two main consequences. Firstly, according to Gehlen, there is no single 
culture, only different cultures; man becomes an individuated expression of his native culture. 
As a consequence of this, Gehlen holds that there is no common human nature. Secondly, and 
this point follows from the first, in Gehlen’s anthropology there is no single definable reality. 
If we “remove” man’s “second nature”, the only (prime) nature remaining is again 
physiological-animal. The reason for this conclusion is found in Gehlen’s view on openness: 
for him openness is a learnt physical-biological behavior, and not innate, inalienably human.  
A second main type of understanding of openness is that of Heidegger. Heidegger 
rightly characterized man as being-in-the-world, where the world means an ontological 
concept and not simply a temporal and spatial universe. According to Heidegger, the world 
belongs to man’s fundamental structure. Being-in-the-world therefore is in strong connection 
with historicity, body, time, etc. It is a great merit of Heidegger that he has articulated man’s 
                                                 
10 See Gehlen, Arnold, Der Mensch Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt. Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 
1966.  
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openness in the framework of such concepts as for example “average everydayness”. With 
concepts like this he was able to point out man’s inseparability from the world. Heidegger 
thought that our interaction with these everyday issues will make our own structure 
transparent and will point to our relation with being. For Heidegger, however, being-in-the-
world is indeed transparent to being, but not to God. Heidegger rejected the idea of world-
openness as God-openness. Man is open to language, history, future (in other words man is 
language-open, history-open and future-open) and to many other contingent issues of the 
world: Man can have authentic relation with all these things, this openness however does not 
overreach the horizon of finite being and can have no religious interpretation.  
According to the third understanding, of which the early Max Scheler can be 
considered as the main representative, man is humbly open to being and man can know being 
as it reveals itself, but at the same time, man is also open to the highest reality, that is, to 
God.11 His famous saying: “every finite spirit believes either in God or in idols”12 can be 
applied here even if we have to take into consideration that there is a huge difference between 
the Scheler of the On the Eternal in Man and the Scheler of the Man’s Place in Nature who 
developed a spiritual, man-based idea of the divine.13 This man-based idea of the divine, 
however, does not concern the direction of man’s openness, even though it concerns the 
decisive issue of the nature and autonomous existence of the object of this God-directness: 
God. I do think that the spirit of the quotation is also valid for the later Scheler, however – as 
he says – the real object of man’s openness and direction is God, therefore whatever takes the 
place of God, one can reckon it – figuratively – as “idol”, that is, a divine-like, super-human 
entity. Here the point is not the object of man’s openness, but the reality of openness itself.  
                                                 
11 Max Scheler’s understanding of world-openness will be discussed at length in chapter 2.2. 
12 Max Scheler, On the Eternal in Man. Hamden: Archon Books, 1972: 267. 
13 The same conclusion was drawn by Dunlop however from an anthropological point of view. See: Francis N. 
Dunlop, “Scheler’s Idea of Man: Phenomenology versus Metaphysics in the Late Works.” Aletheia (vol. II.) 
1981. pp. 220-235. 
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Scheler holds that the essence of man is his “exceptional place”, which is what we 
called above intelligence or the capacity of making decisions. Man's “exceptional place” is 
not the result of a quantitative “leap” from animality to humanity. In other words, there is not 
a quantitative difference between man and other organisms, but the deepest qualitative one. 
Again Scheler says: “Man is an X that can behave in a world-open manner to an unlimited 
extent. Becoming of man is rising by force of spirit towards opening to the world.”14 In 
Scheler’s account openness constitutes man’s ontological structure; it permeates the whole of 
human existence. One of the greatest merits of Scheler’s notion of openness is that starting 
from the phenomenon of man's openness he was able to develop a new, dynamic 
understanding of man, whose essence is grasped in his acts. The second merit of Scheler’s 
understanding of openness is that it opened up the possibility of a religious-theistic 
interpretation of it. By ‘religious-theistic interpretation’ I mean the widest meaning-providing 
understanding and the most comprehensive object of openness. When Scheler says that man is 
a being directed toward God, this axiom has to be taken as referring to an ontological status of 
the human person, which, however, does not necessarily mean its conscious, let alone its 
continuous realization through acts. Scheler’s understanding of man's openness to the world 
refers, on the one hand, to the multitude of possibilities of different actions, wills, believes, 
attitudes, decisions, on the other hand, it means an ontological arch-datum. 
For Scheler the phenomenon of the ex-centric position of man has basically a religious 
aspect. Within this framework the phenomenon of world-openness receives its full meaning in 
a religious-theistic context. Scheler raised the question of the ultimate object of this 
phenomenon: what is the final object of man's openness? While stressing, however, the ex-
centric positionality of man he already answered this question, because it also entails that 
man's original point of reference is not something worldly, but other-worldly. The following 
                                                 
14 Max Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature, New York: The Noonday Press, 1971: 49. 
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citation also proves that Scheler in all of the phases of his philosophy recognized an original 
openness to be a fundamental characteristic of man. Scheler says: 
Precisely in the very moment when the world-open being and the never-
ending striving had come into being in order to penetrate into the endless 
world-sphere and not to stop at particularities […] in this very same moment 
man needed to anchor his center outside and over the world.15  
 
My understanding of the phenomenon of openness is close to Scheler’s idea, which provides a 
religious interpretation to man’s openness. There are two points, which I can adopt from 
Scheler. Firstly, independently of how (or how not) one “fills out” the region(s) of openness 
no doubt that this attribute (openness) is an essential constituent of every human being. 
Secondly, there can be various objects of man’s openness. Man can be open to the object-
world, man can be open to the world of language, man can be open to culture and history, etc. 
According to Scheler the proper object of man’s openness is God. This is basically also my 
thesis. Now, the question is, how can we arrive at this conclusion? It seems that it is the 
phenomenological analysis which can help us to give a satisfactory answer to this very 
important phenomenon. 
In our case, the phenomenological analysis means trying to shed light on the nature of 
man’s openness to God and to distinguish it clearly from bordering phenomena which might 
easily be confused with it. It is, however, not an easy and quick task to accomplish. There are 
numerous phenomena which are close to the phenomenon of openness and which also in 
themselves can hardly be grasped clearly. But before we would launch such an investigation, 
we have to address the significance of the anthropology and anthropological issues of today. 
 
                                                 
15 Max Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature, New York: The Noonday Press, 1979: 108-109. This quotation 
also proves that in spite of any justified distinction between the “early” and the “later” Scheler, there is no 
complete difference between the “two Schelers” from the point of view of man’s openness. 
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1.3. Taking philosophical Anthropology as a Key to Philosophy 
 
“There are many tremendous things, nothing more tremendous than man.” 
Sophocles: Antigone 332. 
 
According to Max Scheler there are serious misconceptions and confusions in 
anthropology and concerning its main object, man. He distinguishes between particular 
scientific, philosophical and theological anthropology. He holds that there is no contact 
between the divergent views on man. He says: 
In no other period of human knowledge man has ever become more 
problematic to himself than in our days. We have a scientific, a 
philosophical, and a theological anthropology that know nothing of each 
other. Therefore we no longer possess any clear consistent idea of man. The 
ever growing multiplicity of the particular sciences that are engaged in the 
study of man has much more confused and obscured than elucidated our 
concept of man.16 
 
Nevertheless, within these three disciplines, Scheler attaches greatest importance to 
philosophy, and considers philosophy and philosophical reasoning as the only clue to solve 
the problems of humanity.  
In my view it is not only due to historical facts, the rapid development of specialized 
sciences, the sub-human world wars, etc., that there has been a need to do anthropology 
seriously. If I might say so, it has never been only historical facts which direct the focus of 
philosophy to anthropological issues. First of all, there is a special intellectual need to do 
anthropology today. We hear it from all sides: man has lost his orientation. A well-based 
anthropology, however, can help humanity to find its way back to its proper “home” where 
justice and peace dwells. I believe that unequal societies are against human nature and race. It 
is, however, only a philosophically conceived anthropology that can articulate a well-founded 
answer to the challenges of the world today. On the other hand, however, the need of doing 
anthropology comes from the nature of philosophizing. For doing philosophy, especially from 
an anthropological point of view is something inherently human (that is human in an 
                                                 
16 Scheler, Max: Man’s Place in Nature. Boston: Beacon Press, 1961: 128. 
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innermost manner); no other creature on earth can do that.17 Philosophy, whatever direction it 
takes, is a certain type of self-understanding. Since the object as well as the subject of this 
activity is human being, the philosopher does anthropology.  
The task of an authentic philosophical anthropology is to give an account of the nature 
of man in the deepest sense. Philosophical anthropology as it is defined by Max Scheler is a 
comprehensive study. As he says, anthropology is:  
a basic science which investigates the essence and essential constitution of 
man, his relationship to the realms of nature (organic, plant and animal life) 
as well as to the source of all things, man’s metaphysical origin as well as 
his physical, psychic and spiritual origins in the world, the forces and 
powers which move man and which he moves, the fundamental trends and 
laws of his biological, psychic, cultural and social evolution, along with 
their essential capabilities and realities.18 
 
The central thesis of this essay, however, seems to suggest that there is no authentic 
philosophical anthropology without continuous hints, crosstalk, overlapping domains, 
indications to a field that we usually call philosophy of religion. It seems that while we’ve 
been trying to concentrate exclusively on anthropological matters, i. e. on man, we did in fact 
philosophy of religion and metaphysics: we have been talking about God, the divine being, 
about man’s God-orientedness. This observation, on the one hand, challenges the 
independence of philosophical anthropology, since it abolishes the border between the two 
sciences (namely philosophical anthropology and philosophy of religion), on the other hand 
however, clearly indicates the raison d’être of doing philosophy in classical terms and in the 
classical manner, that is, doing Philosophy organically. In order to defend this latter statement 
we have to accept that religion and philosophical understandings of issues of the religious are 
not only historical stages or forms of thinking as Hegel would say. Philosophical 
anthropology is a unique path towards the field of philosophy of religion. We know from 
                                                 
17 It might seemingly contradict that some Church fathers believed that Christ, because he is God’s Word, is the 
archetype of all philosophers. Some also believed that angels can do philosophy. Now, philosophy as 
constitutively human means a unique positionality of man: man – as Plato says – can “take care of his soul” and 
“gods”. 
18  Max Scheler, Philosophical Perspectives. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958: 65. 
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Plato and Aristotle that philosophy, and its point of origin: the philosophical investigation of 
man is a kind of “profane doctrine of salvation”; as they say: therapeia toon theoon [Plato]19 
and theologike episteme [Aristotle]. In my view, if we want “to give an account of the nature 
of man in the deepest sense” then religious-theological statements of our anthropology are not 
illicit applications of an anthropological view to the domain of religion, but reflect the truth 
about man and give therefore adequate answers to the crisis of man, since, according to this 
anthropology, man gives an affirmative answer to the cognizability of reality when he 
responds to the whole of human reality which includes man’s ordination to God and God-
openness. In a proper anthropological framework, truths of religion and the divine do not lose 
their meaning, but become more intelligible. If we say, for example, that man in acts of his 
heart is preordained to God (see chapter 2.3. the section on the heart), God will not lose His 
holiness, on the contrary: His holiness comes closer to us.  
In this sense, a well-based anthropology seeks the ultimate reasons and necessary 
conditions of the cognition of certain objects in man as well as tries to understand the truth of 
man’s acts. In this sense, anthropology can be considered as foundation for any other 
philosophical discipline. On the one hand, one can consider every philosophical discipline as 
anthropology, on the other, – as a minimum program – one can consider anthropology as a 
real point of departure for every scientific attempt to define the human being.  
In this essay I consider anthropology as a key to the whole of the constitution of 
philosophy. I’m going to do anthropology in this treatise, even though concentrating only on 
one special human characteristic. I hope, however, that by this “simple” and single-object-
focused investigation the most important problems of philosophical anthropology and of 
philosophy as such will also be treated.  
 
 
                                                 
19 In the Euthyphro (12e-15b) Plato explains to Euthyphro what he means by therapeia toon theoon (the therapy 
of the gods). 
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1.4. Anthropologies of “Openness” (Offenheitsanthropologien) versus Anthropologies of 
“Closedness” (Endlichkeitsanthropologien) 
 
The distinction that I introduce here considers anthropologies from the point of view of 
holding or refusing man’s original and inherent openness. I lay the emphasis on the adjectives 
“original” and “inherent” whereby I want to express that openness and its ultimate 
understanding, God-directedness, belongs necessarily to man. One could object that 
materialist views, such as the Soviet-type of anthropology, also hold man’s openness. To a 
certain extent it seems to be true; nevertheless I think that the notion of openness of the 
materialists is not openness in its original sense. I will argue in this chapter that 
anthropologies of openness realize and apprehend the phenomenon of man’s openness 
correctly in contrast with anthropologies of closedness. 
Materialist philosophers argue that the human being can be open to many things, such 
as surroundings, the physical world, the biological world, objects, etc. The common attribute 
of these views is, however, the restriction of openness to one particular human behavior-type 
and the limitation of its possible objects. When Marxists say that man is open to the physical 
world, they restrict openness to one particular object (namely to physical objects) and exclude 
other possible, for example non-physical, directions and interpretations of openness. In this 
sense, we can say that this view – because it understands openness narrowly – denies man’s 
openness; it leaves out many or sometimes the whole of other objects. Consequently, this 
view on man cannot be considered anthropology of openness, but an anthropology of 
closedness, since it closes and restricts man to one single domain.  
 Views like this can also be considered an anthropology of closedness from the point of 
view of man’s real characteristics. A Freudian anthropology, for example, disregards the 
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majority of the qualities of human behavior, soul and intellect. Freud holds that man’s first 
and most decisive characteristic is his sexual drive. According to Freud, man’s everyday 
actions are determined by motives, which are mostly unconscious, that is, difficult to 
acknowledge and avow. For Freud, eros is not a yearning for a higher reality, but the hope of 
recapturing a sexual bliss and simple pleasure supposedly lost in infancy. He says that every 
human act is permeated by sexual instinct and human manifestations are nothing but different 
and transformed forms of sexuality. I think that this type of view on man disregards many real 
and valuable characteristics of the human being. It disregards the fact that not all of our 
instincts are determined by sexuality for instance. The instinct for nourishment, for example, 
is not only for sexuality or for race-preservation (and is not only transformed, “domesticated” 
or “sublimated” appearance of sexuality – as Freud would say –), but, especially in the case of 
humans, it can be simply for pleasure or for many other reasons. Even less can such a theory 
explain the search for truth, friendship, love, the giving of one’s life for one’s family or loved 
ones, etc. In short, a Freudian (or similar) view on man cannot give full explanation to the 
whole of the richness of the human phenomenon.  
In contrast to reductionist anthropologies, anthropologies of openness open the whole 
of the totality for man. A physicalist view of man, which holds that to know a mental state 
and event is to know the information about the relevant nervous system, cannot exceed its 
limits determined by its physicalist way of seeing things. Anthropologies of openness, 
however, are not determined by physicalist, social or psychologic, etc., constraints in the 
explanation of the phenomenon of openness.  
The third main characteristic of anthropologies of openness concerns their final 
interpretation. Anthropologies of closedness stick on a certain inferior level of interpretation. 
According to materialist accounts, since man is a physical-biological being (that is, exists 
without soul and spirit), his structure is of a physical nature; his feelings, psychical, non-
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material manifestations are finely tuned physical-mathematical answers to different (physical) 
situations. Man is open only to physical reality. Anthropologies of openness, however, give a 
comprehensive explanation of the phenomenon of openness. Anthropologies of openness hold 
that man is not only a sexual animal (Freud) or a biological-physical being (Soviet Marxism), 
but possesses many other qualities beyond the above mentioned few. The main idea of 
anthropologies of openness is that man is not only a physical, biological or sexual being and, 
as a result, the understanding of man’s openness is not restricted to the levels of the physical, 
biological and sexual. To understand man’s openness as being open only to the biological 
world implies a false interpretation. Physicalist and biologist (and many other reductionist) 
views of man leave no chance to give a full and comprehensive account on man’s openness. 
The main difference between anthropologies of openness and anthropologies of closedness is 
that anthropologies of openness aim at the most comprehensive interpretation. In the case of 
anthropologies of openness the most comprehensive interpretation is that it understands man 
in the framework of his being open to a God. Now, we have to answer the question of what 
we mean by man’s openness as God-openness. 
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The Phenomenon of World-Openness 
2.1. Preliminary Meaning of World-Openness 
 
Preliminary Distinctions 
 In the first half of this chapter I shall investigate the problem of making elementary 
distinctions regarding phenomena in general terms, while in the second half of the chapter I 
shall concentrate on the elementary distinctions which mark the phenomenon of world-
openness itself.  
The main project of the thesis is to unfold philosophically one fundamental 
characteristic of the human being: his world-openness (Weltoffenheit). I consider it a multi-
faceted phenomenon; it is therefore one of the main concerns of the thesis to distinguish 
between different phenomena that bear a certain resemblance to world-openness, such as 
being-in-the-world, “Dasein”, existence, instincts of animals, being open to the other, etc. 
World-openness is multi-faceted also in the sense that in the human being it has numerous 
manifestations and aspects, such as being open to the world through actions, being open to the 
world through acts of intellect, through the will, the heart, etc. From this point of view we will 
investigate also the openness of the intellect, the openness of the will, etc, in later chapters. 
World-openness is, however, a particularly hard concept to grasp, since it is not a 
simple phenomenon, such as is, for example, the phenomenon of goodness or the different 
phenomena of values, such as the sacred.20 Furthermore, it might be that our preliminary 
understanding of the phenomenon of world-openness rather distorts the real picture of it and 
results in a caricature. Now, caricatures certainly bear an undeniable resemblance to their 
models, but the distance or dissimilarity between them (models and caricatures) is often 
                                                 
20  Or see Mariano Crespo’s subtle analysis on the phenomenon of forgiveness, where he, because of the 
clear and unambiguous nature of the datum of forgiveness, encountered less difficulties with proceeding within 
the frameworks of a phenomenological analysis. See Mariano Crespo: Das Verzeihen. Eine philosophische 
Untersuchung. Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 2002. (The topic of the easiness or hardness of a 
phenomenological analysis of different phenomena would require a separate thesis altogether.) 
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greater than the similarity. In order, therefore, to avoid misrepresenting the phenomenon in 
question we have to look – phenomenologically – into our preliminary understandings of it 
and just so long as we cannot confirm the opposite we have to presume that all our 
preliminary understandings may be potentially deceptive.  
The preceding discussion may suggest that all our preliminary intuitions – by which I 
mean those intuitions that are naïve or so-called pre-philosophical – are misleading 
understandings. I do not, however, claim that the less rigorous and theoretical everyday 
thinking is valueless for a further rigorous conceptual analysis. Every philosophical inquiry 
sets out from a pre-philosophical, not reflected basis, and if we want to know what and how 
things really are, i.e., if we want to go back to the things themselves, then we have to assume 
an attitude, which is utterly “faithful” to the world. What we want to do here, therefore, is to 
take the reality of the peculiarities of the phenomenon as a starting point for its notional, 
theoretic explication. This method is the phenomenological method:21 as the reality (in our 
case the phenomenon of world-openness) manifests itself in a spontaneous manner, it shows 
from itself and by itself its content and relation to other similar notions. Or, as Martin 
Heidegger remarked, phenomenology is something (and whatever he may understand under 
this label he does not consider it a science), that allows the things to speak for themselves. For 
him phenomenology is “to let that which shows itself to be seen from itself in the very way in 
which it shows itself from itself.”22 In its proper sense, however, the method, the way by 
which we approach and have access to the phenomena of the world, is method-less. As the 
immediacy of the self-manifestation of reality that is primordial and, in a final analysis, needs 
no other methods of any kind except faithfully intuiting and analyzing it. 
                                                 
21 Or it is at least a significant part of the phenomenological method, which comprises many methods. See: Josef 
Seifert, Discours des Méthodes. The Methods of Philosophy and Realist Phenomenology. Frankfurt / Paris / 
Ebikon / Lancaster / New Brunswick: Ontos-Verlag, 2009. 
22 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. New York: Harper Row Publishers, 1962: 38. 
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Following the pathway of phenomenology, it seems to be reasonable, at first, to 
delimit that which world-openness is not. I think that this delimitation is a genuine method of 
phenomenologically going back to the things themselves. Instead of stating immediately – 
and in a certain sense prematurely – what world-openness or any kind of phenomenon is, I 
would like to suggest taking another way, a way from behind, which approaches its subject 
matter from the other way around, and in this sense from a broader perspective. The method 
that I am suggesting here is similar to the work of a surgeon: I cut down what does not belong 
to the thing itself, and I fix and fasten what belongs together.  
The previous train of thought, although it may sound interesting and promising, might 
hide the frequent error of phenomenologists. From the very beginning phenomenology has 
been often charged with overlooking the phenomenon itself and concentrating exclusively on 
what the phenomenon is not.23 This was taken by the majority of philosophers as a sign that 
the original claim of phenomenology had been abandoned. Manfred Frings relates the view of 
Wundt charging the Husserlian method, on the one hand, with only telling us what things are 
not, and on the other hand with the redundant use of tautologies which neither analyze 
positively or explain what a thing is: 
Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1920), renowned German philosopher of his time 
and contemporary of Husserl, once remarked that Husserl's 1900/01 
Logische Untersuchungen only tell us what phenomena are not, never what 
they are. Indeed, Wundt's critique foreshadowed immense criticism of 
phenomenology during this century: it does nothing more, says Wundt, than 
tell us tautologies, such as »a judgment is a judgment«...24 
 
The same thing might be said about Max Scheler, who also devoted so much of his energies 
in his profound descriptions to what phenomena are not, rather than what they really are. The 
reason of this, I think, is twofold. First of all, phenomenological descriptions concentrating on 
                                                 
23 See Spiegelberg’s book where he lists all those who criticised phenomenologists overlooking what the 
phenomenon is. Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, A Historical Introduction. The Hague: 
M. Nijhoff, 1982. 
24 Manfred S. Frings, The Mind of Max Scheler: the first comprehensive guide based on the complete 
works. Chicago: Marquette University Press, 2001: 122. 
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one phenomenon have the intention of making man “see” for himself what a phenomenon, in 
terms of its constitutive properties and the state of affairs rooted in them, actually happens to 
be. The phenomenological description can only point to the essence of the thing, because, on 
the one hand, it is not a definition by genus proximum and differentia specifica, and on the 
other hand, bringing a thing into view relies on the insufficient means of language and 
concepts. Among others it was Adolf Reinach who clearly pointed out the intuitive character 
of cognition in phenomenology. He says:  
I have already indicated that essence analysis is no ultimate goal, but rather 
is a means. Of essences laws hold true, and these laws are incommensurable 
with any fact or factual connection of which sense perception informs us. 
The laws in question hold of the essences as such, in virtue of their nature 
(Wesen). There is no accidentally-being-so in essences, but rather a 
necessarily-having-to-be-so, and an in-virtue-of-essence-cannot-be-
otherwise. That there are these laws is one of the most important things for 
philosophy and – if one thinks it out completely – for the world at large. To 
present them in their purity is, therefore, a significant task of philosophy. 
But one cannot deny that this task has not been carried out.25   
 
Reinach, however, was exceptional among phenomenologists in the sense that he harshly 
rejected the role of any kind of sense perception in cognition. He talks about the “unmediated 
grasp of essences”, “direct intuition of the ideas”, where “no sense perception is required”. He 
– and as a matter of fact many others in this kind of school of the phenomenological 
movement – constantly repeats the claim of intuiting independently of sense experience, since 
real things – that are mostly hidden – are the real objects of philosophy and can be known 
only by viewing and knowing essences. He says: 
I need not have reference to some sense perception [...] Because of this, not 
only – as is often pointed out – does one need to perceive merely a single 
case in order to apprehend the apriori laws involved in it; in truth, one also 
does not need to perceive, to “experience,” the single case. One need 
perceive nothing at all. Pure imagination suffices. Wherever in the world we 
find ourselves, the doorway into the world of essences and their laws 
everywhere and always stands open to us.26  
 
                                                 
25 Adolf Reinach, Concerning Phenomenology. The Personalist, (50.) Spring 1969: 210. 
26 Adolf Reinach, op.cit. 211. 
 28 
According to this scheme, one would say that the representatives of the realist 
phenomenological school do not adopt any form of description of non-necessary facts. In this 
sense – referring back to our previous example in the introduction – investigating the 
phenomenon of the holy, they would not be interested in different, historically defined 
manifestations of the holiness: the holy among the Incas, the holy among the Tuva people, 
etc. In this historical context description would mean having a connection with the temporal 
and contingent facts of the world. This, however, cannot be applied to, for example, Reinach 
as well as to Scheler, since - while they – use examples taken from everyday life, and 
constantly refer to non-necessary facts, they seek knowledge  about the eternal necessary 
essences of things, thus transcending the changing temporal examples as such (we can say 
this about all realist phenomenologists). Now, in my view, the application of examples means 
having an authentic connection with the world itself, which does not necessarily mean, 
however, the study of all contingent forms in which these essences are concretized or the 
cognitive value of concrete sense perceptions. The phenomenologist, however, should grasp 
the main idea of sense perception and apply examples as well as concrete descriptions: getting 
to understand the pure essences via the simple, everyday datum-orientedness of their concrete 
embodiments. The main reason why many of the phenomenologists discuss what the 
phenomena are not is that they are in fact aware of the abundance and richness of the worldly 
phenomena, in contrast to those, who, because of their erroneous concept of life-world, 
reduce cognition to sense experience. The phenomenologist knows that the multifariousness 
of the world – which is a gift and a task for man at the same time – requires distinctions and 
disassociations with meticulous care. In this sense, there is no more sublime a task for a 
philosopher than to assume responsibility for faithfully understanding and interpreting the 
world. Accomplishing his ministry man (the philosopher) encounters phenomena similar to 
the phenomenon he wants to know philosophically. Therefore, when the phenomenologist 
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tells us what the phenomenon is not, he is acting correctly; he delimits what does not belong 
to the phenomenon he aims at. In this sense, the refusal of limiting experience to sense 
experience in phenomenology means a rejection of the erroneous concept of the life-world 
held by a materialistic positivism. This attitude is in fact a life-affirmation and not the 
aristocratic turning away from life and the world with which the Platonic idealism (which can 
be considered as a kind of proto-phenomenology) has often been charged. 
 The second reason for the absence of positive definitions in phenomenology is due to 
its peculiar nature. While all other sciences allow positive as well as negative descriptions of 
their objects on the basis of observation and of reasoning directed at the object of observation, 
in the science of phenomenology something that is meant to be the object of its investigation 
is not observable in terms of the observation of “everyday” objects. The object of 
phenomenological philosophy is brought into mental view in terms of a peculiar 
phenomenological attitude. In the phenomenological attitude, however, nothing is empirically 
observable. In spite of the ultimate indefinability of urphenomena a non-reductive, purely 
essential definition of an essence in terms of its fundamental marks is possible. 
 
The preliminary Understanding of the Phenomenon of World-Openness 
 The main reason why we cannot omit this negative way, the way of “from behind”, is 
that it is required by the thing itself. A preliminary understanding, however, even in its 
primordial form, is always a pre-requisite, that is, it is prior to any other knowledge. It 
precedes every kind of negative as well as positive approaches to different phenomena. This 
preliminary knowledge of a specific phenomenon is not explicit, but implicit, though it can be 
explained and made explicit by careful consideration. Our question is: what is the preliminary 
understanding of the phenomenon of world-openness? Moreover, in what sense does this 
understanding differ from other understandings? 
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 I think that, as in all instances, we have to proceed from our preliminary understanding 
of the phenomenon. Based on this preliminary understanding, we can also formulate an initial 
definition of the phenomenon under discussion. The concept of “definition” in this case has to 
be taken in a wider sense. It is not the clue to the entirety of the thing itself, but it can 
highlight and bring into prominence a few essential aspects of the thing. This “definition” is 
not necessarily like the ancient and medieval definition of things by the help of the genus 
proximum and differentia specifica. In the light of this discussion I propose a name for this 
kind of definition that seeks to capture what is given in a preliminary understanding that 
precedes all definitions: it is a working (preliminary, first hand or minimum) definition. 
Nevertheless, this working definition is not a “lighter” version of the traditional definitions, 
and does not hinder the deeper understanding of the notions of essence and real definition, 
and in no way holds that nominal (I mean by nominal definition the Scholastic definitio 
nominalis, that is, the etymological definition) and real definition (I mean by real definition 
the Scholastic definitio realis, that is, the articulation of the essence of the thing) are only a 
matter of convention and the definiendum is a sheer word. With the application of working 
definition I think we can reveal, or at least attain, the essence of what is to be defined. With 
the application of this preliminary working definition we attain a definition which allows us to 
proceed prior to a full clarification and which does not pretend to express the essence of a 
thing prematurely. 
            As a working definition its original basis is the everyday experience: the experience of 
the phenomenon as it is found in the non-reflective approach. One of the main tasks of the 
phenomenological reflection in its further investigation is, however, to stick precisely to this 
feature, namely to the observation of things as they are given to us in their everyday 
experience.  
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Now, the preliminary understanding based on everyday experience (which, as a matter 
of fact means a primordial, immediate contact with the thing itself) suggests that world-
openness has something to do with human beings – and not with animals –, and presumably it 
is one of the many genuine human characteristics that belong to man in virtue of his being a 
person. Even our pre-philosophical understanding suggests that world-openness belongs to 
the everyday experience of our existence. We may experience our own world-openness, or 
also the openness of someone else. There are instances in our worldly life when we are the 
subjects of world-openness and there are other instances when we are the objects of 
someone’s openness.27  
Being open to the world, according to the common usage, means not being narrow-
minded or imprisoned in one’s own ‘self-world’. It is one among the many peculiarities of 
man that expresses that human beings look forward to see something that is “outside” them. 
In its common usage “being open to the world” means being oriented toward something or 
someone. Nevertheless, this preliminary and pre-philosophical understanding needs a further 
explication and a deeper analysis, since animals are also open to something different from 
themselves. Based on this insight, however, we usually do not call animals world-open 
beings. The world-openness of man, therefore, has to be distinguished from the “world-
openness” of animals. In the next chapters (see chapter 2.8.) on the difference between 
openness and instincts we will deal with this problem in detail. At this point let me remark 
that animals, in contrast to humans, act and interact with the world unconsciously, guided by 
their instincts. In the instinct-determined world of animals there is no room for real freedom 
and consequently there is no room for real openness. In comparison to the openness of the 
animal to the surrounding parts of the world, to some things or aspects in the world, man's 
                                                 
27 In respect of our previous insights we must ask ourselves constantly whether we are ambushed and 
again apply nothing more than stereotypes and tautologies. I think, however, that there are instances when the 
subject matter is so obvious that all statements about it seem to be useless repetition of the same content. The 
description of self-evident truths, such as the description of world-openness, is therefore always “floating” and 
often useless. 
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world-openness includes some grasp of the temporal and spatial world in its totality, and 
beyond this to the whole cosmos, all visible and invisible things in it, and beyond all this, to 
being as such and thus to all being, finite and infinite, world and God. Grasping the totality, 
that springs from certain a priori directedness to the entirety of the material and spiritual 
aspects of the world, let alone the faculty of grasping the fullness of absolute being that 
precisely differs from the contingent world, is totally missing in the animal world. An animal 
– even if it interacts with the world at an incomparably higher speed compared to man, as for 
example in running, fighting, etc. – grasps or is concerned only with one particular or limited 
aspects of the totality. Man, on the other hand, has the faculty of grasping all beings (ta panta) 
rather than only some sphere of being. Furthermore, the proper object of man's openness is 
the absolute being and not only finite and contingent ones. 
 The openness that we can observe in the case of animals is not the main concern of our 
thesis. We cannot be satisfied with this somewhat minimized view of world-openness; we 
have to penetrate into the full meaning of the phenomenon. What we can say at this point is 
that the animal openness – that is, an impersonal being’s – openness is not the phenomenon 
we are looking for and precisely lacks the aspect of totality in personal world-openness.  
 Nevertheless, concerning the nature of world-openness, we are somewhat in the same 
situation as Saint Augustine found himself in his Confessions. He was perplexed by the 
fundamental, but at the same time trivial and seemingly “simple” question concerning the 
essence of time. He was unable to answer the question, although according to his preliminary 
and pre-philosophical understanding he ought to have been able to give a response. Now, the 
same goes for the phenomenon of world-openness. If no one asks what it is, we know what it 
is. But, if someone wants to know the essence of world-openness, we don’t know the answer 
and become acutely aware that giving expression to the essence of a thing in an explicit 
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philosophical prise de conscience is a far more complicated enterprise than having a first 
naïve experience and conception of it. 
There is a huge difference here, however. Time is a fundamental and clearly 
identifiable datum which all of us know in a pre-philosophical way and of which all human 
beings speak daily. World-openness is spoken of only by a few philosophers and is a very 
“young” term; it refers, as we have already said, to a great variety of things and therefore 
cannot be compared to the clear and fundamental data, and consequently ought to be 
approached with greatest caution. 
Nevertheless, one point should be clear: preliminary understandings – independently 
of how primitive they could be in respect of philosophical eloquence – help us to get closer to 
the phenomenon. Moreover, we are not able to formulate one single meaningful statement 
concerning phenomena of any kind, if we do not refer to our pre-philosophical understanding 
of them. Even the opening sentences of this section – and as a matter of fact, of all 
phenomenological analyses – are meaningless and miss the point if we don’t give credit to 
pre-scientific understandings. Thus we simply know that the world-openness is “one 
fundamental characteristic of human beings”, and that this characteristic has much more to do 
with human beings than animals, and, as a matter of fact, serves to distinguish them. As in the 
case of time in Augustine, we are in contact with the problem through everyday experience. 
What I am trying to develop here concerning the everyday experience of the phenomenon of 
world-openness is somewhat similar to Heidegger's theory of “average everydayness”. 
Heidegger in his “Being and Time” says that man or Dasein exists in an ordinary and 
undifferentiated way during most of his lifetime. It is, however, in its simple way, an 
authentic relation. Heidegger's main project, that is, uncovering the essential structure of 
Dasein, can be done in different ways. The analysis of Dasein's everydayness serves as one 
path for it. According to Heidegger, in our everyday lives the being-in-the-world, that is (if I 
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might put it in this way) our original openness to the world, already possesses some vague 
and average understanding of the totality.28 I think we can fully agree with Heidegger, that 
everydayness and everyday experience can provide a certain type of knowledge, which is 
fragmented and partial, but can be conceived as genuine access to the things themselves. It 
seems sometimes that this knowledge is poor and insufficient. However, it is enough to start a 
serious investigation. Though this first-hand knowledge is still not complete, the use of it is 
similar to the knowledge of using a computer by a child. The child does not know the 
constitutive elements of that device, but, in spite of this, he can use it quite well. A simple use 
and a reduced reflection of this use, however, cannot satisfy us. It is therefore necessary to 
carry out a profound philosophical inquiry exceeding – and in this sense incorporating – all 
naïve understandings, even if those naïve understandings can provide true insights concerning 
the very essence of the phenomenon. We have to step therefore behind the child and explain 
to him step by step the real nature of the object of his everyday concern. 
 The phenomenon of world-openness, however, is not a crystal clear phenomenon. It 
does not stand before us in an immediately intellectually graspable lucidity. On the other 
hand, it is not totally unclear either. The term being unclear or compound has at least two 
distinct meanings. By the concept “being unclear” I do not mean only the composite nature of 
a phenomenon in the sense that it would require extremely hard work to unfold its meaningful 
structure. There are many phenomena in the world, which are also of a compound nature; 
nevertheless, I do not think that all of them bear a philosophical relevance. There are human 
phenomena such as the reading of a philosophically relevant book, which are of compound 
nature and seem to have some kind of philosophical relevance. The reading of a book (even if 
it is on a philosophical topic) from the viewpoint of the act of reading, however, bears no 
                                                 
28 “Accordingly, Dasein's 'average everydayness' can be defined as 'Being-in-the-world' which is falling 
and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its own most potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both its 
Being alongside the »world« and in its 'Being-with-others'.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, New York: 
Harper & Row, 1962: 225.  
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philosophical relevance whatsoever except inasmuch as it leads us beyond the text to the 
things themselves of which the text speaks, not even if the action is in connection with a 
human being, which would suggest that it has at least an anthropological importance. 
Nevertheless, it would be an enormous task to describe adequately and give a full account on 
the phenomenon of reading. No doubt one could do that and could formulate sound 
statements about it, but philosophically it would hardly have any significance. It follows that 
it is not the complexity that defines what is philosophically significant and what is not.  
 There is, however, another meaning of the complexity and the concept of “being 
unclear”, which certainly deserves more attention. In my view, there is also a phenomenon 
that we can call philosophical complexity. It seems however that the primary objects of 
philosophy are simple and immediately graspable phenomena, whereas complex phenomena 
bear less philosophical value. Dietrich von Hildebrand says in his book on the nature of 
Philosophy, that Philosophy is distinct from other sciences in the sense that it has a proper 
method and object. He says: “The object of philosophy is primarily of an apriori nature. A 
specific characteristic of philosophical knowledge is its principal aim, namely, to discover 
apriori and not empirical states of facts.”29 He characterized the object of a priori 
philosophical knowledge as having (1) “strict intrinsic necessity” and (2) “incomparable 
intelligibility” and a priori philosophical knowledge itself as possessing (3) “absolute 
certainty”.  
 Now, according to this scheme, it seems that complex phenomena are not really 
genuine objects of a philosophical inquiry. Above we said that the phenomenon of world-
openness is complex. The main problem, however, with the phenomenon of world-openness 
is not that it is complex, but it might be that the term a) refers to a whole series of quite 
different phenomena and b) that perhaps none of them is entirely “clear” or possesses a 
                                                 
29 Hildebrand, D. von, What is Philosophy? Milwaukee: Routledge, 1991: 63. 
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necessary essence or that it is at least hard to find. Nevertheless, independently of the 
complexity of a phenomenon, if – after a careful phenomenological investigation – it really 
turns out to be philosophically meaningful, valuable and important, there is no doubt that the 
topic in question is of authentic philosophical nature. It is true that a philosopher regarding the 
objects he investigates strives for an absolute certainty, and wishes to comprehend something 
characterized by strict intrinsic necessity and incomparable intelligibility.30 Nonetheless, in 
case of a complex and hardly identifiable worldly phenomenon, it seems that we have to 
prescind from the above mentioned characteristics of the nature of real, a priori philosophical 
knowledge or at least not remain silent about this phenomenon because we have not yet 
reached ultimate clarity of understanding it. I think that the complexity of a phenomenon 
shouldn't hinder us from penetrating the object as deeply as we can. As a matter of fact, if we 
do not make an attempt and complete the intellectual unfolding of a complex phenomenon, 
we do not even know whether it was of philosophical or non-philosophical significance. 
Moreover, examples of great philosophers of past centuries show that there is hardly any 
immediate achievement in the history of philosophical reasoning. Great and valuable thoughts 
are most of all the result of yearlong or lifelong serious thinking. The “laborious way of self-
knowledge” (to world-openness) is not an instantaneous project, but requires huge efforts. In 
case of complex phenomena, I think that the point of philosophical reasoning is the same as it 
is in the case of the a priori knowledge. Therefore, I claim that in pursuing the 
phenomenological investigation, the task of the philosopher is to tell whether some or none of 
the elements of the phenomenon (or the phenomenon itself) bear the characteristic of strict 
necessity, certainty and intelligibility or not. Only after clarifying this can we take into 
consideration the possible philosophical significance of a phenomenon. This requires the 
deepest intellectual seriousness and perseverance and involves the whole being of the 
                                                 
30 This does not exclude, however, that less contingent essences cannot be the objects of a philosophical 
investigation. See: Josef Seifert, Discours des Méthodes. The Methods of Philosophy and Realist 
Phenomenology. Frankfurt / Paris / Ebikon / Lancaster / New Brunswick: Ontos-Verlag, 2009.  
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philosopher. This insight completely corresponds to one of the main concerns of the 
phenomenological movement, namely the re-definition of thinking.31 Consequently, we have 
to take the risk of finding the way back to appropriate thinking. In my view “finding the way 
back to thinking” means to destroy and reconstruct all what genuine philosophy and its 
objects are, that is, our task is dubitando ad veritatem pervenire. Therefore, distinctions, 
specifications, analyses, argumentations and comparisons in this thesis will serve only one 
purpose: to answer the question whether the term of World-openness refers to a whole series 
of quite different phenomena, and to tell which of them is “clear” or possesses a necessary 
essence and finally to tell what is the proper understanding of the phenomenon of man’s 
World-openness. 
 Not every phenomenon of the world around us deserves philosophical attention. In 
addition, there are aspects and interpretations of different phenomena, which are also not of a 
philosophical nature, although the phenomenon can have philosophical significance in 
another respect. Following this train of thought, however, we can say that there are aspects, 
interpretations and forms of a phenomenon, which are eminently philosophical. We see 
immediately, for example, that the phenomenon of driving a car or riding a horse has no 
appreciable philosophical aspect. Of course we can talk analogically about the “philosophy” 
of horseback riding and we can formulate philosophically meaningful sentences using 
analogies concerning the richness of the beauty of horseback riding, but the phenomenon still 
does not lend itself to being a suitable object of philosophical investigation.  
 I consider the phenomenon of world-openness a multi-faceted though philosophically 
meaningful phenomenon. In itself, the phenomenon of world-openness can have bad and 
good, less bad and less good interpretations, i.e., descriptions. At the beginning of our 
phenomenological analysis of world-openness it seems reasonable to tell which of the 
                                                 
31 I indicated this in the introduction of the thesis. 
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interpretations I consider to be good and philosophically more significant than other 
interpretations. Without doing this, the phenomenon of world-openness remains ambiguous 
and we will get lost in the different (and many times contradictory) meanings of the 
phenomenon and phenomena, which are so alike to the true phenomenon of world-openness 
that we can become disorientated.   
 Since entities of the world do not constitute independent universes, it's obvious that a 
phenomenon could bear resemblance to numberless similar phenomena, which in one way or 
another can have something in common. For example, in the phenomenological investigation 
of the phenomenon of spousal love one has to investigate – among others – the phenomena of 
friendship, sexual desire and many other phenomena, which have something in common with, 
or are related in some – even in negative – ways to, spousal love. One has to analyze the 
common and distinct characteristics and the relation between things in order to have an 
insight into what the essences of spousal love and other forms of love are. Now, the 
realization of this whole process comprises the investigation of numerous different forms of 
love. The method of phenomenology therefore can be considered – as Max Scheler puts it – a 
“genuine positivism”,32 or – as Dietrich von Hildebrand says – an “empiricism of essences”. 
The enumeration of similar phenomena, however, cannot go ad infinitum. Now, returning to 
our example, it wouldn't make any sense to study the phenomenon of the fad of stamp-
collecting as one form of the appearance of love. Including all the phenomena with minor 
resemblance to the original problem of spousal love would make a phenomenology of spousal 
love an endless and hopeless endeavor. The examination of the phenomenon of the fad for 
stamp-collecting is pointless from the aspect of the problem of spousal love, since it doesn't 
add anything to the clarification of the phenomenon in question. There are minor 
                                                 
32 See Max Scheler, “Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition” in: Max Scheler, Selected 
Philosopical Essays. Evaston: Northwestern University Press, 1973: 138: “The 'ray' of reflection should try to 
touch only what is 'there' in the closest and most living contact and only so far as it is there. In this sense, but 
only in this, phenomenological philosophy is the most radical empiricism and positivism.” 
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commonalities in the phenomenon of spousal love and the fad for stamp-collecting, since both 
have an object, both can be considered as an attitude, both have a temporal and spatial 
duration, and so on and so forth, but essentially – which would necessitate a generic 
similarity, as for example we can see it in the example of spousal love and friendship – they 
do not share common points. However, the most important difference is that the phenomenon 
of spousal love has philosophical relevance and significance, whereas the phenomenon of the 
fad for stamp-collecting has not, at least not inasmuch as it is the specific stamp-collector’s 
fad rather than being considered just as the phenomenon of fad as such, which also has some, 
though perhaps minimal, philosophical relevance. In other words, the phenomenon of spousal 
love has a philosophically graspable and understandable essence; it is philosophically 
significant. 
 There is another typical error that a phenomenologist can commit, when he supposes 
that there exists a philosophically meaningful essence, when in reality there is no such 
phenomenon. The existence of the notion (Begriff) of a thing does not necessary mean that 
there also is found a real essence of the thing.  
 There are two basic forms of this kind of error. The first form is when man speaks 
about an irreal or even impossible Idea (pseudo-“phenomenon”) as if it existed in reality. The 
concept of “classless society” or the idea of “tolerance as genuine substitution of love” are 
examples of the first kind of error.33 I think, however, in all these cases there can be found a 
philosophical contradiction between the state of affairs and the corresponding propositions. In 
other words, although these statements are grammatically well-formed, they are in re 
intrinsically impossible. It is a common error of philosophers and thinkers34 of all times, 
                                                 
33  I think philosophically one can never argue for a classless (or in other words, non-divided) society, except 
perhaps in some transcendent, heavenly world, and even less of tolerance as a substitution of love, which is 
eternally impossible. These ideas are self-contradictions.  
34 Nowadays especially politicians, political scientists and pseudo-philosophers commit this error. They 
are near similar to the Sophists of the ancient Greek society. 
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especially of our time, that they speak about non-existing phenomena, which do not exist in 
reality or are not even possible phenomena but contain inherent contradictions.35  
 The other form of the error which a phenomenologist can commit is when he 
philosophically speaks about phenomena which have no philosophical significance 
whatsoever. In this case, the phenomenon investigated can have real existence and can even 
be a highly interesting problem, but be lacking in those components that make its exploration 
philosophically meaningful. Both cases can be considered as special instances of what 
Wittgenstein called a language game. I think, Wittgenstein's vision36 concerning the 
potentiality of the free use of notions, which as a matter of fact can constitute a “new tower of 
Babel”,37 is true. We can create new, independent universes only by the simple use of words. 
The significance of this observation in respect of our theme is that this is precisely the 
symptom we have to avoid, namely, speaking about a phenomenon that does not exist. To 
sum up, we can say that the existence of a notion does not guarantee the real existence of the 
notion as a phenomenon, nor that it possesses a philosophical relevance. It is therefore one of 
the preliminary requirements of the investigation of the phenomenon of world-openness to 
assume that it is an authentic and hence detectable objective phenomenon. 
 We have to emphasize the importance of the aforementioned statement, since in the 
case of the phenomenon of world-openness one might think, at first sight, that this is not a 
real phenomenon, and, because of its usage in common language, which is very different from 
its philosophical use, it has no philosophical significance whatsoever. Due to its everyday 
usage, the concept of world-openness, when confused with its philosophical and essential 
anthropological meaning, can lead to a misleading understanding of the term. In its everyday 
usage it means a certain type of open-mindedness. In everyday usage a “world-open” person 
                                                 
35  This mistake is committed also by earlier thinkers, for example by Kant when he speaks of the transcendental 
ego or the transencental deduction.  
36 Or see Rudof Carnap’s remarks on the notion of ’babig’. 
37 I borrow this term from Dietrich von Hildebrand. 
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is, for example, one who is willing to accept or tolerate different cultural goods. With the 
notion of world-openness we refer to someone being open to the cultural goods, or to one who 
is able to adjust himself quickly to different situations. We call a person open-minded or 
world-open who is willing to consider new ideas and contemplates without prejudice the 
values (or disvalues) of a thing or a person. Nowadays, we say that a person is open to the 
world when he travels a lot and visits exotic places with an open mind and ready to recognize 
their value though they are entirely different from what is used from home.  
 In certain ways, especially nowadays, world-openness has become a synonym for 
tolerance in the common language. Now, according to its definition (tolerance is a policy of 
patient forbearance in the presence of something that is disliked or disapproved of), tolerance 
may be far from an ideal policy, since it contains the acceptance, or at least the silence or even 
permission of something which is not only believed to be wrong but which at times ought not 
be tolerated by an individual or by the law. I think, however, that this kind of view of the 
phenomenon of world-openness is – from our point of view – a complete misunderstanding 
and leads us astray, at least in the sense that it withholds the realization of a true 
phenomenological investigation of a radically different phenomenon. Such a distorted or 
limited view of world-openness cannot satisfy us; it is especially poor for a strict 
philosophical analysis. The meaning of world-openness that I am going to use throughout the 
thesis has nothing to do with this common usage of the word. 
The second preliminary main characteristic of world-openness is, besides the fact that 
we consider it a phenomenon and not a notion, its presumptive philosophical character. I 
claim therefore that world-openness can be investigated in its ultimate reason and principle, 
and by the same token, this knowledge is acquired by the aid of human intellect alone.  
 Thirdly, it seems to be useful to try to define the “subject” of world-openness. By the 
term subject I mean the being, who or that can be the bearer of the characteristic of world-
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openness. Now, at the beginning of our speculations we already possess the preliminary 
insight that world-openness is exclusively a personal phenomenon and cannot be attributed to 
impersonal beings. The preliminary understanding of world-openness suggests that non-
human animals or things cannot be open towards the world as, for example, human beings 
can. Moreover, we also know that this difference is not only a quantitative one. At the first 
sight it seems that impersonal beings, such as animals, possess (in terms of quantity) “less” 
openness than human beings. Since animals can move, hunt, hide themselves, use different 
signs in communication, have numerous interactions with the world, or even fly, we have the 
impression that they are also open to the world, and there is only a quantitative difference 
between man and animals. In case of unmoving entities however the question of being open to 
the world doesn't even arise. It's clear for us that stones, books, elements and objects are 
incapable of interactions, therefore, they are not open to the world. In other words, they do not 
possess the character of openness, except in completely different ways such as the “openness” 
of clay to receive any form, or the sense in which Aristotle attributes to prime matter a kind of 
infinite “openness to all forms,” but it is obvious that here we speak of entirely different 
things connected only through some distant and vague analogies.  
From the aspect of immovable entities, we immediately see that we can speak only 
analogously about the openness of all impersonal beings. The capability of changing position, 
the interaction framed by instincts, the apparent freedom and apparent sophistication of 
behavior-patterns do not enable animals to be open to the world in its real sense as a man can. 
Animals, as impersonal beings, though they are certainly “closer” to persons than all other 
kinds of impersonal beings, cannot be considered being (world-)open in the true sense of the 
term because of their restricted access to reality. (Here we again applied Scheler’s distinction 
between the world (Welt) of man and the surroundings (Umwelt) of animals and claimed that 
animals have access only to their surroundings, which is only a limited access in comparison 
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to man’s access to the world.) Consequently, the character of being open to the world can be 
attributed only to conscious, personal beings. It means that the bearer of the character of 
world- and God-openness can be either man or angel, or both. In my view, since both are 
conscious, personal beings, they are both world- and God-open. The reason why, in spite of 
this, I say that world-openness is principally a human characteristic is because of the bodily 
existence of the human being. Existing in a body is an exceptional status. Angels – and on this 
occasion let us accept the existence of angels – are pure spirits, i.e. self-subsistent forms, and 
they are completely incorporeal and have no bodies of any kind.38 In this sense, they have less 
interaction with the actual world – whatever it is in its proper meaning – than human beings 
have.39 In consequence of this, their openness to, and interaction with, the world is no doubt 
different from the one human beings have. Given their much higher natural knowledge of 
God, they are no doubt by nature much more capable of God-openness than we, and no doubt 
are open to, and interact with, the deepest realms of the world, other angels and human souls 
in ways in which we cannot do so. As they also know all material beings much more 
consciously and deeply than we, they are by nature more capable of being related to the world 
as a whole. Moreover, while they obviously do not regularly speak or interact with human 
beings in the ways we are able to do so, they interact in other respects more profoundly with 
the human beings whom they protect and know better than we know them. At least many 
religious persons believe that they are also present in a more perfect way in our moral and 
religious acts than the average human person is. Therefore, if angels exist, they are certainly 
not less able to be world-open and to transcend a mere environment and hence cannot be said 
to be less world-open than we. 
Nonetheless, there are certain forms and appearances of the world wherewith they 
never interact. Therefore, I think that we have to lay emphasis not only on the factual 
                                                 
38 See Saint Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia 50,2 
39 Or, at least, we don’t know the degree of their interaction with this world. 
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existence of the world in the discussion about world-openness but also on the material and 
bodily part of this world and the access to it inasmuch as it presupposes the human body. 
Man’s unique place in nature also comprises man’s unique access to this world. In a certain 
sense we can consider this feature as perfection, as for example martyrdom, which man can 
possess but angels cannot. The reason why I consider world-openness principally a human 
feature has to do precisely with man’s this-worldly and his bodily character. It is natural for 
humans to know through their bodies, and for their souls to enliven their bodies. Angels, on 
the other hand, are pure intellects and not naturally united to a body. Consequently, angels 
know things in a way that is radically different from how humans act and know.40 Now, 
knowing things through the body and being related in many other forms to the body can be 
considered as part of the specific human form of world-openness in which the bodily aspect of 
the human being plays an indispensable role. 
 Fourthly, in its preliminary sense of world-openness we usually refer to an object 
having or showing a higher quality of character. Even in its common usage we presuppose 
that it has a certain direction, which we are open to, and this direction must be, on the one 
hand, something that is extrinsic to man, and on the other hand, something having a certain 
value which man does not possess. The fourth preliminary characteristic of world-openness is 
therefore that it portrays man as a being of lack. Man has countless exceptional 
characteristics, but his whole worldly life is about to achieve higher forms of these 
characteristics. For example, I think we can agree that man is intelligent, but always has to 
strive for higher and higher regions of understanding: he wants to know, to acquire always 
more and more knowledge. In this sense man is open to higher forms of intelligence, or, 
putting it negatively, man is lacking of full intelligence. At the same time, however, our 
world-openness reveals that man in a certain sense already possesses implicitly the totality of 
                                                 
40 See ST Ia 51,1 
 45 
being. By this I mean that man, in spite of his deficiencies and contingent nature, is a 
microcosm. Man is a microcosm, but not in the sense that man would be the homunculus that 
is a tiny pattern of the astronomical universe, but in a traditional philosophical sense, which 
says that although man is only one creature among the many, he is predisposed to know or at 
least to reflect the totality. In this sense we can say that world-openness is the chance or 
opportunity to recover man's worldly imperfections. By the use of the notion “being of lack” I 
mean, that affirming man's openness, we at the same time affirm his deficiency and 
imperfection. Man, being a “creature of defect” (as Arnold Gehlen called man Mängelwesen 
or homo inermis41), calls for an “object” or “objects” to fulfill his shortcomings. To a first 
approximation, this object is indefinite, because man has countless faculties, orientations, 
talents, abilities, etc., which all have their different objects. Insofar as man is a deficient being 
(Mängelwesen), he is a creature of openness (Offenheitskreatur) as well as an object-and aim-
directed being (Finalitätswesen). 
 Fifthly, there is a preliminary meaning of world-openness, which is related again to its 
final direction and object. The deficiency of the being of man and his desire to overcome this 
deficiency shows that the object of his openness must have the character of the fullness of 
being, which satisfies all his needs and imperfections. But certainly the – physical-, social-, 
object-, or any other kind of particular “world” and even the entire world alone as possible 
object cannot fulfill that desire. 
Let me remark that this view of openness utterly differs from the notion of 
Mängelwesen developed by classical German philosophy, shared by Kant, Hegel, Marx and 
many others. Namely, according to them, the idea of Mängelwesen means preeminently a 
negative trait: man is a being lacking characters, which others, such as animals, can have. 
These philosophers defined man in contrast to animals and animality. For example, according 
                                                 
41 See Arnold Gehlen, Der Mensch: seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt. Frankfurt am Main: 
Athenäum, 1966: 37. (There are other available translations of the term Mängelwesen: being with shortcomings, 
deficient being, etc.) 
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to Nietzsche, man is an “unfinished animal”. In contrast to this view, world-openness is 
something positive in the sense of expressing man's capability and striving to transcend his 
deficiencies. The notion of Mängelwesen refers to the unfinished nature of man; it depicts 
man as a finite and underdetermined being. Considerations about the phenomenon of real 
openness, however, emphasize that this incompleteness can be overcome and provides an 
organic definition of man. Man is not only a negative, but structurally a positive being, even if 
this positive character is in progress (in the sense that man is an organic unity) and hasn't 
reached its end point.  
 Man's openness does not stop at particular beings and objects. Entities of particular 
character solely in themselves cannot justify world-openness. Partial opennesses, such as for 
example being open to another person, who, by giving good advice helps one to avoid a 
trouble or mistake, refers only to particular outcome of the object of the advice. Or, I can be 
open to and I can accept, for example, the points of a lecture given by a professor, 
nevertheless this openness refers only to a particular object, namely to the points of the 
lecture. Beyond particularities, however, world-openness, as a human characteristic, aims at 
the highest and final object. In my understanding therefore, the ultimate object of a real 
(world-)openness must be an ultimately reasonable being, that is, God. We call, therefore, the 
ultimate understanding of world-openness ‘God-directedness’. My thesis is that the 
interpretation of world-openness as God-directedness provides the full understanding of the 
phenomenon. I keep defending this thesis in spite of criticisms that point out the infinite 
superiority of God to the world and who therefore hold that the world-openness is an entirely 
different phenomenon distinct from God-openness. I can fully accept the first part of their 
proposal, but not the second one, because I consider the phenomenon of world-openness as 
general, not specified (from the point of view of its object) openness and God-openness as its 
most important interpretation. On the other hand, however, I will argue in the next chapters 
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(see chapter 2.4. and Conclusion) that my understanding is philosophically meaningful and 
more valuable in contrast to other interpretations. The main difference between my 
understanding of the phenomenon of world-openness and the understanding of Gehlen, 
Plessner and Portmann, is that they give a physicalist interpretation of the phenomenon of 
world-openness. In my view, however, the physicalist interpretation is inadequate and fails to 
do justice to the proprium of man. 
 Now, this understanding of the phenomenon of world-openness involves another 
question, namely, are we right to give a religious interpretation to the phenomenon of world-
openness? John F. Crosby gives a very simple answer to this question. He says, 
If we hold on other grounds [...] that God exists and we human persons are 
grounded in God, then it becomes natural to recognize in the sense of 
infinity conditioning our experience of things a certain presence of God in 
our conscious lives.42  
 
It seems that the theistic reading of our sense of infinity is the only reasonable reading of it if 
we are consistent.43 Based on a very simple and elemental observation of man's vulnerable 
and self-unsatisfactory nature, we have arrived at a fundamental insight of all philosophical 
anthropologies of openness: this is the affirmation of man's peculiar (incomparably higher 
than animals and any other impersonal creatures) place in nature, which, however, calls for a 
higher, extrinsic completion. All those philosophies that disregarded this aspect fell into the 
philosophical trap of hybris. Understanding man’s vulnerability and his openness has been of 
tremendous importance since the first appearance of man, since man himself can overestimate 
and misunderstand his vocation and essence. Man himself can overestimate – that is to deny – 
his openness conceiving himself omnipotent as well as man is disposed to overstep his 
grandeur. When man tries to rival God or gods he falls into the trap of hybris. As a matter of 
fact, if I might use a theological analogy, hybris was in the same way the origin of the sin of 
                                                 
42 Crosby, John F: The Selfhood of the Human Person. Washington: D. C. The Catholic University of America 
Press, 1996: 164. 
43 See ibidem 
 48 
the fall. Philosophies of openness, however, are optimistic about the nature of man, namely 
holding man's openness is neither overestimation nor underestimation, but a realist acceptance 
of man's place in nature. As Hildebrand puts it: “Man is not a self-sufficient being. The true 
nature of man can be understood only when we grasp his metaphysical situation and his being 
ordered toward God.”44 Later Hildebrand says that this is transcendence and man’s 
transcendence is a “fundamental fact”. This fundamental fact means that man is able to 
communicate with something more comprehensive than himself. Hildebrand identifies this 
“something greater” with God and says: “The metaphysical situation of man is characterized 
by the great dialogue between man and God.”45 It’s true, man’s openness is for something and 
points to something. Without acknowledging the God-directedness of man’s openness, we can 
easily lose sight of our original vocation. The reading of man’s openness deprived from its 
proper object and direction results in a distorted picture of man. The man being deprived of 
God is like a Zombie. This man is a monster – without direction, aims, tasks, and religion. 
This man is, as a matter of fact, full of hatred and, in absolutizing some finite good, of some 
form of superstition.46 
 Sixthly, we understand world-openness in its preliminary meaning not only as a 
structural feature of human beings, or as a simple capacity or possibility, but also as an 
attitude. According to the classical philosophical definition, attitude is a mental state of 
approval or disapproval, favoring or disfavoring and is associated with emotion and feeling. 
In the classical philosophies the term attitude generally designates any mental disposition of a 
being for or against something or of taking an approving or disapproving, a positive or 
negative stance towards it. According to this scheme, attitude is concerned with evaluation 
                                                 
44 Dietrich von Hildebrand, “The New Tower of Babel.” In: Dietrich von Hildebrand: The New Tower of Babel. 
London: Burns & Oates, 1953: 22 
45 Dietrich von Hildebrand, op.cit. 23. 
46 Hildebrand puts it in this way: “The one who wants to shake off the sacred bond of absolute truth will 
inevitably fall into the web of the most naïve, uncritical, not to say superstitious, worship of unfounded 
opinions.” Dietrich von Hildebrand, op.cit. 19. 
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and emotional response and comprises also temporality. In this interpretation attitudes can 
change temporally: sometimes an attitude disappears, sometimes it emerges, even if in this 
understanding of attitudes, for example of the fundamental moral attitude (Grundhaltung) or 
the fundamental moral attitudes of virtues and vices we find that they may possess a 
formative and lasting, superactual presence in the person rather than coming and going. But 
even here they can eventually change, for example in a becoming evil of a good person and in 
the conversion of an evil person. 
I think, however, that there is another interpretation of the notion of attitude that does 
not belong so much to the moral life of free or affective attitudes and stances but to the 
intellectual sphere. In the phenomenological movement there were many philosophers who 
held that the proper understanding of philosophy consists in a certain type of change of 
attitude. Among them, it was Adolf Reinach who described this change with an exceptional 
clarity in his short essay entitled “Concerning Phenomenology”. According to Adolf Reinach 
phenomenology is a special “way of seeing” and “attitude” incomparable with the observation 
of natural sciences. Sometimes he also speaks of a phenomenological method rather than of a 
phenomenological attitude. He says: 
For the essential point is this, that phenomenology is not a matter of a 
system of philosophical propositions and truths – a system of propositions in 
which all who call themselves »Phenomenologists« must believe, and which 
I could here prove to you – but rather it is a method of philosophizing which 
is required by the problems of philosophy.47 
 
According to Reinach, there are numerous kinds of attitudes. There are two, which are 
discussed in detail in this essay. There is, for example, the attitude peculiar to the natural 
sciences, and there is the attitude peculiar to philosophical objects. These real philosophical 
objects require a certain phenomenological, that is, essence-concentrating or essence-intuiting 
attitude. Only within the framework of this attitude can we concentrate on the “things in 
                                                 
47 Adolf Reinach, op. cit. 194. 
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themselves”. It means that with the help of “epoché”48 one can get an intellectual intuition of 
the “essences” of the observed things. With this Wesensschau one can discover truths which 
are a priori and not a posteriori; truths, which are neither based on empirical experiences, nor 
causal analysis.49 
 Dietrich von Hildebrand also developed a profound understanding of attitudes. 
Hildebrand claims that there is nothing higher among natural values than moral values. As a 
second step he says, that only man can behave morally in the proper sense of the word.50 
Now, for Hildebrand the question poses itself: how can man participate in values?51 In his 
answer, Hildebrand refers to man's freedom and introduces the notion of attitude. Concerning 
attitudes he says, that 
they can grow out of conscious, free attitudes; man himself must essentially 
cooperate for their realization. They can only develop through his 
conscious, free abandonment of himself to genuine values. In proportion to 
man's capacity to grasp values, in so far as he sees the fullness of the world 
of values with a clear and fresh vision, in so far as his abandonment to this 
world is pure and unconditional, will he be rich in moral values.52 
 
In his view attitude is the disposition of grasping interesting and valuable things in 
themselves.53 This, however, requires an exceptional effort from man, namely, the rejection of 
                                                 
48  According to Josef Seifert there are four senses of epoché, which one has to take into account here: 1. 
prescinding from real existence in the context of essential analysis. 2. phenomenological reduction as suspension 
of belief in the 'transcendent existence' of the world. 3. phenomenological reduction. 4. suspension of 
transcendence not only of existence but of 'Wesensgesetze' as well. See Josef Seifert, Back to the ‘Things in 
Themselves’. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism. New York and London: Routledge, 1987: 
II. Part 2.  
49  Or see Dietrich von Hildebrand: “What is also new in phenomenology is its emphasis on the 
existential, immediate intuitive contact with the object, in opposition to any abstractionism or any dealing with 
mere concepts.” Dietrich von Hildebrand, What is Philosophy?, London and New York: Routledge 1991: 224. 
50 See Dietrich von Hildebrand, Fundamental Moral Attitudes, New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1950. pp. 
1-2. 
51 Basically he distinguishes three modes of this participation. See for more in Dietrich von Hildebrand, The 
Modes of Participation in Value, in: International Philosophical Quarterly. New York. Vol. I. Nr. 1. 1961. pp. 
58-84. 
52 Dietrich von Hildebrand Fundamental Moral Attitudes, New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1950. pp. 2-3. 
53 Of course this is a simplificated generalization of his deep thoughts on moral attitudes. His philosophically 
much deeper analysis is in Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis. Eine Untersuchung über ethische 
Strukturprobleme. Habilitationsschrift. (München: Bruckmann, 1918), vollständig abgedruckt in: Jahrbuch für 
Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Band 5. Halle: Niemeyer. 1922. S. 462-602. Sonderdruck der 
Habilitationsschrift, ebd. 1921. Reprint Vols. 3-6 (1916-1923) 1989. Bad Feilnbach 2: Schmidt Periodicals; 2. 
Auflage (unveränderter reprographischer Nachdruck, zusammen mit der Dissertation Die Idee der sittlichen 
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his selfish and auto-oriented concerns. According to Hildebrand, a really virtuous man, 
having developed the right attitude, won't by-pass values and won't leave them unanswered.54 
 This is precisely the profound meaning, which we would like to apply here to world-
openness and which clearly differs from other philosophical concepts of attitude. There are 
two main points which I would like to emphasize here. The first is that world-openness as 
“attitude”, in contrast to the classical definition, is not only a mental attitude. In our 
preliminary understanding we have to see, that world-openness comprises the whole of the 
person and not only single distinct acts or mental states. The sense of the notion of world-
openness, what I would like to use, is not like the restricted openness of a child for example, 
who might be open to the story of a tale and listens to it attentively. We are open to the world 
in its totality and not only in few aspects of this totality, and with our totality as spiritual 
persons, not just with this or that single act.  
 The second peculiarity which characterizes world-openness as an “attitude”, is its 
independence from particular short spans of time as those during which, for example, a head-
ache or pain in the finger last. While this is also true of superactual attitudes, such as virtue 
and vices, what we call world-openness is even more independent of temporal change.55 For 
while superactual attitudes like goodness, faithfulness, veracity, etc., are temporal in the sense 
that they can be generated and cease to be in time, openness is not temporal in this sense, 
since it stems from the ontological structure of man. For example the attitude of faithfulness 
might be the subject of temporal change: from a certain point on it appears, at a certain point 
in time it can cease to be. Even in an “everlasting love”, since it also has a beginning, that is a 
                                                                                                                                                        
Handlung), , hrsg. v. der Dietrich-von-Hildebrand-Gesellschaft (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 
1969), S. 126-266; 3., durchgesehene Auflage (Vallendar-Schönstatt: Patris Verlag, 1982) 
54 A good thematization of Hildebrand’s ideas on value-response are found in the first chapter of his book on the 
nature of love. Dietrich von Hildebrand, The Nature of Love. South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2009.  
55 My understanding of the attitudes’ independence from temporality is similar to the views as that of Dietrich 
von Hildebrand. Hildebrand calls attention to the superactual character of many personal attitudes, and notes the 
importance of superactual existence for the depth and continuity of personal life. He says, however, that attitudes 
having a superactual character still take place in time and form in time. This notion is amply developed in 
Dietrich von Hildebrand’s Christian Ethics, 2nd edition (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978) Chapter 17.  
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terminus a quo, the attitude of faithfulness bears the character of temporality. World-
openness, though more properly speaking the structural, ontological one than the attitude, on 
the other hand, is in some sense simply there, even if it is realized in a reduced or partial or 
even in a totally repressed form.  
Taking into consideration this difference, it seems reasonable in regard to the first of 
these phenomena not to speak about the attitude of openness, since it is not an attitude at all. 
Moreover, inasmauch as it is an attitude, it is not simply one among the many, but rather a 
very peculiar and a kind of attitude that is only somewhat similar to other attitudes. In the 
conclusion of the thesis, we shall sharply distinguish between a kind of metaphysical world-
openness or God-openness which is constitutive for a person and hence always there by 
nature, and the attitude of world-openness. Now, it seems that here we have developed a third 
meaning of world-openness, since our characterization suggests that this phenomenon is 
neither an attitude nor a constitutive trait of human being (but perhaps rather both at the same 
time). Without going into detailed discussion of this trait, I would say that the underivable 
character of world-openness is due to is being an arch-phenomenon. Max Scheler said that 
arch-phenomena have “genuine essences” and possess an irreducible and original identity. 
Now, I think that in the search of the irreducible and original identity of the phenomenon of 
world-openness an excursus like this is meaningful and valid until an essential definition (if 
there is such a definition) is found.  
 In the framework of the preliminary understanding of world-openness as an attitude 
that is different from the constitutive ontological openness of which we have spoken, we can 
say that openness is that by means of which man takes a position toward the world which 
opens his spiritual eyes and enables him to grasp not only neutral facts but also and primarily 
values. Moreover, it is only man who can realize moral values, and the proper “place” or root 
of their realization is his openness as attitude. The phenomenon of world-openness as attitude 
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is therefore essentially openness to values. In other words, this openness is the “basis” of the 
whole moral life, since it is precisely that which precedes all moral attitudes and thus also 
differs from what might be called the fundamental moral attitude or fundamental moral option 
and has more the character of a condition of the latter, being more a cognitive attitude than a 
moral one that has the character of a response. Openness, inasmuch as it is an attitude, is the 
indispensable presupposition of the attitude of goodness, generosity, patience, faithfulness, 
reverence, etc., etc. For example goodness presupposes openness in the sense that there is no 
other-directedness56 in goodness if man is not open to the other. The basic disposition of 
openness, as their presupposition, is present in every act of love and goodness57 independently 
of its factual awareness or realization.  
 Viewed from the very opposite of this attitude we can say that if man is incapable of 
any abandonment of the self, i.e., if he is closed, then he becomes the prisoner of his egoism 
and finally becomes blind to values. The value-blindness58 of man, in my view, arises first 
and foremost from his closedness. I consider a man to be absolutely closed when he 
approaches everything in the world with an unbearable bias and totally ignores the rest of the 
world. For this man there is only one person in the world, that is himself, and there is only one 
world: his world. This man sees in everything himself (his idol – which is himself – is his 
object) and with looks at things exclusively from under his spectacles. This man, as a matter 
of fact, is alone in the world, since it is himself who disqualifies and who is disqualified. In 
his negative attitude, he is unable to understand any thing in itself as it manifests itself. For 
this type of man there are no secrets, holy, hidden domains in the world. Everything is 
                                                 
56 Other-directedness is the core of the attitude of goodness.  
57 “Love is, as it were, flowing goodness, and goodness is the breath of love.” Dietrich von Hildebrand op. cit. p. 
62. 
58 The notion of value-blindness was coined by Max Scheler and later used by Dietrich von Hildebrand. The 
problem of value blindness has been discussed systematically in von Hildebrand's work, Sittlichkeit und ethische 
Werterkenntniss, Halle: M. Niemeyer, 1921 p. 24ff. 
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obvious and intellectually penetrable. Consequently, the man of closed attitude is unable to 
see the immeasurable fullness of values, which is beyond his own “horizon”.  
 There is another type of closedness of human attitudes, which is diametrically opposed 
to the original meaning of world-openness as attitude. This closedness, however, also results 
in value-blindness. Dietrich von Hildebrand characterizes this type of closedness as 
concupiscence. In his understanding this man is the one who, 
limits his interest to one thing: whether something is agreeable to him or 
not, whether it offers him satisfaction, whether or not it can be of any use to 
him. He sees in all things only that segment which is related to his 
accidental, immediate interest. Every being is, for him, but a means to his 
own selfish aim. He drags himself about eternally in the circle of his 
narrowness, and never succeeds in emerging from himself. Consequently, 
he also does not know the true and deep happiness which can only flow 
abandonment to true values, out of contact with what is in itself good and 
beautiful.59 
 
In my view, the man suffering from the second type of value-blindness is somewhat closer to 
the understanding of what we call values. At least he recognizes value to the extent that it is 
important for him, but only for him. This is the attitude of one-sided value-recognition, when, 
although one recognizes the value, one doesn't share it with others and seeks only that which 
is momentarily useful and pleasurable to oneself. Nevertheless, this is still value-blindness 
stemming from an attitude opposite to that of openness. In my view when a person utilizes 
values for his own purposes, we might call this kind of attitude ‘value-shortsightedness’. The 
man of ‘value-shortsightedness’ recognizes the exceptional character of the value, but 
disregards certain aspects of it, for example, the communal character of the value of love.60 
The man of ‘value-shortsightedness’ also gives no adequate answer to the value. 
                                                 
59 Dietrich von Hildebrand, op. cit. p. 8. 
60 Here, although I borrow his main term, I do not follow Dietrich von Hildebrand’s analysis in every aspect. On 
his four types of value blindness see Sittlichkeit und ethische Werterkenntnis. Eine Untersuchung über ethische 
Strukturprobleme. Habilitationsschrift. (München: Bruckmann, 1918), vollständig abgedruckt in: Jahrbuch für 
Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, Band 5. Halle: Niemeyer. 1922. S. 462-602. Sonderdruck der 
Habilitationsschrift, ebd. 1921. Reprint Vols. 3-6 (1916-1923) 1989. Bad Feilnbach 2: Schmidt Periodicals; 2. 
Auflage (unveränderter reprographischer Nachdruck, zusammen mit der Dissertation Die Idee der sittlichen 
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 In contrast to this closedness, openness is a permanent disposition to recognize 
something superior to one's pleasure and interest, and to be ready to subordinate and abandon 
oneself. Only openness yields contact with the world, and only openness provides real access 
to the world of values. Openness, therefore, is an indispensable presupposition for all forms of 
capacity for values and knowledge about them. Therefore, the requirement of a “conscious 
and free abandonment” is meaningless without an antecedent openness.  
 Only openness can be the real framework of the recognition and realization of values. 
Insofar as man is open to the sublimity of the world of values, capable of giving an answer to 
these values which call for an adequate answer. The adequacy of his answer, however, does 
not depend on his openness, since openness is in itself only the possibility; it all depends on 
man's concrete realizations of these capacities in his factual life-situations. Nevertheless, 
independently of its realization, we can says that openness is the presupposition for every 
response to values, every humble subjection to the “in itself important”, and, it is, at the same 
time, a fundamental component of such response to value. For example, when we rejoice at 
the success of our children; when a chill comes over us seeing a magnificent painting, or 
when we are confronted with the numen as Mysterium Tremendum, which forces us to our 
knees and generates unprecedented and radical feelings, such as awe and trembling, etc...etc., 
in all of these instances the basic attitude (as well as constitutional character) of openness is 
implied.  
 Openness as basic attitude and constitutional character of man can be observed on 
different levels of life. Openness is implied, for example, in all moral conducts toward 
ourselves and toward our fellowmen. Openness is present in the world of values when man 
takes into consideration his needs and future, and puts all his efforts into one single act in 
order to achieve the expected result. When, for example, someone wants to be a good chess 
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player, one subordinates other aims to this and concentrates on the training of being a good 
chess player. We would say that this act is the virtue of perseverance or diligence or 
pertinacity. Yes it is, but we must also see that behind these virtues there is always openness 
as fundamental attitude. We are open to our future, we are open to our development, we are 
open to our self-discipline, we are open to our personality, etc. Before all subordinations and 
sacrifices to ourselves, there is openness. To see, for example, the preciousness of something, 
that, by the way, contributes one's personality, one has to be open to the nature and value of 
the phenomenon in question (as well as there are countless other circumstances, facts, 
possible outcomes, etc., one has to take into account). Later, in the framework of this 
openness, one can develop virtues required to achieve one's goals.  
 The radical character of world-openness can be observed on the communal level of 
life. Openness is also necessary in our moral life involving others, that is, community in a 
broader sense. If man is not open toward others and other (non-living) entities, then he senses 
nothing of the abundance of values of others and of other entities. If man is not 
unconditionally open to others, then he is unable to exert the most basic moral attitudes 
toward a wider community. For example, openness to the other, or openness for the other, for 
and to the beloved, is a fundamental element of love. In its communal aspect, in the case of 
love, the basic attitude of openness is the presupposition for every true love. In openness, 
guided by the attitude of love, we are able to see the real values of our beloved, as well as we 
are able to see her as a person in the full sense of the word. Again, openness is the framework, 
in which man is able to recognize his fellowman's inalienable dignity, individuality, 
unrepeatability, goodness and beauty. Openness is, however, not only the source of attitudes 
of moral character, which are responses to values of our fellowmen, but it is also the 
necessary attendant of the development of these attitudes.  
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 An openness of the attitude of love is present when we are open to non-visible or 
hidden things or persons. A child, for example, can have many latent talents. Parents of the 
child, however, without openness to the possible talents of their kid, cannot love the child in 
the proper sense of the word. The same goes for other not-yet-evolved values of the child. 
Parents have to be open also toward all those values, which are not-yet-evolved: the value of 
the free decision of the child, the value of his or her own mature life, the preciousness of the 
child's thinking, etc. All these elements of true love flow from openness. Without being open 
to these possible values, the acts of love are meaningless, that is, the closed man can love 
neither himself, nor his fellowmen and community.61   
 As a final consequence we can say that wherever we look, we see and experience 
openness that can, in this dimension also be identified what others have called “reverence”, to 
be a fundamental element of moral life and recognition of values. Openness means, therefore, 
to be open to values. Consequently, man has capacity for values, that is, he is capax virtutis.  
 Divergent meanings show that the phenomenon of world-openness is not easily 
interpreted in a purely philosophical framework either. There is something unreal in world-
openness which induces talk about an apparent world-openness. On the other hand, its reality 
cannot be denied, and so one tries to distinguish an everyday or restricted world-openness and 
a true world-openness having the full meaning of the phenomenon. The really striking fact 
about the world-openness is that it – like the phenomenon of the horizons of human cognition 
– recedes: it is always there, but requires huge efforts to grasp. Man's openness to the world is 
the multitude of possibilities of different actions, behaviors, wills, beliefs, attitudes, decisions 
and, at the same time, world-openness precedes all these actions, attitudes and constitutes 
their root. 
                                                 
61 The same was said by Plato in his dialogue Gorgias. According to Plato, when tyrants kill people or banish 
them or confiscate their property, think they are doing what is in their own best interest, but are actually pitiable. 
Socrates maintains that the wicked man is unhappy. (472e) In chapter 2.3. I’m going to give many examples for 
the communal character of openness. 
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 Nevertheless, this character of world-openness shouldn't prevent us from the attempt 
of carrying out a real phenomenological analysis concentrating on the intelligible essence(s) 
of the phenomenon of world-openness. There are, however, phenomena which can be easily 
confused with world-openness. Moreover, there are many phenomena, which are apparently 
similar to the phenomenon of (world-)openness, but might constitute the clear antitheses of a 
genuine openness. Our task here, therefore, is to list all these phenomena, rightly characterize 
them, compare them with the phenomenon of world-openness itself, and finally clearly 
differentiate between that which is not the phenomenon we look for and that which it is. In the 
process I will also describe phenomena, which constitute obviously the antitheses and pseudo-
forms of the phenomenon of world-openness. The investigation, therefore, sometimes has to 
apply pedantic distinctions and points, which apparently might not be to the point of our 
investigation. The preliminary understanding of world-openness, however, helps us to reduce 
these far-fetched meanings as well as helps to focus and delineate the phenomenon. 
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2.2. The Phenomenon of World-Openness in Max Scheler 
“Every finite consciousness has of necessity a metaphysics  
– insofar as it exists without God's factual self-disclosure.” 
(Max Scheler 1954)  
“Anthropology and ontology are […] nothing but  
two aspects of one and the same philosophical approach.” 
(Emerich Coreth 1969) 
 
The main task of the present chapter is to give a brief account on Max Scheler's view on the 
phenomenon of world-openness, since he was the first who applied the notion in the sense 
that we are trying to explicate. Besides therefore the exposition of Scheler’s thought on 
world-openness, we will apply throughout the thesis his basic distinction between the animal 
world (Umwelt) and the world (Welt) of man.  
The term world-openness constitutes an essential part of Scheler's anthropology. It is, 
however, highly questionable whether we can talk about coherent anthropologies, since, 
before the German 20th century anthropology, from Scheler, Gehlen and Plessner on, there 
was no anthropology in the modern sense of the word. This insight suggests that our epoch, 
on the one hand, really detects that man is exposed to a real danger (I think that the danger 
consists in inhumanity, that is, a total perversion of man's original, ineffable essence), and on 
the other hand, can in fact be considered as a real epoch of anthropology. This insight, 
however, concerning man's place in the world has to be understood as a good consequence of 
something negative, since it rather indicates man's unbalanced and distorted role in the world, 
which originally belongs to him. Following this train of thought, it is also questionable 
whether we can talk about structuralist anthropology or anthropology in structuralism, since 
its representatives in the fifties talked about the “death of man”. For example, according to 
Michel Foucault, man had been only a temporary target of sciences and will disappear with 
the emergence of structuralism. According to another structuralist, Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
sciences can only explicate man's structures, since being a complex structure, he is timeless 
and unconscious. In the same way it is also problematic whether there are postmodern 
anthropologies at all, since – as for example Lyotard claimed – neither the ego nor the subject 
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has unity, in short, as a matter of fact, they do not even exist. According to the proponents of 
Marxist ideology, there is strict determinism in the world that leaves no room for freedom. In 
this deterministic-mechanistic materialist view, the role of the subject (and of subjectivity) is 
minimized and the notion of man is distorted. In short, some 20th anthropologies questioned 
the integrity of man, subject and person (or however we call the great “mystery” of the 
world).  
Following the classical insights of philosophy there is, however, another viewpoint 
that has been articulated in contrast to the anti- and non-anthropology of anthropologies of 
closedness. For a vast number of thinkers the “discovery and turn to subjectivity”62 became a 
genuine philosophical topic. These thinkers of the anthropological awakening did philosophy 
in terms of anthropology.  
Max Scheler is one of the leading figures of the anthropological renaissance. His 
interpreters all agree that one of his main concerns was anthropology.63 Scheler’s main 
project was to explore the basic structure of human nature. In his latest and because of many 
final points controversal book devoted to philosophical anthropology, “Man’s Place in 
Nature” he claims that a primary task of a philosophical anthropology is to  
“show in detail how all the specific achievement and works of man – 
language, conscience, tools, weapons, ideas of right and wrong, the state, 
leadership, the representational function of art, myths, religion, science, 
history and social life – arise from the basic structure of the human 
nature.”64 
 
Scheler, starting from the “basic structure of human nature” discovered that man is in search 
of infinity.65 The search leads man to an ineffable numinous experience of an ultimate 
                                                 
62 See Crosby, John F., The Philosophical Achievement of Dietrich von Hildebrand. Concluding 
Reflections on the Symposion. Aletheia An International Yearbook of Philosophy (5.) 1992: 321. 
63 As for example Herbert Spiegelberg, who was among the firsts, who did justice to Max Scheler's 
anthropology saying that “ethics and philosophical anthropology were the persistent central concerns of Scheler's 
philosophy.” In Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction. The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982, ff. 273.  
64  Max Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature, New York: The Noonday Press, 1979: 88. 
65  Moreover, Scheler says that the sense of infinity is before every experience or assertion about the world 
and the self: “Hence, it is a complete mistake to assert that I exist (as in Descartes) or that there is a world (as in 
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Personality, appropriately described as ens a se, a being from and through itself. Now, in the 
course of the search man discovers that he is nothing at all (he discovers his Nothingness, 
Nichtigkeit) as he is confronted with the source of his being. This is the feeling, which in itself 
is a religious feeling or act as such (and as a matter of fact it is also a response to the 
numinous experience); it is that which Scheler calls a feeling of infinite dependence, or in 
other words, the experience of his condition as a being which is caused by another, obviously 
of a higher power (Gewirktheitserlebnis). According to Scheler, man is supposed to answer to 
this feeling: either he gives an adequate answer, i.e., man identifies the object or the being on 
which he depends in a radical way with God, or, man can suppress the feeling of the 
transcendent and fill it with earthly and finite goods, as he says, using a religious phrasing, 
“idols”. In the light of his view on man’s relation to an absolute sphere, we can now 
understand his claim that “every finite spirit believes either in God or in an idol”.66 In another 
place he adds: “Man is therefore, necessarily a metaphysician – insofar as he does not believe 
in the reality of God or believes in the reality of God.”67 Now, paraphrasing Tertullian's 
saying and applying it to Scheler, we can conclude that man possesses anima naturaliter 
metaphysica. It means that man is in an outstanding position possessing, on the one hand, an 
incomparable access to reality and, on the other, an ability to express adequately the object of 
his orientation. For Scheler it also means that independently of whether one has had a 
philosophical training or not, one is able to reach a point where the totality of being is offered 
to oneself. 
 In whatever form we talk about man, we have to get one point straight, namely the fact 
that man is “interesting” (which means man is worth being discussed about) for scientific 
                                                                                                                                                        
St. Thomas Aquinas) before asserting the general proposition that there is an absolute Being – in other words, to 
derive the sphere of absolute Being from the other modes of being.” Max Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature, New 
York: The Noonday Press, 1979: 90.  
66 “Jeder endliche Geist glaubt entweder an Gott oder an einen Götzen.” Max Scheler, Vom Ewigen im 
Menschen. Bern: Francke Verlag, 1954: 261. 
67  Scheler 1957: 207. 
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research and man has a special place among the entities (possible philosophical objects) of the 
world. According to Scheler, man has an exceptional position; he is not like “a coat hanging 
in a cupboard” – as Heidegger would say. As a matter of fact, in comparison to other beings, 
man is the only one who wants to do good, wants to know the truth, deals with the questions 
of the world, wants to enjoy beauty, deeply investigates the reasons of the world and at the 
same time is fully aware of his freedom and who constantly wants to uncover the underlying 
reasons of all domains. According to Scheler, every understanding of man involves an 
inseparable self-understanding of being rooted in history, since every philosophical 
speculation according to its own depth includes a fundamental decision (Grundbestimmung) 
on the nature of man. Philosophies, however, are not important or unimportant depending on 
whether they take explicitly this fundamental decision or not. Now, concordant with Scheler's 
thoughts on man, I claim that all philosophical (and theological) anthropologies as well as 
different disciplines of philosophy are false if they do not, in some fashion, include 
anthropology in their starting point. I consider therefore every philosophy as implying a 
certain anthropology even if the philosophy in question apparently doesn’t have 
anthropologically relevant features or says little or nothing on anthropological issues. The 
question of the phenomenon of man is, however, in one or another form, inevitably a main 
concern of all philosophies independently of the type of the philosophy. And since it is always 
the philosopher who is asking, above all his personal existence is questioned.68 Philosophy, 
philosophizing, while not always being about us, human beings, being able to deal with space 
aand time, inanimate matter, plants, the cosmos, God, being as such, logical laws, etc., is 
executed only by us, human beings. However, many other philosophies have an explicitly 
marked anthropological interest or even a primary focus and interest in the human person. 
This can be said about Scheler: his whole oeuvre can be conceived as a philosophical inquiry 
                                                 
68 Cf. the famous Horatio citation: “Tua res agitur”, that is, „it concerns always you.” 
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about man as focal point. There are three senses in which we can understand Scheler’s remark 
that every philosophy is anthropology. In the first sense it means an anthropologically defined 
thinking; it means a philosophy pervaded by deep anthropological interest. This is not found 
in all philosophies. In the second sense we say that all philosophies are anthropology insofar 
as they take the phenomenon of human being as their starting point.69 In the third sense, 
however, we say that every philosophy is anthropology referring to the fact that, since every 
philosophizing being known to us is human, every scientific approach implicitly entails a 
fundamental position on the philosophizing subject as well as on the nature of man. It means 
that it includes a philosophical approach (how one philosophizes; how fundamental one’s 
philosophy is; what the aims of one’s philosophy are; what does philosophy concerning one’s 
life mean, etc.) and a philosophical judgment about man’s nature and vocation.  
 In respect of Scheler’s views on man’s world-openness there is one further issue, 
which we have to discuss briefly. In Scheler's philosophy “proofs” (Beweis) play no role in – 
what we traditionally call the proofs for the existence of God.70 Nevertheless, a demonstration 
(Aufweis) or a non-deductive verification (Nachweis)71 of the existence of God we might 
reconstruct as the following: man’s consciousness possesses a necessary relation to an 
absolute sphere, in the same sense as “world” and “ego” are given immediately in human of 
consciousness, and God’s existence is, therefore, not just indirectly derivable through 
proofs.72 Besides thus asserting a necessary relation of human consciousness to God (the 
                                                 
69 In this sense a theological anthropology or a metaphysical tractate of God can also be anthropological. 
70 See: “to find God is something different from proving his existence” Max Scheler, On the Eternal in Man. 
Hamden: Archon Books, 1972: 254. 
71 This is a term hard to be translated. Frings translates it as rediscovery. He, however, remarks that this is not a 
good translation. Nachweis is certainly another way for proof (perhaps understood in a less logical-formal sense) 
the existence of God.  
72 For Scheler there was a difference between an argument or proof (Beweis) and pointing out or demonstration 
(Aufweis). In order to understand Scheler’s account on proving the existence of the Supreme Being in a different 
way, we have to follow his essential distinction between different kinds of ‘proofs’: 1. proof (Beweis) ; 2. 
demonstration (Aufweis); 3. Nachweis (no adequate English word for this; the best translation that I can propose 
is ‘non-deductive verification’). In short, according to Scheler, the way we can tell something about God’s nature 
and existence is the demonstration (Aufweis) and non-deductive verification (Nachweis), since the religious 
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absolute being), which is the basis of the religious act, Scheler – even though he denies the 
ontological argument as invalid – assumes a very similar direct evident knowledge of the 
existence of God, which he even calls the “zweitevidente Einsicht”, the second most evident 
knowledge (after the insight that there is something rather than nothing): that God (an 
absolute being) exists.73 Namely, man’s consciousness and the absolute sphere are 
amalgamated,74 which means in other words, that man has a unique access to the fullness of 
reality, and consequently, also to the absolute sphere of the Supreme Being.75 In this train of 
thought we again encounter the ancient problem of the possibility of cognition of God. 
According to the classical understandings, there exists a gap between man and the divine 
sphere. Now, according to Max Scheler, this gap can be bridged and God does not reign in the 
distance beyond man's reach. The expression of “man is necessarily a metaphysician” clearly 
states that man is essentially capable of transcending himself. Man is not only a “finely 
composed machine” being imprisoned in his own physical and material cage of determinism. 
Similarly, since man can recognize his broken nature and nothingness, and has also the 
capacity and the passion to always become more, man is not the protagonist of the eternal 
drama of the failures of his transcendental goals; consequently he is not a “useless passion”. 
Scheler acknowledged the real existence of the gap between man and God (this is the reason 
why we cannot charge the early Scheler with pantheism even if he talks about the 
“deification” of man76), but firmly had stated the need of conceiving God, calling this 
                                                                                                                                                        
sphere as Urgegebenes (archphenomenon) belongs to the not-provable things, namely they (as the “we”, the 
“ego”, the “existence” and the “world”) are primordial phenomena. 
73 See Josef Seifert, “Schelers Denken des absoluten Ursprungs: Zum Verhältnis von Schelers Metaphysik und 
Religionsphilosophie zum ontologischen Gottesbeweis”, in: Christian Bermes, Wolfhart Henckmann, Heinz 
Leonardy und Türingische Gesellschaft für Philosophie, Jena (Hg.), Denken des Ursprungs – Ursprung des 
Denkens. Schelers Philosophie  und ihre Anfänge in Jena. Kritisches Jahrbuch der Philosophie 3 (1998), pp. 34-
53. 
74 In the sense of a unity as, let’s say, flesh and bones are inseparable in human body. 
75 Here we cannot go into the details of Scheler’s philosophy of religion. I think, however, that a very careful 
critical investigation would needed to avoid Scheler’s pantheistic later philosophy of man’s relation to God. 
76 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1982: 299. (This is no longer the case with the later Scheler. I think that he tended very much 
to a profound metaphysical confusion in his „Man’s Place in Nature” and also to some type of pantheism and 
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knowledge an “essential insight” (Wesenseinsicht).77 But even if we fill this gap (the gap 
between the absolute sphere and us), we don’t know much about his essence. According to 
Scheler there is a second step which has to be taken and this is the phenomenological analysis 
of religious acts, in which one has to show why religious acts are in an outstanding position in 
comparison with all other acts. Now, this second step is the second feature of – the early – 
Scheler’s philosophy of religion:78 the phenomenology of religious acts. 
 There are a number of religious acts such as prayer, a certain kind of religious fear, 
acts of thanking God, awe, etc. The common feature of these religious acts is that, on the one 
hand, by their essence they cannot be fulfilled by any finite, worldly objects of experience (in 
another formulation these finite and worldly objects, if they take the place of God, are idols), 
on the other hand, they are naturally rooted in the very nature of human being. Both 
characteristics point to transcending man. That is why Scheler presents the phenomenology of 
religious acts. A religious act transcends all worldly objects, namely its aim is not non-
worldly, but rather other-worldly. According to Scheler, one of the most basic experiences of 
the believer is that the fulfillment of the expectation of the religious feeling can be fulfilled 
only by God. There is no other person or object, which could fulfill the expectation or 
intention of the religious act of the believer. The impossibility of the fulfillment of religious 
acts by finite beings lies, for Scheler, in the very existence of reality itself, i.e., in its thisness 
(Sosein). But a genuine religious act is always directed – using Rudolf Otto's famous 
formulation – to the “totally different” (das ganz anderes).  
  I have said at the beginning of this chapter that the term world-openness constitutes 
an essential part of Scheler's anthropology, even so, little has been said about world-openness 
                                                                                                                                                        
even to a kind of atheism in the sense that God was conceived by him as the most powerless and weak idea 
instead of the most real being and creator of the world.) 
77 Max Scheler, Der Formalismus in der Ethik und materiale Wertethik. GW 2. p. 407. 
78 I use the term philosophy of religion in the case of Scheler in a wide sense, since he explicitly rejected any 
kind of philosophy of God. According to Scheler, philosophy should deal only with religion itself by the help of 
a phenomenological analysis of religious experience. See Frings Manfred S. Frings, The Mind of Max Scheler. 
The First Comprehensive Guide Based on the Complete Work. Milwaukee, Marquette University Press: 2001: 
121. 
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itself. On the other hand, constantly, however latently, we have been talking about world-
openness, since in the background of all our statements on Scheler's views on the nature of 
religion, proofs for the existence of God, phenomenology of religious acts, etc., there was the 
presupposition of man's openness to the world. Behind the recognition of man's nothingness 
(Nichtigkeit), for example, there is the philosophical insight of the world-open man, who can 
acknowledge his nothingness precisely in his openness facing the world. If there is not the 
philosophical prerequisite of openness, then there is no recognition and acceptance of the 
conditio humana. The recognition of the other, of the world, of man's unique position can 
never be articulated and understood without the preceding presupposition of the phenomenon 
of world-openness.  
 The same goes for the Schelerian “demonstrations” for the existence of God. If we do 
not suppose a prior real openness on the part of man, and would it not have an adequate 
direction, we would not be able to attain to such knowledge of God. Denying the essential 
openness of man and the necessary relation of his consciousness to an absolute sphere, we 
could not point to a supreme being outside us. The Schelerian “proofs” for the existence of 
God presuppose that the world-open man is open to a full meaning providing reality, which, 
in fact, is an adequate “answer” to his acts. We can conceive Scheler's “proofs” as new 
formulations of Descartes' proofs for the existence of God from the idea of God (direction of 
the “movement”), that can be explained only by a really existing God (object).79 
 Scheler developed an original thought on the God-directedness of the human being. In 
his understanding “every finite spirit (Geist) believes either in God or an idol.”80 What does 
that mean? First of all it means that man (the finite spirit) has essentially a structure, which, 
consciously or unconsciously, directs him in all of his moments of life, or, in other words, 
                                                 
79 As for example does Spiegelberger. He conceives Scheler's proof as an “Aufweis, a pointing out of what 
everyone can discover directly by following the direction of the pointer.” See: Herbert Spiegelberg, The 
Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982: 299. 
80 Max Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, Hamden: Archon Books, 1972: 261. 
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man is bestowed with the peculiarity of being directed outward to an object, which might 
explain man's own existence in the most comprehensive sense. Again, without the 
presupposition of man's original openness Scheler's groundbreaking idea would not have a 
solid foundation. On the other hand, however, as William Petropulos says, we cannot specify 
religious acts as the only “exits” to the world and to God (in other words, the phenomenology 
of religious acts is not the only way for “demonstrating” God's existence; there are many 
other ways as we shall see it in the next chapters of the thesis), since man does not perform 
always and exclusively religious acts. “Since the religious act is an essential endowment of 
the human mind, it is not a question of whether an individual performs it. It is only a question 
of whether the act finds its adequate »object«”81 Being directed toward God has to be taken 
as an ontological status and does not mean a continuous realization only through religious 
acts. In this sense we can also understand Scheler’s idea of man’s openness to God without 
the exact definition of the object of this openness, that is, as “simple” openness.  
 In Scheler it seems, however, that man's structural (god-)openness can have two 
objects: God or substitutions of whatever kind for God, that is, idols. It seems also that there 
are two directions and two objects. Both object-directed movements have their point of 
departure in man's openness, but they can point to different objects. Even if being open to the 
world is a necessary constituent of human being, – following Scheler – as bottom-line we can 
say, based on our everyday observations, that man has the character of being directed towards 
transcendence.82 This is, in my understanding, the “neutral” nomination for man's openness. It 
is neutral in the sense that it does not contain yet the element of the divine reality. 
Nevertheless, the interpretation of world-openness as God-directedness requires, I think, one 
further (in my view fully justified) step.  
                                                 
81 William Petropulos, Scheler and Voegelin. In: Stephen Schneck (ed.), Max Scheler's Acting Persons. 
New Perspectives. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002: 115. 
82 Scheler doesn’t use either of the words. It is my interpretation. Although, he could have used it, e.g. in 
his anthropology, when he is talking about man as God-seeker (Gottsucher). 
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This law stands: every finite spirit believes either in God or in idols. And 
from it there follows this pedagogic rule of religion: the correct way of 
dispelling 'unbelief' is not that of guiding man to the idea and reality of God 
by arguments external to his personal condition (whether by 'proofs' or by 
persuasion), but that by showing him […] that he has installed a finite good 
in place of God, i.e. that within the objective sphere of the absolute, which 
he 'has' at all events as a sphere, he has, in our sense, 'deified' a particular 
good […] In thus bringing a man to disillusion with his idol […] we bring 
him of his own accord to the idea of the reality of God. Hence, what I have 
called the 'shattering of idols' is the principal (and only) way to prepare the 
religious development of the personality.83 
 
For Scheler – as the quotation above shows – man's openness can or cannot succeed in 
attaining its proper object. Independently of the object and the success of reaching its object, 
openness, however, still remains the same and does not undergo a change. A phenomenon 
such as a preventive war, for example, can be considered preventive insofar as it does not 
overstep the objective lines of a preventive war. If it obviously targets civilians, attacks 
without any sign of hostility on the part of other nations, acts without the permission or 
consent of international organizations, then it is an offensive action. In other words, if it fails 
its object, it cannot be considered a preventive war anymore.  
 Also consider, for example, what happens when someone puts a certain herb into a 
meal which unwittingly causes serious health problems to another person; the object of his 
cooking, namely to please the other, has failed. Nevertheless, due to the fact that the object of 
his goodwill has not failed (since other state of affairs can prove his original goodwill), he 
will be charged with the unintended infliction of pain and suffering. Yet, the object of the 
cooking has failed. If I might put in this way, the aim of his action is missing; there is no 
pleasing, instead there is pain. This is again an example of the disappearance of the 
phenomenon after the failure of its object.  
On the other hand, the phenomenon of world-openness does not terminate even if 
intended toward valueless, meaningless or fool's gold (Talmi) entities. According to Scheler, 
                                                 
83 Max Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, Hamden: Archon Books, 1972: 267-268. 
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the real object of man’s openness and direction is God, therefore whatever is in the place of 
God, he reckons it as “idol”. Idols, in the place of God, might be also objects of man's 
openness, but are improper objects. On the one hand, man has the capacity to abuse his 
openness; on the other hand, the capacity of openness precisely enables him to overcome this 
abuse. The “shattering of idols” is therefore not a mission impossible, but requires the huge 
effort of the phenomenological – as Patocka says following the Platonic tradition – “care [or 
guidance] of the soul”.   
 The Schelerian idea of the world-openness of man opens up enormous new vistas. Let 
me mention just one example. In the contemporary discussions of interreligious dialogue (and 
in ecumenism too) it has become of utmost importance to find a common ground, a 
foundation for dialogue. Now, Scheler's views on man's openness to the world can provide a 
real foundation for interreligious dialogue, since the main thesis of his anthropology may 
receive a theistic interpretation (which was also Scheler's authentic idea), which says, that 
since all men are open to the ultimate reality, all men are in salvific relation84 to God.85 The 
first half of the sentence can be considered as the philosophical point of origin (of an 
interreligious dialogue), whereas the second half of the sentence is the theological and 
interreligious result of the philosophical one. Moreover, since the image of the world-open 
man comes from a philosophical observation, we can say that philosophy can frame the 
furtherance of dialogue. In other words, the “grammar” of interreligious dialogue can be 
philosophical. 
 For Scheler, man is an ultimate givenness (Gegebenheit). Man utterly differs from 
animals, his principles of life cannot be reduced to any functions or determinants of his 
surroundings, which means, that he can have a command over his instincts, and on the other 
                                                 
84 Scheler doesn’t use this term. In my understanding „salvific relation” means that all men, independently of 
their religious convictions, are in an intimate connection with God. Because of their metaphysical constitution all 
men can be saved. This tie, between God and man, signifies the potentiality of being saved – and not its actual 
status.  
85 From this, however, does not follow that they are all saved. 
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hand, that he can command himself by intellect arising from his personality. Man's principal 
characteristic – which also comes from his intelligence – is the capacity to question. He says: 
Again, we can define intelligent behavior without reference to psychic 
processes. An organism behaves intelligently when it satisfies the following 
conditions: It must be capable of responding, without trial and error, to a 
new situation meaningfully, cleverly or foolishly; that is, aiming  
at a goal but missing it, for only one who is intelligent can be foolish. 
Moreover, independently of the number of trial runs, an intelligent organism 
must be able to overcome the task defined by his instincts. […] This 
intelligence, however, in case of man, can serve peculiar spiritual aims.86 
 
Scheler was particularly interested in the problem of hominization raising the question of 
man's specific place and role. He says that the essence of man is his “exceptional place”, 
which is above that which we call intellect or the capacity of making decisions. Man's 
“exceptional place” does not depend on stages, there is not a quantitative difference between 
man and other organisms. Scheler claims that it would be also erroneous to say that what 
makes man a man is an additional new stage of extant vital and psychic functions (such as 
power of feeling, instinct, associative memory, intelligence), which can be the subject of 
psychology as well as biology.  
This new principle transcends all what we call »life« in the most general 
sense. It is not a stage of life especially not a stage of the particular mode of 
life we call psyche, but a principle opposed to life as such, even to life in 
man. Thus, it is a genuinely new phenomenon which cannot be derived from 
the natural evolution of life, but which, if reducible to anything, leads back 
to the ultimate Ground of Being of which »life« is a particular 
manifestation.87 
 
Scheler found a comprehensive notion for the principle of life of man, which can express 
man's capacity to grasp arch-phenomena, essences as well as a “multiplicity of emotional and 
volitional acts”. This notion is “spirit” (Geist) and the “act-center”, in which the spirit 
manifests itself within the finite spheres of being, is called “person”.88 For Scheler, man's 
                                                 
86 Max Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature, New York: The Noonday Press, 1979: 29. 
87 Max Scheler, op.cit. 33. 
88 The idea that the person is just an act-center in Scheler’s sense and not a substantial being according to many 
thinkers is a dangerous error. Among others it was Josef Seifert who tried to unfold this critique in several 
places, including in his Leib und Seele. Ein Beitrag zur philosophischen Anthropologie (Salzburg: A. Pustet, 
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most important characteristic is being open to the world (Weltoffenheit). “Man is an X that 
can behave in a world-open manner to an unlimited extent. Becoming to man is rising by 
force of spirit towards opening to the world.”89 This distinction says that man in comparison 
to animals can free himself from his surroundings, man can form his surroundings, that is, 
man has a world (Welt), whereas animals have surroundings (Umwelt). Disengaged from 
natural surroundings, man became a “world-open” being. All this constitutes preparedness for 
something, the creation of the possibility “for something which can happen only to man”. 
Contrary to an animal – as Scheler says –, man is transcendence, man is in becoming. This 
also means that an animal neither can objectify the world nor question, man, on the contrary, 
continually questions. Man has and is freedom, whereas an animal has a “scheme of life”. 
 There are a lot of peculiarities arising from man's structure of existence. Scheler lists 
them as follows: 1. Only man possesses a developed thing and substance category. 2. Man has 
his own space. 3. Man possesses a concept of space and time prior to all sense experiences. 4. 
While an animal has “surroundings-space”, man has “world-space”. 5. Only man is able to 
transcend everything as well as himself. 6. Man has also the capacity of ideation. Ideation 
means the suspension of the reality of things involved in the grasping of the essences of 
things. 
 Starting from the phenomenon of man's openness, Scheler was able to develop a new, 
dynamic notion of man, whose essence is grasped in his acts, which integrated the traditional 
scholastic, static notion of the person. In his view, the spirit is pure activity, while the center 
of the spirit, i.e., the “person” is a continuously self-realizing act-structure.90 Scheler says that 
                                                                                                                                                        
1973), Das Leib-Seele Problem und die gegenwärtige philosophische Diskussion.  Eine kritisch-systematische 
Analyse (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 21989) 
89 Max Scheler, op.cit. 49. 
90 I think that with this Scheler did not want to say that there are “less” (like babies), and “more developed” (like 
adults) human beings. He did not want to defend abortion for instance. With this rather strange expression he 
wanted to point out how the “hidden” aspect of man, the personality maintains its connection with the world and 
others, and how it manifests itself. 
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the sphere of the person exists only in pursuance and execution of his acts.91 For Scheler, man 
is in continuous contact with the world through his acts.  His familiar relation to and with the 
world shows that, as a matter of fact, man is at home in the world; he has essentially to do 
with the world. Being open to the world in this context means having the capacity and ability 
“to arrive home”, even if man says sometimes no to life. From the fact of the freedom of 
world-openness comes the fact that man can say no to life and the world, or can negate the 
truth of his world-openness. The apriori endowment of openness, however, independently of 
the statement and view of the individual, still makes possible the absolute negation (which is 
in this sense erroneous) of the world, life, openness, and the like.  
 Scheler rightly observed the religious aspect of the phenomenon of the excentric status 
of man. World-openness is, however, the basic phenomenon, which gains its full meaning in 
the religious context. He also had to answer the question of the ultimate object of openness. 
His question is: what is supposed to be open to man's openness? The discovery of this 
excentric core in man does not manifest itself exclusively in metaphysics, but means that 
man's original orientation is not worldly, but other-worldly.  
Precisely in the very moment when the world-open being and the never-
ending striving had come into being in order to penetrate into the endless 
world-sphere and not to stop at particularities […] in this very same moment 
man needed to anchor his center outside and beyond the world.92  
 
Scheler gives basically a religious interpretation to the phenomenon of world-openness. No 
matter how (or how not) one fills out the region of openness, one can never be in doubt that it 
is constituent of every finite being, because it is simply “is there” (dass sie bestehe).93 
  
                                                 
91 See: Max Scheler, op.cit. 56. 
92 Max Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature, New York: The Noonday Press, 1979: 108-109. 
93 See: Max Scheler, Absolutsphäre – «Metaphysischer Hang» – Metaphysik des Absoluten – und der 
Glaube an eine Selbsmitteilungen Gottes. In: Max Scheler, Schriften aus dem Nachlass. (Maria Scheler ed.) 
Bern: Francke Verlag, (Gesammelte Werke) Vol. X: 201. 
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2.3. Aspects in the Person that can be open: Intellect, Will, Heart, Attitudes, Faith 
“Fecisti nos ad te Domine, inquietum est cor nostrum 
 donec requiescat in te.” 
(Saint Augustine, Confessions) 
 
 So far, in the preceding chapters, we have been talking about man and openness in 
general terms. The topic is in need, however, of further elaboration. In the present chapter, the 
scope of the investigation turns to the subjective side. It will concentrate on another aspect of 
the problem. Presupposing that world-openness is a phenomenon, which in one important 
sense of the term is an attitude or an element thereof, we also have to suppose that there are 
different aspects and forms of the same phenomenon. The phenomenon of world-openness 
manifests itself in different acts and attitudes of the human being, that is man can behave 
world-open manner in his acts. In this sense we can speak about the openness of different 
human acts, such as the openness of the heart, the openness of the will, the openness of the 
intellect, the openness of the faith. In the following we shall be investigating all those acts and 
attitudes, in which human being’s openness can be detected. I shall refer to these acts and 
attitudes as aspects, that is, supposing that they are aspects of the very same phenomenon that 
the person can take an attitude of openness, can open herself. Our question is in this section 
is: How can the intellect, the will, the heart, and other attitudes open to something and what 
are the right objects of these opennesses? It should also be asked whether there are specific 
values in the objects of openness, or whether openness does not presuppose its objects as 
values. In other words, what (what value) makes an object a real one? Does the justification of 
a certain type of openness in man depend on the authenticity of its object? In this section we 
base our investigations on previous insights on world-openness, that is, the bearer of openness 
can be only a personal being, man.  
 
Openness of the intellect  
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  The openness of the intellect is a vast topic. In this section, we shall examine a higher-
rank faculty of man, which, in contrast to the will (highest appetitive faculty in man), is called 
cognitive or knowing faculty. Our investigations on the phenomenon of the will in the next 
section will sufficiently explain the fundamental function of knowledge or cognition with 
regard to willing. Here let me mention just one essential point concerning the relation of the 
will and the intellect: will is a desideratum born of intellectual knowledge, whereas cognition 
precedes any act of the will; as the Scholastic dictum says: nihil volitum nisi praecogitum. In 
general, we refer to thinking and cognitional actions (power for knowing things, power of 
judging, reason, intelligence, understanding, power of remembering, recalling, power of 
recognizing the agreement or disagreement of human conduct with the rule of what such 
conduct ought to be, etc., etc.) of the human mind as intellect. As a matter of fact, however, 
intellect is the faculty of grasping the truth. Even if intellect starts its investigation usually 
with contingent facts and entities, its highest object is truth. Therefore we can say that the 
intellect tries to grasp not only the truth of things (nor truth(s) of the thoughts), but truth itself. 
What I mean by the distinction between truth of the things and truth itself can be best 
explained by an analogy taken from Plato. Plato in his dialogue the Eutyphro wants to know 
the notion of holiness (or, according to other translations, piety). Socrates asks:  
Is not holiness always the same with itself in every action, and, on the other 
hand, is not unholiness the opposite of all holiness, always the same with 
itself and whatever is to be unholy possessing some one characteristic 
quality? (Eutyphro 5d)  
[…]  
Now call to mind that this is not what I asked you, to tell me one or two of 
the many holy acts, but to tell the essential aspect, by which all holy are 
holy; for you said that all unholy acts were unholy and all holy ones holy by 
one aspect. (Eutyphro 6d)  
 
Now, the same goes for truth. There are the truths of the things, which are objects of the 
human intellect, but at the same time, through the truths of these things, the intellect wants 
(and is able to know) to know truth itself, by which all truths are truth.    
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It seems that among the faculties of man, the intellect is open to the world in the most 
manifest way, since intellect by its definition has to do with the world. One could say that we 
are open to the world in every act of the intellect. Now, whether this claim is true, the 
following investigation, phenomenological analysis is supposed to answer. This analysis, 
however, because of the immense dimensions of the topic of the intellect, should be taken 
only as an attempt to show the essential connection between openness and intellect. 
 Even the general and everyday meaning of the intellect suggests that it has to do with 
something that is outside the knower and that reaches out towards objects. Modern authors 
call the intellect ‘mind’, I think, however, that intellect and mind are synonymous and can 
refer to various manifestations of the same phenomenon. I mean by that that intellect can have 
various forms of function. When, for example, the intellect functions in a discursive manner, 
we call it reason. Inasmuch as the intellect immediately (auf einem Schlag) recognizes eternal 
truths, such as the value of love, it is called intelligence. Besides this, there are instances when 
the intellect refers to the self and to inner mental and bodily activities. In this case however 
intellect is called consciousness. Moreover, the intellect can refer to moral implications of a 
situation and of man's partaking in them. In this case intellect is called conscience. The 
intellect can retain knowledge concerning the part. In this sense, intellect is called memory. 
These all are instances, in which the intellect refers to something that is unlike itself. Now, 
referring to something is again a certain type of openness. 
 There is another preliminary understanding concerning the openness of the intellect, 
according to which we say, that, since we usually refer to intellect as an access to the totality 
of entities and principles, intellect is the only vehicle to have an authentic connection with the 
world. Having an authentic connection with the world means rejecting, on the one hand, 
subjective idealism, which says that nothing exists except the mind and its perceptions, where 
material things (everything outside the mind) are mere perceptions, and, on the other hand, 
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naturalistic materialism, which says that the only thing that exists is matter. Materialism 
indeed pays attention to things and the world but fails to recognize that things are not only 
material compositions and phenomena are not only the results of material interactions. 
Between these extremes the idea of authentic connection with the world of realist 
phenomenology can be thematized. Realist phenomenology, based on its insights into the 
nature of the intellect, was able to develop an original view of knowing and having a real 
connection with things. Rocco Buttiglione writes: 
The discovery of intentionality, then, which stands as the ground of 
phenomenology in the Logical Investigations is the discovery of the 
reaching out of consciousness towards objects. [See especially the Fifth 
Logical Investigation.] On the other hand, knowing does not consist in the 
subject’s pure and intentional reaching toward an object; knowing 
something is always also a self-giving of the object within the subject’s 
reaching. This is why phenomenology wanted to be a return to the things 
themselves.94 
 
The maxim of phenomenology, “back to the things themselves”, means therefore an authentic 
connection with the world. Phenomenology is interested in the things of the world as they are 
given to us in experiences. In this sense phenomenology is indeed a “genuine positivism”,95 
as Max Scheler says or a real “empiricism of essences” as Josef Seifert stresses referring to 
Dietrich von Hildebrand's account on the method of phenomenology.96 This also means that, 
according to phenomenology, the knowing faculty of man is not imprisoned in the cages of 
the self and his self-generated ideas, neither in any reductionist view on the outer world. The 
intellect freely and in an unbiased manner is disposed to be open to the world, and at the same 
time, it examines the world as it is.  
                                                 
94  Rocco Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyła. The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II. Michigan: 
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997: 273. 
95 See Max Scheler, “Phenomenology and the Theory of Cognition” in: Max Scheler, Selected 
Philosopical Essays. Evaston: Northwestern University Press, 1973. p. 138: “The 'ray' of reflection should try to 
touch only what is 'there' in the closest and most living contact and only so far as it is there. In this sense, but 
only in this, phenomenological philosophy is the most radical empiricism and positivism.” 
96 See Josef Seifert, Editor's Introductory Essay. In: Dietrich von Hildebrand, What is Philosophy? 
London and New York: Routledge 1991. pp. XLI-LVI. 
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  One of the main characteristics of the knowing faculty of man is that it is not 
essentially exercised by the use of any organs. Bodily organs, however, can be considered as 
the first step of the real function of the intellect. Bodily organs are “first steps” in the sense 
that man perceives and recognizes the world intelligently through the senses in a specifically 
human way. This does not mean that cognition would be equal to the activity of any organic 
faculty or of the brain, or even to the immaterial conscious sense perception as such. For 
example, in observing the yearly apparent movement of the Sun, I can recognize the 
principles of the movement and based on these observations I can produce a solar calendar. 
The first step of producing a calendar can be considered as an act that occurs through the use 
of a bodily organ, seeing, hearing, etc.; the second step, however, never. By the help of the 
activity of bodily organs, such as the faculty of sight of the eye, we will never be able to 
produce calendars of any kind, since sense perceptions per se, if not informed by the 
intellectual knowledge, as they always are in the specifically human sense perception, are 
lacking the essential characteristics, such as grasping abstract essences and knowing the 
universal in intellectual cognition. With the help of my sight or hearing, not even adding all 
my organic faculties, I can never draw consequences concerning principles, ideas, abstract 
entities, etc. Finally, we can draw the conclusion concerning the attribute of the intellect: 
since the intellect can exercise the activity of knowing in a manner wholly impossible to any 
organic faculty, on the one hand, we can say that it transcends all other bodily faculties, and 
on the other, we can call it a supra-organic faculty. In this sense, man's knowing faculty, since 
it transcends organic faculties in comparison to these faculties, can be viewed as a more open 
faculty.  
 There is another way of proving the unique openness of the intellect. The localization 
of thinking has been a central issue for philosophers of the mind. However, if we take the 
example of a person in the persistent vegetative state or in the locked-in syndrome, along the 
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same lines with the preceding train of thought, we would say that the human being in the 
“persistent vegetative state” (PVS) is not a person and does not possess human dignity at all. 
This localization of human dignity is, however, erroneous, and, above all, illicitly identifies 
simple bodily functions with higher spiritual categories. A PVS patient, even if he gives no 
signs of intellectual life of any kind, even if he is bed-ridden from birth, is still a human being 
endowed with human dignity in the full sense of the word. As life and human dignity is more 
than the accumulation of bodily functions, so is the intellect more than any organic activity of 
the brain or even than the performance of intellectual acts. In this sense, however, we again 
encounter a new aspect of openness of the intellect, namely, that the intellect is not bound to a 
sense-organ and even less can be reduced to any of the functions of a sense-organs; compared 
to sense perception or certain more limited motoric and other abilities the intellect, despite its 
manifold dependence on brain function, is not even bound to a specific region of the brain and 
most certainly differs in its essence so much from the brain that it cannot in any way be 
reduced to the brain. Since it is not bound to any of the functions of the brain, it also 
transcends them and is open to a wider range of reality. 
 From another point of view, one can also observe the openness of the intellect. From 
the point of view of the object of intellect and senses this difference is more manifest. The 
object of the senses is only one particular part of the totality. With my eyes I see what can be 
seen and with my ears I hear what can be heard, etc., etc. As a matter of fact, none of the 
senses can substitute (nor contribute to) another sense. Similarly, senses cannot substitute the 
function of the intellect, because they grasp only a limited range of reality. For example, 
sitting in a theatre, I am able to visually concentrate on the stage. Doing this I will see what is 
occurring on the stage. The minute I want to see the top box and I avert my eyes, I don't know 
what is taking place on the stage. Even if I hear the dialogue (which act seems to be a 
substitution of sight), it is still one object that I hear, and another distinct object that I see. It 
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seems to be trivial to say, that I cannot observe and see at the same time two different kinds of 
things as objects. Nevertheless, if we relate it to the problem of openness, it is more 
illuminating. The objects of the senses are always single; they cannot, by their definition, 
grasp a multiplicity of things, or the totality of the world. One could object that the experience 
of hearing can come from different sources. That's true; noise, for example, comes from 
thousands of sources. It does not mean, however, that it would be the abstracted experience of 
thousands of objects. Noise in itself is indeed a single, particular object for hearing, even if 
later one can distinguish different sources of the noise. This latter step, however, is not the 
function of the faculty of hearing. This further analyzing step is the intellect. Senses are 
therefore also open to the world, although in the mode of their capacity and are open only to 
parts of the world that present themselves to a particular sense, and even the sense of sight 
that has the widest range and possesses a somewhat infinite horizon or ocean or sly, is still 
infinitely limited when compared to the entire universe that lies beyond its reach. The reality 
that they grasp can be only one part of the whole reality. Consequently, senses are directed to 
limited objects, whereas intellect is open to the totality of the world. 
 We can ask, whether there is another way to proceed, whether there is another way to 
approach the problem of the object of the openness of the intellect? My answer is that, if we 
start our investigations from our everyday experience and we broaden the notion of intellect, I 
think there is. In the following few paragraphs we will proceed by substituting the notion of 
intellect with the notion of cognition. We can reformulate our initial question concerning the 
object of the intellect: what is the object of cognition? This substitution, however, is not an 
illicit one; since the intellect's eminent act is cognition, and to a certain extent, other acts of 
the intellect, such as judging, recalling, or awaking one's conscience depend on cognition.97  
                                                 
97 The classification of human faculties is again a classical problem of philosophy. Here we cannot go into 
detail; nevertheless I think that considering these faculties from an underlying a priori, but implicit object of the 
intellectual openness, my claim is justifiable. To prove, for example, that memory's object also is God, would be 
an interesting project, still we have to omit it.  
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 Now, if we analyze the human existence (conditio humana), we can observe that we 
are never content ourselves with the given reality. The desire of the mathematician to create a 
perfect mathematical system, our eternal striving for the good, the satisfaction of our 
everyday needs and again their emergence, or the transient beauty of art, etc...etc., they are all 
further steps for further worlds. All these human acts, products, feelings, etc., are open to 
further possibilities. We simultaneously feel the imperfection of these entities and their origin 
in the perfect, which transcends them. This is the origin of the experience of our strangeness 
in the world, but this is also the origin of our unshakable experience of being at home in this 
world, since, in spite of our all deficiencies and cruelty of the world, we are embedded in 
perfections. There is always something as a drive, which urges us towards an aim, what we 
can call the final stage or final relief. Man questions as well as being the object of questions. 
His questioning gains its full meaning, on the one hand, from the fact that the reality is 
questionable, the reality can be questioned, and on the other hand, from the fact that his final 
questions necessitate final answers.98 This conatus, however, which asks about the being of 
all beings, is that which we call metaphysics.99 Man wants to know – whereas this willing is 
realized primarily by his intellect – not only the whatness of things, but the totality as it is in 
its unity and coherence of its parts.  
 Nevertheless, one can reject metaphysics as well as the possibility of the cognition of 
reality. But with this rejection, one carries a similar action into execution, namely one 
replaces the intelligible cosmos (kosmos noetos) with death, materiality or nothingness. 
Replacement of the object of our conatus with something improper is that which Max Scheler 
called the installment of a finite good, an idol in place of God.100 Idols, however, are varied. It 
seems that their number and variation is almost infinite. Scheler's project of the “shattering of 
                                                 
98 On the relation of the intellectual act of questioning and the world-openness, in the Neo-Thomist school, 
Emerich Coreth contributed the most notedly on the openning pages of his Metaphysik (Freiburg i.Br.: Herder, 
1980).  
99 As we remarked in a previous chapter referring to Max Scheler: anima naturaliter metaphysica. 
100 See Max Scheler, On the Eternal in Man. Hamden: Archon Books, 1972: 267 
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idols” is therefore also an infinite endeavor. But precisely this infinite desire and process 
shows that we human beings pursue metaphysics. Even if there are idols instead of proper 
objects, even if there are so many dead-ends and deadlocks, reality still remains intelligible. 
On the other hand, in spite of all fragmentations and seemingly useless successiveness of life, 
we still gravitate towards totality. And since we explicitly or implicitly, pursue metaphysics, 
we come to the idea that we must to pursue metaphysics and we must question. 
 I claim that the question of being is implicitly present in all acts of the individual man 
(actus hominis) and in all human acts (actus humanus). One can skip particular problems and 
questions, but the question concerning man's basic orientation is inevitable. Even if 
mathematical rules possess a certain aprioriness and certitude, one can neglect them, since, in 
spite of their necessary nature, they do not belong essentially to human being. Man questions 
in the manner that he cannot evade his questioning, since it is a necessity and aprioriness, in 
which he himself is the subject. In this context man's openness is the framework of his most 
fundamental act of questioning. It might seem to be too stereotypical, but I think the 
following statement is still valid: if there is no openness to the world, we couldn't address the 
totality. From this follows that man exists insofar as he questions about (and in the same 
moment, affirms) the object of his openness: world, being, and God. In other words, man 
himself is the question relating the object of his openness.  
 Man’s openness can have, however, many objects, and it seems that these objects are 
not necessarily of the highest value, that is, in many cases man does not question in all his 
acts the foundation of his existence. For example, in the intellectual openness towards a 
simple, contingent thing, like a documentary, at the first sight it doesn't mean necessarily a 
search for the intelligibility of his existence. The question, what our openness makes possible, 
is however not only one question among many, but it pervades the whole of the human 
existence. Karl Rahner developed a similar view on man's place in the world. He says that the 
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metaphysical question is not any question about any object at all within the implicitly 
presupposed horizon of the question about being. It is – as Rahner says – a radical question 
(in this sense differs from any other), which manifests the basic constituting principles of 
man.101 Later Rahner argues that this question is a transcendental question, which means that 
its main objective is to discover the basic human structure prior to any experience. Rahner 
develops a so-called transcendental philosophy stating that man implicitly already possesses 
the fullness of reality. His theory of the Vorgriff auf das Sein, the preapprehension of being, 
plays a decisive role in his theology and philosophy. He thinks that by the philosophical 
articulation of this concept one can express the fundamental being-and God-orientedness of 
man. Rahner, but this is true also for all the proponents of the transcendental Thomist 
tradition, claims that man already possesses somehow the totality of being. This “somehow”, 
or implicit knowledge is, however, highly problematic, since it rather seems to be a hollow 
knowledge than anything else. Asking the question of what kind of knowledge is 
preapprehension one would be compelled to say that it is a certain knowledge without any 
concrete content. Even if Rahner would respond to the question that “preapprehension can 
only be determined by establishing that to which it attains”,102 it wouldn’t solve the problem, 
since precisely its hollowness questions the raison d'étre of the concept of preapprehension of 
being. One can rightly ask: what's the point of presupposing and introducing a peremptorily 
coined concept if it doesn't have any positive content of whatsoever. It is supposed to convey 
information about the most valuable object, in reality, however, it doesn't fulfill this task. It 
seems therefore that introducing the concept of preapprehension is simply redundant.  
 Even if we cannot accept the final consequence concerning the notion of Vorgriff, 
there are two achievements of the transcendental Thomist school which we can accept: firstly, 
                                                 
101 Karl Rahner, Spirit in the World, New York: Continuum, 1994: 58. 
102 Karl Rahner, op.cit. 143. 
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the emphasizing of the dynamic nature of the intellect; and secondly, the appreciating that this 
dynamic movement of the intellect is toward an absolute being, toward God. 
 When we try to unfold aspects in the person which can be open and concentrate on the 
faculty of the intellect, in contrast to the above mentioned transcendental Thomistic view, we 
do not realize an investigation of the conditions of human cognition, even if we come to the 
same conclusion that man is such a being who has questions about his own existence and 
about the totality of the world altogether. “Man questions.”103 – we say with Rahner, and in 
this simple fact we can find the point of departure of the whole metaphysics. The entities of 
the world and man’s being as well can be set against the questioner: this is a final and 
irreducible phenomenon. On the other hand, however, the ground of the necessity of 
questioning is the questionableness of the world in its totality. The center of our interest is not 
only epistemological, rather metaphysical. We don't seek after only the subjective conditions 
of foundation of cognition, but try to realize a real foundation of the foundation (Begründung 
der Begründung). 
 In the problem of man's openness to the world we describe the questionableness of 
being and world as a response to man's peculiar intellectual dynamism. Nevertheless, we have 
to stress that man's openness has only a theoretical priority to the questionableness of the 
world. The focus of our interest, if I might repeat, is the openness of man's intellect. But how 
can one explore this dynamism and how can this be done in the best way? We can follow, for 
example, Saint Thomas Aquinas in the inquiry about human knowledge, and we can say that 
the facts that we perceive are not simply empty facts; they do not hang in the air. We not only 
accept the facts, but we also constantly evaluate, compare, and question them. Facts, 
happenings, acts, moments, different aspects of life, etc., stand in a wider context in the 
perspective of the knower. Owing to this wider context, we know that these facts are limited 
                                                 
103 Karl Rahner, op.cit. 57. 
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and we experience our limitedness as well. The finite being, man, therefore has an a priori 
knowledge of being; or, to put in this way, at least he has knowledge about the fact that being 
is not absolutely unknown. If, therefore, we follow this latter “minimum” program, we can in 
fact say that being and world are “questionability”.104 This insight concerning the world is the 
starting point of exploring the dynamism of the intellect, which goes hand in hand with the 
investigation of the phenomenon of the openness of the intellect. Only in this way can we 
proceed: the questionableness of the being and the world is a response to and an object of 
man's peculiar intellectual dynamism. 
 The starting point is therefore always man. His basic experience of contingency is a 
natural companion to his worldly existence. Nevertheless, the human being has an eminent 
place within the world, since he is aware of this contingency, whereas the other creatures – 
i.e. the irrational ones – are not. Only the human being is capable of asking questions and 
directing his senses beyond himself. The human being is the one capable of passing himself 
over, of regarding himself from the outside, i.e., from a remote point of view. There is no 
other living being, which can do that. It is therefore a very important characteristic of the 
intellect's openness that only human beings can have. 
 Yet the human being does not analyze himself only, but beyond this, the entirety of 
existence. This transcendent necessity and direction can be observed also within the 
arguments based on contingency: in order to be satisfied, we have to postulate a self-existing 
and by itself necessary being, which underlies every occurrence from every viewpoint (ipsum 
esse subsistens per se necessarium). The existence of such a being excludes non-existence 
and a cannot-be-otherwise existence; its greatness lies within its being the basis for 
everything, and as such, it is not very far from the mystery of the transcendental-mystical 
experience. 
                                                 
104 See Karl Rahner, op.cit. 68. 
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 Now, to understand what I mean by immediate or apriori knowledge of the world in 
case of openness seems to be difficult. This problem is in connection with the question of 
preapprehension of being. In order to understand the problem, let's compare our knowledge of 
the world and being with our knowledge of contingent facts. We obtain knowledge 
concerning things such as emotions, and objects. As the verb “obtain” expresses, there is a 
certain distance between the object and the knower. We “come closer” to things, we “lay 
siege” to things, we want to know its inner and outer structure and components and its 
connection with other things; in one word, we realize a certain type of essence-knowledge, 
i.e., we want to know what it is. In the cognition of entities and objects we – as it were – step 
to the thing. This, however, is a discursive kind of knowledge. In contrast to this, however, 
our knowledge concerning being and the world is not like wandering from one step to 
another, since this knowledge is not the product of a secondary reflection, but in itself is a 
primary one, even though it is open to be more consciously grasped, refined, etc.. In order 
however to know anything in the world, we have to suppose and we have to have knowledge 
about the being and the world. This knowledge is prior to any kind of other knowledge. 
Openness of the intellect therefore possesses a certain kind of knowledge, what we can call 
non-thematized or implicit knowledge. On the other hand in the matters of the world we can 
possess – this would be the ideal of knowledge – clear and explicit knowledge. From this 
follows the most important attribute of the discursive knowledge: it is an acquired knowledge, 
whereas precognition is not acquired, but the ground of (any other kind of) knowledge.  
 Man can question the world, because he knows that it exists, knows about its being. 
Man's all implicit, metaphysical questions refer, on the one hand, to the being of the question, 
on the other hand, to the being of questioning as act. As a matter of fact, however, we cannot 
give the final and substantive cause for this all-embracing question, which is hidden in all our 
acts, as for example we could give the cause of the question of “why does and does not the 
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horse move?” In this case we can answer the question if we point out the fact that the horse is 
lame or is dead. It is likewise sufficient if we refer to the fact, that under normal 
circumstances, horses move lashing. We can give the answer also by referring to the end 
(finis) of the question, namely that we would like to arrive somewhere. In the case of this 
concrete example we are able to explain the act of questioning as well to point to the object of 
the question, that is, its point of reference. In the case of the question referring to being, 
however, we cannot. From this follows the particular position of metaphysics among sciences, 
since it has to prove its theses by its own principles.  
 Man cannot know, cannot judge, cannot claim anything without presupposing the 
intellect's openness and being (ens) in an implicit way. There is no cognition, no acts without 
the prior grasp of the intellect's openness and being. Our intellect grasps things, even non-
existing ones, as embedded in being. The question of man, the analytics of man and the 
question relating to being are inseparable linked. We cannot lose sight of either of them in 
dealing with one of them. Even if we start from man's everyday experience of his 
contingency, we have to acknowledge that what man does is a necessary metaphysical 
questioning and it includes in an eminent way himself, therefore human metaphysics is in the 
strongest connection with the analytic of man. In other words, as we have said in the previous 
chapter quoting Emerich Coreth's words: “Anthropology and ontology are […] nothing but 
two aspects of one and the same philosophical approach.” As a preliminary conclusion, 
however, it seems that the intellect is openness par excellence.  
 The intellect can have a self-knowing relation. What we are trying to outline here is 
one of the traditional problems of philosophy. Its main thesis is the original unity of the 
cognition and the knower, which is called, according to Hegel and some other schools of 
philosophy, as being-with-itself (bei-sich-sein) of being. Since every being exists, it can be 
known by its existence (that is, by its participation in being). The importance of this insight is 
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enormous, since along this thought there can be seen the competence of philosophy in issues 
of theology. It also clearly opposes to any kind of metaphysical irrationalism, which says that 
there are domains of being and values unattainable for intellect. On the other hand, however, 
it also means a dismissal of all forms of skepticism, which deny the possibility of cognition. 
Above all this insight says that knowledgeableness constitutes the basic structure of all 
existent being and after all affirms the cognition of God. 
 I think, that our conclusion is in full accordance with Saint Thomas Aquinas, who says 
that omne ens est verum. This means that insofar as the particular being (or the existent) 
exists, it participates in being, and insofar as it participates in being, it is true, that is, 
cognizable. This cognizableness, however, is not added from outside to the particular being, 
but it is a constituent part of the being. This is the reason why we can say that the possibility 
to know things is a transcendental (taken in the sense of the transcendence of the 
transcendentals of medieval philosophy, that is, transcendental is, which is independent from 
the particular being and the specific categories of being) characteristic of all beings. Quidquid 
enim esse potest, intelligi potest.105  - says Thomas Aquinas referring to the main thesis of his 
metaphysics, namely, every being is susceptible of being interiorised in thought and being 
known. Aquinas adds to the problem of being and cognition, that it is not a unity or 
compound of two distinct entities, but an original togetherness: intellectum et intelligibile 
oportet proportionata esse, et in unius generis.106 We can ask, what does it mean in the case 
of knowledge and knower to have the same origin (in unius generis)? In this question we are 
interested in the philosophical ground of the unity. Now, according to Saint Thomas Aquinas, 
                                                 
105  Summa contra Gentiles II. 98. 
106 Sententia libri Metaphysicae. Prooemium 
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being, which is susceptible of being interiorised, and the intellect, which is here the source of 
cognition, are one in the act (actus) of being: intellectus et intelligibile in actu sint unum.107  
 Thomas Aquinas emphasized that everything that exists, is in being, and susceptible of 
being interiorized, therefore – being and cognition – is one in the act of being (in actu sint 
unum). In other words – using a Heideggerian vocabulary – the unity of being and cognition 
means an all-supposed “being-for-itself”, an “in-itself-reflectedness” or “subjectivity”.108 
While by the concept of “being-for-itself” we approach the problem from the viewpoint of 
being, the concepts of “in-itself-reflectedness” and “subjectivity” means the same thing, but 
from the viewpoint of cognition. The general meaning of these concepts is that the intellect 
has an active role in cognition and all that we know comes to be known by the illumination of 
the intellect. As we see material lights (lights of colors) in colors, so see we the “light” of the 
intellect in every cognizable thing as it illuminates them. For that very reason, if we suppose 
the original openness and activity of the intellect and not its passivity or numbness, then we 
can conclude that it is not the object that originates knowledge, but the mode as we interiorize 
it. Moreover, if we suppose that openness is one of the principal characteristics of the 
intellect, then we can disprove the naïve sensualist theory of cognition of materialists.  
 Cognition is not an encounter of two things in time, nor a coincidental finding of the 
other, nor a seizure of the other. I think that one shouldn't artificially divide cognition into two 
pieces, since the object and the knower are not “strangers” for each other, but there is an 
original mutual ordination. There are many passages where Thomas Aquinas refers to this. He 
says, for example with Aristotle, that anima est quodammodo omnia109 or on another place 
                                                 
107 Ibidem (I do not mean the coinciding of being and knowing in God, because God’s knowing infinitely 
many possible worlds does not make these actual beings, nor is God all he knows, otherwise He would be finite, 
sinning etc.) 
108 As far as I know Saint Thomas Aquinas does not use either of the expressions expressis verbis, 
nevertheless, I think, that the expressions listed here mean the same as the Scholastic reditio subjecti in seipsum.  
109 STh I. q.14. a.1.; STh I. q.16. a.3.; or in the De Ver q.4. a.8., De Ver. q.24. a.10. (and in many other passages) 
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again referring to Aristotle that idem est intellectus et quod intelligitur.110 The point of all 
these passages is to underline that the ontic possibility of cognition is based on the openness 
of the particular being and the being. The passage of “man [soul] is in a sense all things” 
(quodammodo omnia) means that man is able know everything that is above and below the 
sky. Animals or other automatons do not have this characteristic, because they do not possess 
such a high level of openness in cognition. The authentic connection of man – in a sense – 
with everything in his cognition also means that knowing the thing in itself (knowing its Ding 
an sich), man does not deform or destroy it. It was Kant who claimed, that with the attainment 
of the Ding an sich we would deform and degrade it to a “phenomenon” or an “object”, 
therefore, according to Kant, man does not know the thing in itself. In a similar way Kant 
denied that man can know God and spiritual realities. His idealism – and this is precisely one 
defect of his philosophy – restricted human knowledge to the phenomena of space and time, 
and even here claimed that we do not know what space and time and things in them are in 
themselves, but know them as pure appearances formed by our a priori forms of intuition and 
perception, receiving from outside solely a chaos of sense impressions. When Kant proceeds 
to speak of our transcendental Ideas of world, soul, free will, God, immortality, etc., he sees 
them as entirely produced by human reason and while being necessarily thought by us, not 
giving us any knowledge of autonomous reality. 
That is, Kant had not overcome the skepticism of Hume, since the “unreliable” 
experience remained the main criterion of his system. According to Kant, experience only 
provides us with a chaos of sense impressions that in some way issue from unknown things in 
themselves wherefore neither material things nor the spiritual soul and God can be known in 
themselves but rather are either appearances in time and space informed by our subjective 
forms of intuition of time and space or transcendental ideas like the world, soul, and God, that 
                                                 
110  ScG II. ch.78. n.9.  
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are generated by the subject when it extends the categories (necessarily but in a certain sense 
“illegitimately”) beyond their application to appearances. Nevertheless, it must be admitted 
that the main reason for the Kantian agnosticism is not the misinterpretation of the alleged 
transcendental ego, but is due to not being grounded in the objectivity of cognition. 
Cognition, in my view, is given by the openness of things, and means perfection also for the 
one who, in a sense, “participates” in it. In this sense cognition, the most authentic act of the 
intellect, is neither a deformation, nor a degradation, but an authentic connectedness with 
things themselves, or, in other words, with objectivity. 
 Recapitulating our main points, we can say that in respect to the intellect man is open 
to the world in many senses. The former analysis tried to unfold these points albeit not in the 
length as these problems in fact would require. From the viewpoint of openness, however, I 
think there are four main points by which we can characterize intellect. 
1. Man’s intellect implicitely possesses the totality of being. Man can possess the 
totality of being due to the peculiar character of his intellect, which is open to 
the totality of being. The openness of the intellect is, therefore, threefold: 1. the 
intellect is open to the preliminary, non-thematized knowledge of being 
(Vorgriff), 2. the intellect is open to the cognition of contingent beings and 3. 
the intellect is open to know being in its totality.  
2. Holding the openness of the intellect is an essential requirement for a realist 
philosophy. If, according to our previous insights, knowledge is the self-giving 
of the object within the subject’s realm, then it also means that we have the 
possibility of obtaining knowledge of essences. In other words, we (our 
intellect) are open to things themselves. Needless to say, this insight has the 
most far-reaching consequences. Without this presupposition it would be 
nonsensical to talk about the possibility of attaining knowledge of any kind of 
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essence.  
3. Man first and foremost is open to other persons. If we say that the intellect is a 
faculty, in which man is open to the world, then it helps to overcome solipsism 
as well as other objective materialist views of epistemology. The theory of 
openness of the intellect can better explain the complete return (reditio 
completa) of the subject, since it is always realized through another person, to 
whom the intellect is open. The affirmation of the existence of the other person 
refutes rigid forms of solipsism and provides solid ground for rejecting 
(sensualist) materialism, which claims that there are no spiritual beings and 
cognition is only sense experience.  
4. Finally, the affirmation of the openness of the intellect not only explains the 
possibility of reaching towards objects, but the self-perfection of the knower 
(intellect) as well. The knower (our intellect) is not an isolated planet, which 
has nothing to do with the world around him and has no connection 
whatsoever. On the contrary, there is a positive relation between the knower 
and the objects, and there is a self-realization, that is, perfection (intelligere est 
perfectio intelligentis), that takes places in the “participation” in them.  
 
The openness of the will 
 Among many faculties of man there is the faculty of the will. Our question in the 
present section of the chapter is: which characteristic does the openness of the will have in 
man? Our general question is in this section whether the human will can be characterized as 
open to the world or God. I think the best way to proceed in the framework of this problem is 
to analyze different human acts from the viewpoint of a possible openness. Nevertheless, our 
first working hypothesis should be a presuppositionless approach to the phenomenon of the 
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will. It means that we should avoid premature assumptions like all acts of the will are nothing 
but different types of openness or the common attribute of all acts of the will is their other-
directedness. Of course, we have an anticipatory understanding on the nature of the will 
coming from our natural and everyday attitude. Whether these statements concerning the acts 
of will are true or not, the following discussion has to solve. Here, argumentation means the 
analysis of examples of concrete acts as they are given to us. I shall analyze 
phenomenologically and philosophically the different aspects and surfaces of (world-
)openness of acts of the will. To analyze something phenomenologically means that I 
presuppose that the phenomenon of world-openness of acts of the will has a philosophically 
meaningful essence, which can be the subject of a phenomenological analysis. 
 First, I shall mention four general points, which characterize the will as a human 
faculty. Later, I shall characterize volitional acts in five points. Both analyses will be realized 
from the viewpoint of the openness of the will.  
 The will is a spiritual phenomenon, which influences and regulates our acts. There are 
basically two kinds of will. These two kinds of will differ in their direction.111 The first kind 
of will is that which commands man in a positive way. Man can urge and command himself to 
do something. One can stimulate oneself in a situation, where one comes to the end of one's 
rope. For example, a sportsman in the last few meters, even if he is out of breath and under 
normal circumstances would give up the competition, can urge himself to complete the 
distance. His will, and within his will he himself wants to attain a goal, which is beyond his 
reach. We can say, therefore, that the sportsman in his will is open to something that is 
desired. The object of his desire is clearly a distinct entity, which exerts an influence on him. 
The simple “I will” of the sportsman expresses the sportsman's conscious attitude towards the 
                                                 
111 There are many classical disctinctions such as the will as responding to objects (endowed with some 
importance) and the will as commanding actions. 
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relation and difference which exists between him and his aim, and, at the same time, the 
conscious desire to overcome this difference.  
 There is, however, another type of will, which is the very opposite of the former, 
namely, it hinders the person from doing something. There are situations when we abstain or 
choose not to do something by our mental power. The best examples of this kind of will are 
when someone overcomes his instincts. According to their laws, Christian monks have to 
abstain from intercourse, that is, they must control one of their most decisive and natural 
instincts. Nevertheless, not every instinct has the same level of naturalness. In the case of a 
heavy pain we cry and suffer; we do it according to the drive of our instincts. We cry and 
suffer in each instance of injury, without restrictions. In the case of sexuality, however, which 
obviously has an overwhelming power, much deeper than other instincts can have, we do not 
initiate intercourse in every case, therefore sexuality, although it belongs to our everyday life, 
(since we are partly sexual beings), it is not as natural as for example eating and sleeping are. 
Now, let us take the example of the relation of will and the phenomenon of sexuality of 
monks. Monks can control the sexual instinct by the help of their will.112 The instinct in 
question insofar as it were satisfied through sexual activity of any kind, according to their 
conviction, would cause serious harm in their relation with God because they would break 
their vow of chastity which they have freely taken and because sexual activity outside 
marriage is immoral also for those who are not monks. Therefore, they try to avoid living 
sexual relations, they abstain from intercourse. In short, they simply don't want to perform 
sexual acts of any kind including the legitimate sexual life of marriage. Of course, their will to 
renounce any good or evil form of human sexuality is not a mere negative will not to do 
something but has such noble positive motives as a special undivided love of God. We can 
reformulate our statement above: the simple “I will”, that is the “I will, not marry nor have 
                                                 
112 Again, we investigate this phenomenon from a phenomenological point of view, not presupposing 
God's grace, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, etc., as for example theologians do. 
 94 
sexual relations with a wife” of the monk expresses the monk's conscious attitude to the 
relation of a state of affair which exists between him and his aim, and, at the same time, the 
conscious desire to overcome this difference. This, however, again presupposes a certain kind 
of openness of the will.  
 Another common characteristic of all acts of the will is that their starting point is the 
experience of desire or desires. This attribute again reveals an aspect of the openness of the 
will. Let us take the example of the will of eating a piece of cake. Before we would start to 
will to eat the cake, there are many desires which precede the actual will of eating. It does not 
mean, however, that desires initiate or define the act of will. Desires certainly influence 
volitional acts, but they are not the only initiators of an act. Volitional acts are, ontologically 
speaking, independent from desires. I think genuine volitional acts, by their definition, are 
free in the full sense of the word. Now, before we would want to eat the piece of cake, there is 
for example the desire to eat but not necessarily to eat the cake. We also might not just have 
the desire to eat because we are hungry or enjoy fine food but the more specific desire to eat 
something sweet in general and to eat this sweet cake in particular. Nevertheless, there are 
other desires, which are precisely the opposite of the former. There is, for example, the desire 
not to eat any sweet, since sweets before the meal spoil one's appetite. But there is also the 
desire not to put on weight, or precisely the opposite of this, to put some weight on, because 
of health reasons. Preceding the act of will there are therefore many desires which incline us 
to different actions and leave us different options. Now, in the example of the will of eating a 
cake, the will reconsiders and reconsiders, chooses between different possible actions based 
on its previous experiences. In this process one can observe a certain character, which is 
precisely the opposite of being closed in man's own world. Whenever man considers his 
experiences and deliberately, with his totality chooses and accomplishes one act of the will in 
contrast to others, he transcends the realization of other options. On the one hand, the will 
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transcends man, on the other, it essentially belongs to man. Independently of the quality of the 
desire (be it a wrong or a good direction), this capacity expresses the openness of the will.  
 The third point concerns the function of the will as it is in connection with the 
conscious choice between desires. Here, the emphasis is on being conscious. An animal or an 
impersonal being, referring back to our previous example, couldn't choose intelligently 
between desires, aims and means. Moreover, an animal couldn't reflect on its “deliberate” 
choice. Man, on the contrary, is able to think his choice over deliberately and to consider the 
consequences as well as to reflect on the fact that even if he has chosen to eat the cake, he 
knows, that he could have done otherwise. We can conclude that the faculty of the will is a 
specifically human feature. As our everyday examples show, even if I choose to do something 
– during and after the action – I know that there was no necessary constraint not to choose 
otherwise that I wanted with my full awareness. Now, the one who is aware or conscious of 
his acts, acts intentionally, in other words, has an authentic connection with entities or things 
of the world. This, however, again means the transcending of the borders of the surroundings 
of man, and shows that man possesses a world. Recalling some of the things we have said 
previously on world-openness and on Scheler’s insights into the religious act and idols, we 
may add: Possessing a world – from the viewpoint of the will and deliberateness – means that 
theoretically man is able to respond with his will to the absolute totality of the world as well 
as, when he recognizes the finitude and limitation and contingency of the world  – as the final 
object of his will – to God whom he can search for, desire, and, in the deepest level of free 
will adore and love for his own sake. It is here again that an inner connection between world-
openness and god-openness becomes evident, not in the pantheistic sense of identifying God 
and world but on the contrary, in the Augustinian sense that the world, if we are open not only 
to its beauty and greatness but also to its finitude, cries out to us: look above us, and thus 
opens our minds to a being and a good that infinitely transcends the world. In other words, the 
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world-openness of intellect and will cannot even discover and open itself to its finitude and 
positive depth without discovering the need for an entirely new openness that can have as its 
object only the absolute being such that the world, if it were the only and ultimate object of 
openness, and our desire and will and heart would love it alone, would turn into an idol. 
The fourth general characteristic of the will as human faculty is that it is always 
interwoven with the emotional and intellectual life. There are millions of emotions and 
deliberations along one single volitional act. In other words, volitional acts do not proceed all 
by themselves, rather, they are accompanied by emotions. But there are also intellectual 
justifications and motivations concerning the volitional act. When I, for example, want to eat 
the cake, although my will comprises the object of the eating and the cake, there are countless 
other secondary objects participating in the process of willing. Willing to eat the cake also 
means to consider the secondary object of nutrition: this food has a nutritional value, which is 
good and healthy for my body. 
Willing to eat the cake also means to consider the real value of willing to eat the cake, 
that is, the value of that particular act of will. The “will” of impersonal beings or animals does 
not have this character. An animal for example cannot change its mind, cannot stop eating and 
turning to – according to its considerations – a higher value, thus acknowledging the lesser 
value of eating. An animal attacked during feeding stops eating and defends itself, but not 
because it deliberates and ponders upon the values of life and food. An animal does not have 
the capacity to distinguish between the values of the life and the food. Consequently, an 
animal will never sacrifice its life for higher reasons and values.113 Man can sacrifice his life 
as, for example, thousands of martyrs did.  
Eating a cake is only a subjectively and provisionally satisfying good. Nevertheless, as 
an example it also shows the deep essence and vocation of free will and its transcendence 
                                                 
113 Even if there are some reports on that. I think, however, that these reports are based on 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations of animal behavior.  
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(namely it transcends the objectively and provisionally satisfying good) without which we 
cannot understand the will’s world-openness and god-openness. If our relation to other 
persons or God is only a desire of our happiness, we cannot love them more than ourselves. 
We cannot make full justification for the deeds of martyrs, there is no justification of higher 
values and values at all without the transcendence of the will. 
The most important different openness of free will is that of value-response. There 
were number of thinkers, especially in the 20th century such as Max Scheler, Dietrich von 
Hildebrand and Karol Wojtyla, who attributed special importance to the authentic 
understanding of the person. In their understanding, following the traditional thought, the 
person is unrepeatable, individual, undivided, and rational being endowed with dignity and 
freedom. In this sense value-response means loving someone not for my own sake or for my 
own desires, emotions, but for something or someone that has similar human personality and 
freedom as I have. It is clear that only human beings can have human personality and 
characteristics which are accompanied to the person. Love for the beloved person’s sake is a 
typical example of value-response of the free will. In this example our will governs us to love 
something, which does not belong to us, which is totally beyond our reach. Now, to love for 
the beloved person’s sake (who also has free will and in many cases the free will of the 
beloved person can cause us serious harms) means to accept the innermost core of his or her 
being and leaving our own – in many cases selfish – desires and deliberations. In cases like 
this we love the person only for him- or herself (persona est amanda propter seipsam). Or 
another example of value-response of free will is the love of God. In both cases we govern 
our will according to the dignity and inalienated value(s) of the beloved person. In both cases 
we respond to the person, and it is a real openness of the will if it can give an adequate answer 
to the value of the person.  
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 As we see, the act of the will stands in the middle of countless emotions, intellectual 
deliberations, motivations, justifications, etc. However, this means also that each act of the 
will is in essential connection with reality (even if the will is directed to fiction, the point of 
fiction is to point to a higher reality). In other words, the acts of the will are open to the world. 
By this openness the will does not operate like the unidirectional instincts of animals. In 
comparison to human beings, animals behave like “idiots”, taken in the ancient Greek sense 
of the word. The word idiot comes from the Greek idiotes, which originally referred to a 
person who did participate in the political or public life of the polis, in other words, someone 
who lived an individual life, unconcerned with larger, political affairs. Idiotes are those who 
can concentrate only on one single issue,114 which is most of the cases themselves. Now, man 
owing to the openness of his will, which – as we said – is interwoven with the intellectual and 
emotional life, does not behave along the (one single) principle of instincts, but lives a 
freestanding autonomous life. 
 Now, to sum up, we can characterize volitional acts in five points from the point of 
view of their openness.  
1. In the act of the will there is an anticipatory knowledge of the aim. It means that 
although the aim is the last in the order of execution, it, on the one hand, determines the 
whole process of the act of will, on the other, it directs and renders intelligible the act. As 
Thomas Aquinas said: Finis est primus in intentione et ultimus in executione.115 Having an 
anticipatory knowledge of the aim of the act means that the will already possesses something 
that actually does not have the willing man. In this sense the will is open to the anticipatory 
knowledge of the aim. 
2. In every volitional act there is a certain aspiration for the particular aim of the act. For 
example, when I want to achieve something, then the final aim functions like an independent 
                                                 
114 The meaning of the word idiotes is „man of one issue” or „man of one business”. 
115 Summa Theologiae I.II. 1.3. ad 2 
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leitmotif for all my acts. Independently of whether this aim is internal (that is, one's efforts are 
directed in the direction of the self) or external, it is always something extra to my present 
state. The will, therefore, aspiring this “extra”, has to be open to this.   
3. There is, however, a constant reconsideration of the possible consequences of the 
modes of act and different acts. Reconsidering the possible consequences indicates the 
openness of the will to the consequences of the reconsideration. It is a peculiarity of the act of 
will that we can define an absolute zero point as the origin or source of the act: this zero point 
is the decision concerning the act. When I decide something, in its own context, everything 
must be subordinated to this decision. The decision itself, however, is not yet accomplished, 
the content and the object of the decision is still in process. As a matter of fact, a decision can 
be never completed, since whenever it is completed, it ceases to be a decision proper. 
Decision, however, as one of the most important factors of the volitional act, indicates a 
certain lack in man. This lack must be overcome and replaced by positive content. This, 
however, means that man opens up to the world, breaks out of the closedness of his present 
state. When I, for example, make up my mind to do something, then this decision will serve 
as principle and driver throughout the whole project. The factor of decision therefore also 
indicates the open character of volitional acts. 
4. The ultimate characteristic which distinguishes an act of the will from other acts is the 
peculiar character of the realization or execution of acts. Now, man can never participate in 
his acts with and in all his totality, as for example God can. Man's acts therefore are not 
identical with his personality. The reason for that is that man does not possess himself, he is 
in the process of continuous change. Man is in reality – using the phrase of Max Scheler and 
Karol Wojtyla – an “acting person”, who realizes himself through his acts as authentic 
connections with the world, but this self-realization, because of our worldly, individual being, 
is only partial. His different acts represent different aspects of his personality, as well as 
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different dimensions of his personality take part and are realized in these acts. Man cannot 
compress his whole reality into one single volitional act. This is because man is a contingent 
being: contingent in all acts of his being, contingent in his acts, contingent in the deliberation 
of his act as well as in its consequences. As a matter of fact, strictly speaking one cannot pre-
calculate the outcomes of man's acts. Since the outcome, the execution of a human act 
immediately “leaves” man. In the case of God, however, it is just the very opposite. Since 
God is not a contingent being, his will does not constitute an independent faculty, which 
would acquire more (in being) than what God is. As Thomas Aquinas says, since there is no 
difference between God's being and essence (between His esse and essentia), the will of God, 
that is the principal object of the divine will, is His essence.116 We can conclude that the 
human realization of the act of the will can be considered as an act, which surpasses man, 
therefore this character also proves the openness of the act of the will. 
Nevertheless, there are other instances which show different forms of closedness of 
the will to the world and to God. One example for the closedness of the will is when man 
follows the path of his own desires. Concupiscence is a typical example of the closedness of 
the will. In cases like this man follows his “blind” or “shortsighted” will, by which he finds 
temporal pleasure and values of lower standard, and rejects God’s original will, which, 
however, would provide higher values. Pride is again an example for the very opposite of the 
openness of the will. A conceited person as a matter of fact can lose his self-controll. His will 
follows contingent purposes, which, however, are non-existent. To believe, for example, that 
the writer of this essay has reached the stage of holiness is a deception, since it contradicts to 
the facts of his present state. With believing this, his will would lead him acting against his 
original vocation. It would restrict his freedom and finally it could pervert his whole 
personality. Pride, therefore, leads to a closedness to God and the world, and is an entirely 
                                                 
116 See: Summa contra Gentiles lib. I. cap. 73-74. 
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wrong direction of the will.  
Nevertheless, the two examples also show that, even if the will can take a wrong 
direction, ontologically speaking the will is open to the infinite. The transcendence of man’s 
vocation means that we have to find it beyond our own – many times misleading – will. In our 
experiences (of goodness, truth, etc.) we directly experience that we are ordained to the 
infinite, on the other hand however, nothing prevents us to say no to our infinite vocation. 
Because of the contrary nature of affirmation and negation, the conflict of egoism (that is, 
egoism of my own will) and openness can result in an existential crisis, which can lead man to 
sin. But even the sinful person as well as his misled will is open to the infinite reality. 
 
The openness of the heart 
 There are many faculties in the human being. Nevertheless, I think – if I might 
generalize the principal thesis of my work – that they all share the same outward direction (of 
their common openness) and all have the very same ultimate direction and object.117 In other 
words, in their openness they are all open to God as their ultimate object.118 It is also true for 
those acts (having their origin in any of the faculties), which seem to have an inward 
direction, such as thinking or self-observation. One of the typical forms of the world-openness 
of man is love. Philosophers usually consider love as the faculty of the heart. Our serious love 
connections are transmitted from heart to heart. In this section we are interested in the 
openness of the heart. Our question: What peculiarities the openness of different types of acts 
of love has? 
                                                 
117 A faculty is not an act and does not as faculty have an outward direction in the way acts have one, but 
possibly in a very different sense. Faculties are more properly directed as potentialities to acts in the person, and 
in this sense they can have objects. 
118 The openness of different human characteristics and of man himself is a huge topic, that we cannot 
investigate here in its fullness. The present chapter cannot comprise all the aspects of openness in all possible 
human acts. The chapter therefore should be taken as outline of a vaster topic. 
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 Throughout the history of philosophy, the heart was defined as the innermost core of 
the human being where attitudes such as love reside. In my view the phenomenon what we 
call heart is the center of the person. In this sense heart is the the center of human affective 
life, which includes intentional and spiritual forms of affectivity or any kind of feelings.  
In common language we call someone open-minded and open-hearted when one 
sincerely gives room for the reception of information, facts coming from somewhere else. For 
example if, in a serious conversation, I thoughtfully listen and accept the complaints of my 
interlocutor, things that embarrass him, affect his life, get under his skin, etc., I can be 
considered open-hearted. I am open to his words, as well as his feelings, his hidden emotions. 
This openness enables me – beyond the mere hearing of his complaints – to comprehend what 
is hidden in his spoken words, as well as, what he himself – in some cases – can neither 
comprehend nor formulate. In its general meaning the openness of the heart means to be open 
basically to everything, but not everything that is heard, seen or experienced is good to hear, 
see and experience for man. In other words, not everything is valuable or good, and would 
contribute to the development of the personality of man.  
 The receptive character of the openness of the heart – as well as its responsive 
character to the other person, the availability to the other, self-donation, etc., – is a 
constitutive element of the human being, it can, however, also lead to miserable delusions. 
Take the example of many delinquents, who try to take advantage of the open-heartedness of 
many people. For example, in misappropriating donations, criminals misuse open-heartedness 
of the heart of someone else with the intention of not fulfilling the real, expected object of that 
person’s openness. In these cases, the openness of the heart of the victim is directed to 
something; it has a certain object, which can and is desired to be achieved, but can be also 
substituted with something else. The latter case, however, is what we call fraud, and can cause 
serious injuries or trauma to the victim. Openness of the heart in cases like this, therefore, can 
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have many different objects: appropriate objects, inappropriate objects, virtual objects, real 
objects, etc. It should also be noted that there is qualitative difference between the objects as 
answers to openness; that is, there are good, less good and wrong objects of openness of the 
heart. An act of fraud of the victimizer is also an answer to the openness of the heart of the 
victim, however an inadequate one. In short, since openness of the heart is always an 
openness to something, its openness demands an answer. 
 The former two examples can be considered two special forms or manifestations of 
openness in love of the victim. Now, we continue the investigation of examples of the 
openness of the heart and we turn to another example, another form of love. In the next 
example we will consider sincerity as a certain form of openness of the heart. We usually say 
that a good marriage depends on the sincere openness of the partners. If the partners are fully 
open to the other, then we speak of a good marriage. I do think, however, that sincerity 
sometimes does more harm than good, since sincerity is not the single value in a love 
relationship. There are so many problems arising in the family because of the erroneous 
understanding of values. Influenced mainly by the spirit of the age, which says that there is no 
higher value than sincerity independently of whatever you do in your life, partners usually say 
that the highest value is sincerity regardless of how inappropriate or disgusting the issue is 
which they share with the partner. To be sure, sincerity is an important value in spousal love, 
but not the only one. It is associated with numerous other values and there is in spousal love – 
as in every worldly situation – a certain hierarchy of values. Sincerity in spousal love plays a 
decisive role, but in certain situations other values, for example the value of good manners or 
of consideration of what a beloved person can bear to hear, put the value of openness of 
sincerity into perspective and show that a flat sincerity in simply and inconsiderately 
revealing everything to another person is no authentic moral value. In spousal love, however, 
there are other more authentic aspects of openness.  
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 In spousal love – as for example in friendship too, which phenomenologically likewise 
is a certain type of love – there exists a certain intellectual openness toward the partner. This 
openness is manifested when the spouses take each other into their confidence, or when they 
carefully listen to the sometimes unfounded complaints of the other, and, being prompted by 
the complaints, try to help to overcome the situation. Intellectual openness in spousal love, 
however, might concern good events in life. The married couple can have many good, 
common experiences, such as the experience of joy over their children's success. The 
openness of the heart can manifest itself in many other forms in love. Without providing more 
examples, we can say that they all share the character of other-directedness. This means that 
performing the act of love the direction of the act points to an other entity, which can be an 
object or objects (which is necessarily a lower level of the full meaning of love) or person or 
persons (which is a higher level of fulfillment of the act of love) or both.  
 Besides the intellectual openness, there is also the bodily openness in spousal love. 
The bodily aspect plays a decisive role in the relation of man and woman. In spousal love, it is 
a unique way of the realization of unity of man and woman. In Dietrich von Hildebrand's 
view, sexuality finds its full meaning and place only in the marriage of a man and a woman. 
Within this context, although the body is only one of the “vehicles” of self-giving, its role is 
indispensable. The aim of spousal love is the total self-giving of the person to the other, where 
self-giving can be conceived as one special form of openness. Now, such an intensity and 
degree of loving openness that makes the total mutual sexual gift and union an expression of 
spousal love and is infinitely more than purely “sexual openness” found also in a whore. The 
openness of total self-giving in a love of another person for her own sake and expressed also 
in the conjugal act, cannot be found in phenomena  of purely “sexual openness” which are 
totally different from  spousal love, such a promiscuity or sexual games of unwed couples. 
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Moreover, the sexual aspect plays a lesser or no role at all in other categories of love. 
Hildebrand says concerning the unique place of spousal love:  
Through a real love, man is drawn to his depth. His relation to the entire 
world becomes different, more authentic. 
This spousal love aspires to a union which extends much farther than that of 
simple friendship, filial love or parental love. It desires a bodily union. In 
spousal love, the body of the beloved assumes a unique charm as the vessel 
of this person's soul...119 
 
We see that spousal love clearly possesses the bodily aspects of openness. The spouses are 
open to the other in, as well as through, their body. Moreover, they can perform the most 
intimate act of bodily union. In contrast to this, while there can be an intellectual openness to 
the other in friendship, the bodily aspect plays a minimized role. Friends are intellectually and 
spiritually open to the other, and this relation is mutual,120 nevertheless sexuality, and the 
bodily aspect of sincere openness by its definition, does not constitute an essential part of 
friendship. In the case of friendship therefore, the bodily aspect of the openness of love is 
missing.  
 In general we can say that all kinds of love have the character of other-directedness. 
Other-directedness, however, presupposes that there is a certain order of love, as for example 
Plato has explained in his Symposium, in a way that does not take into account the unique 
nature of spousal love between man and woman but rather sees the example of love that 
includes the sexual sphere in homosexual love, even though holds that this love ought not be 
“lived out” in its sexual dimensions as is especially shown in Alcibiades-speech on Socrates 
in the Symposium. In the Symposium, Eros is the love of good and beauty, nevertheless, Eros 
starts precisely from the lack of good and beauty. In this sense, Eros is the guiding principle 
of man's life, which shows how to overcome and how to live real (philosophical) life. Since 
the aim of love – says Plato – is the generating in Beauty, one can attain it through stages. On 
the first stage there is the physical love, on the second the spiritual love. On the third stage 
                                                 
119 Dietrich von Hildebrand, Man and Woman, Chicago, Illinois: Franciscan Herald Press, 1966: 18. 
120 Since it is due to the essence of friendship to be mutual. 
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one loves arts, then coming to the fourth, there are the lovers of truth. This is followed by the 
stage of science and cognition, and on the ultimate stage there can be found lovers of the 
absolute Beauty. This ascent in love to the “final and highest mystery” begins with love for an 
individual young man and ends with love for the Form of Beauty, which “always is and 
neither comes to be nor passes away, neither waxes nor wanes.”121 Following Plato, we can 
say that the other-directedness of love cannot stop at particular entities nor worldly, although 
beautiful things. When we talk about other-directedness, it does not mean that the direct 
object (direction) of the openness would be the tipical other. The act of love by its essence 
exceeds the other and strives for the love of a person in her totality. It is also true for such a 
paradoxical phenomenon like self-love. We would suppose that self-love is directed only to 
the person who performs this act. Self-love is, however, only the first step toward others. In 
other words, self-love is one form of love, which centers round the self, but radiates through 
the borders of the self. The degree to which one loves oneself will determine the degree to 
which one is able to extend love to others. Those who hate themselves, that is, cannot perform 
an authentic form of love and actually perform an antithesis of it, are unable to exercise a 
sympathetic, self-offering act. Consequently, those who hate themselves are closed in their 
heart to themselves as well as to others. 
 In the following we will concentrate on features of openness of the heart and love 
towards God. The main question of the section on the openness of the heart was: what 
peculiarities the openness of different types of acts of love has? Our main question here is: in 
what sense does the openness of the heart towards God differ from other types of openness of 
the heart. Openness of the heart to something reaches its highest point in the ordination of 
man to God. Saint Augustine expressed the restlessness of the heart that has not found God in 
his famous saying: “You have made us for yourself, O Lord, restless is our heart until rests in 
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you.” This restlessness which any  man, even the most evil and closedminded possesses, on 
the hand implies a structural openness of man to God, and on the other hand is a sign that man 
is not yet in a comprehensive intellectual, volitional, and affective way open to God. In the 
latter sense openness of the heart means a readiness to accept values, goods, and the true 
vocation of man. Since God is the highest good, value and the most loveable being for man, 
man’s openness finds its highest object in the love of God. The openness of the heart towards 
God therefore has no limitations in the sense that openness can have in the case of friendship 
or spousal love for instance. Openness of the heart in spousal love, for example, necessarily 
encounters the “limits” of the other person and, in a positive sense, is, through its exclusivity, 
limited to one person only, which is far from an imperfection of spousal love: the openness of 
the spousal love of the husband aims at his wife, but only his wife and not other women. In 
this kind of act of love the openness of the heart must be directed at one individual and 
irreplaceable person, otherwise this spousal love ceases to be spousal love and becomes 
something else – in many cases a perverted form of love and openness. When man is open to 
God, in his heart he encounters the fullness of love and goodness. The openness of the heart 
to God comprises in an incomparably higher manner all aspects of the openness that we 
discussed in the preceding part of this section. In the openness of the heart towards God 
therefore man can really find his rest.122 
 Investigating the different faculties of man, we have tried to characterize the openness 
of the heart from the aspect of love. This is basically what we have done so far in this section. 
There are, however, numerous other forms of love and similar phenomena, in which one 
could also point out the characteristics of openness of the heart. Solidarity, sympathy, 
fraternity, brotherhood, patriotism, benevolence, parental love, God's love toward man, 
endearment, affection, attachment, passion, fervor, ardor, charity, desire, adoration, worship, 
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etc., etc., are all individual cases of the very same phenomenon, love.123 They are all special 
kinds of love(s) sharing common characteristics. From our point of view, however, the most 
important is that the character of openness of all these cases of love is undeniable. In one way 
or another, they all share the attribute of being open to something or someone. We have seen 
in the previous examples that some of them have the bodily aspect of openness, some of them 
not; some of them are only intellectually open to the other lacking the bodily factor, some of 
them not; some of them essentially involve the corporate aspect such as patriotism, others not. 
However we characterize the different forms of love, one after the other, there is one attribute 
which seems to be common in all manifestations of love, this is the other-directedness. 
 
Openness of the faith 
 In the following section I shall concentrate on another aspect in which the person can 
be open. I shall analyze the openness of faith, presupposing that faith is one of man's most 
important acts. Throughout the whole thesis the main idea was to show openness as a kind of 
ontological openness of man, which can actualize itself through different acts. Searching for 
the possible manifestations and actualizations, however, I think that the act of faith is also a 
significant “place” for the manifestation of openness. Here I continue the restricted analysis of 
the previous sections concentrating on faith exclusively from the viewpoint of openness, since 
we cannot engage in giving a full account on the attitude of faith taken into consideration all 
its aspects. 
 Contemporary philosophy uses the term belief to indicate the attitude man has, 
whenever man takes something to be the case or regards it as true. On the other hand, the term 
faith is used to refer also to the same attitude, but – in some languages, such as in Hungarian, 
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my mother tongue – in a stronger way. We usually say that faith is a stronger belief than 
simple everyday “belief,” and based on an unquestioning confidence. 
We must here sharply distinguish at least the following three things; 1. A belief in the 
sense of a conviction (or uncertain opinion) that is in no way based on accepting another 
person’s trustworthiness, such as when, looking at the clouds on the sky, say we believe that it 
is going to rain on the next day, and: 2. The belief that what a friend tells us true because we 
believe that he knows or has good reasons for his belief or observed the facts he 
communicates to us, and trust his veracity wherefore we believe what he told us. This belief is 
first of all rooted in a confidence and belief in another person that is the basis for holding true 
something simply because another person told it to us; that belief in her is the basis of beliefs 
that the judgments she makes are true. 3. Belief in the sense of a religious response of faith 
and acceptance of what God has revealed (mostly through a trustworthy person or witness). 
This faith, as faith in the second sense, is a faith that some ‘X’ is ‘y’, because a trustworthy 
person told us so, but its distinctive nature is that it is a religious act and directed at God, not 
at a human person, which gives it a very different character for many reasons that we cannot 
here explore in depth. 
All of these three meanings of belief are a belief that or a faith that and therefore must 
be distinguished from: 
4. The act of faith or belief in, that is an act of trust and confidence in the 
trustworthiness and veracity of a person that makes us believe that what such a person tells us 
is true. This faith in someone is also present in the religious faith, in the faith in God and his 
veracity (that is the basis of the faith that what God has revealed, normally through the 
mediation of  human persons whom we have to trust, is true). Impersonal beings cannot be the 
object of this act of belief or faith in, but they, or states of affairs regarding them can of 
course be the object of a belief that, as is for example the case when we believe many things 
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about impersonal beings such as that plants and animals were created by God, have lived in 
paradise before the fall, etc. 
Another point in the discussion of faith is that we must not identify faith with the 
degree of its strength. There is also weak or hesitant religious faith, which nonetheless 
continues to be faith. This weak religious faith must not be confused with some strong 
convictions about certain scientific matters. The latter is strong conviction, but it is in no way 
identical with – weak or strong – religious faith. In my view religious faith, at least a religious 
faith that is based on some divine revelation, such as Jews, Christians, and Moslems believe 
to be the basis of their religion, is always based in a “belief in”. I also consider the term of 
religious faith stronger and more important from the point of view of openness, because it 
rests on a certain confidence in a person, whereas free-floating convictions based on 
observations and assumptions do not rest on the trust in the credibility of a witness.  
Nevertheless, there is one verb, “to believe”, to indicate all the acts we of belief and 
faith we have mentioned. We can say, therefore, that the terms belief and faith are frequently 
used synonymously, which gives easily rise to confusing quite different things. 
 According to this preliminary definition (an attitude that man has, whenever he takes 
something to be the case or regards it as true), to believe something doesn't involve 
necessarily reflecting upon what is believed. There are, accordingly, a number of things that 
man believes in his everyday life. It seems therefore, that first of all, it is useful to distinguish 
between different kinds of beliefs according to the consciousnesses of their objects. We shall 
not distinguish here again between impersonal and personal beliefs; my distinction concerns 
the everyday usage when we do not reflect on the object of belief and proper usage when we 
think of the object of belief in question. There are instances of unreflectively believing in 
persons or of believing that certain states of affairs obtain. These kind of unreflected beliefs 
pervade the whole of our everyday life. In this everyday usage the term belief does not 
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necessarily involve any uncertainty or any reflection about the matter in question. We can 
believe, for example, that a machine such as an airplane works reliably so that we will not 
have a crash. Ordinary men are not familiar either with design and construction, or with 
functioning of an airplane, nevertheless they still trust the crew that they can drive the 
monstrous aircraft without failure, they believe to the constructors that they are well versed in 
the sciences of physics and aerodynamics, or that they base at least their rules and operations 
of building airplanes and their operating aircrafts on the cognition of these sciences. 
Moreover, they believe in physics of the physical world that its principles shall continue to 
work in the same way (analogously) as so far in their life, and, in the very same act, they 
believe in countless other things. Numerous things we believe are quite mundane, such as that 
there is a functioning lamp on my desk, or that tomorrow there is another day or that I can pay 
with the same currency in the same country. Other examples show that one can have or lose 
one's faith in a medicine (sometimes without any justification), or that I can have or I can lose 
my faith in my favorite soccer team, writer, composer, etc. All these examples show that 
beliefs are essential parts of our mundane life; they play a decisive role in our everyday life, 
and forming beliefs is one of the most salient features of the human mind. At this stage of the 
investigation we did not apply the distinction between faith in and faith that.  
 Now our question is: how can we characterize belief from the point of view of 
openness? In our previous investigations we considered openness as a constitutive or essential 
mark of the person. From this it would follow that belief as a human attitude is also one 
manifestation of this openness. Opennesses, however – as we have seen in our previous 
studies on the characteristics of aspects in which man can be open – are not necessarily 
conscious. As we have seen, even if man is ontologically open to the totality of the world, his 
openness sometimes remains unreflected and does not necessarily lead to an intellectual or 
volitional attitude of openness. The same goes for faith. The examples above show that 
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independently of the object and the content of the belief, the belief can remain unreflected. 
The usage of a vehicle, for example, doesn't require any kind of consciousness concerning the 
complex functioning of a car or an aircraft. We simply believe in the functioning of the 
vehicle in question: for example, we simply believe that there is something going on with the 
petrol in the engine which drives the car. This act of belief, however, is still an authentic one. 
In all these acts we place our confidence into a thing or person that is outside of our reach. We 
believe that this person or thing can work or function in accordance with our – hidden or 
explicit – expectations. On the other hand, we are in a certain sense “delivered to the object or 
content of our beliefs”. This means the subjective side of belief: objects and contents of our 
beliefs might also determine us to a certain extent. Beliefs, however, that are not based on 
believing in a person and believing a person, are more pure forms of a belief that, which is 
more based on our repeated experience than on the deeper meaning of confidence and trust in 
a person, such as believing in God. Nevertheless, I think, this act also entails the element of 
“placing one’s confidence in something” but we do not go to the ultimate root of such beliefs. 
 This type of faith in the first sense has the character of openness insofar as its object 
lies outside of man. In this sense we believe something – that a state of affairs existed, exists 
presently or timelessly, or will be realized in the future – that is distinct from us. When we say 
that we “believe in the competence of the pilot of an aircraft,” we really believe that the pilot 
is competent such that “belief in” is here a misleading expression.  More similar to the “faith 
in” is the trust we place in the pilot before entering the airplane: the belief that the belief in are 
closely connected in a further way: we must believe that he is not a kidnapper but an honest 
person who wants to get us to our destination, etc., and therefore trust him and deliver 
ourselves, entrust ourselves and our loved ones to the pilot. At the same time, however, a less 
tangibly person-directed trust lies in exposing ourselves to the principles of physics, trusting 
that they will continue to be upheld in nature, as well as to the previous work of the 
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constructors and engineers, trusting that they were not only competent but had honest 
intentions. Thus also this trust that is not tangibly directed to a person or a “faith in,” has in 
the last analysis a personal addressee. Delivering oneself to someone, i.e., delivering oneself 
to essentially unknown principles and persons, means being open to certain things that lie 
beyond the reach of our certain and of our own knowledge in general. 
    There are other examples, in which one can also detect the openness of the faith. The 
object of the faith even in its everyday meaning indicates that there is a certain kind of 
directedness – according to the classical distinction – in believing in someone and to 
something. Objects of belief in the common sense are those toward which the acts of belief 
are directed. In the example of believing that tomorrow there is another day, the object of my 
belief obviously signifies a different entity than me. In this example, the object of my belief is 
that the day tomorrow will really come to be. I, however, because of my ontological structure 
and cognitive limits, cannot have full possession of the coming days; it means that I am open 
to the coming days. Thus I say that ontologically and epistemologically man is open to the 
coming days, the way, however, as he realizes this openness can take many forms: he might 
try also to change some things that are within his power, or he can be closed to this 
possibility. 
 Besides the everyday usage of the notion of belief, there is the belief in a religious 
sense. In this context we talk about religious belief, in which the person more or less reflects 
on the content and object of his belief or faith. A person is said to belong to a certain religion, 
at least in the case of a religion that is based on some texts and teachings handed down to us 
through human persons who claim to have received them from God, insofar as he accepts, 
that is believes, the principal elements of the religious teaching in question. Nevertheless, 
non-believers – taken in its everyday meaning – confess also to believe in certain things. 
Believers and non-believers can also be open to pseudo- or conflicting scientific beliefs, 
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moreover, the acceptance of scientific (or pseudo-scientific) views is analogous to the 
acceptance of the dogmas of religions: it takes place through authority and belief. Now, there 
are many transitional degrees between the total acceptance and refusal of religious faith which 
presents difficulties and creates debates for scholars exploring statistics of world-views. 
  In the traditional philosophical definitions of faith appears the transcendence of the 
divine being, not only the ontological transcendence and difference of God in relation to the 
human being, but also the “cognitive” transcendence of God and divine things that, as objects 
of religious faith reachable only through grace, lie beyond all reach of purely rational human 
knowledge, as well as the reflection on this transcendence. Generally, in all these definitions, 
faith is defined in contrast to the philosophical knowledge of God through human reason. 
Saint Thomas Aquinas' description of the “twofold mode of truth in what we profess about 
God” can be a good example of this distinction: 
There is a twofold mode of truth in what we profess about God. Some truth 
about God exceeds all the ability of the human reason [and this is the 
domain of faith]. Such is the truth that God is triune. But there are some 
truths which the natural reason also is able to reach. Such are that God 
exists, that He is one, and the like.124 
 
It is however not only in the reflection on religious matters, which we would call faith – taken 
in the proper, religious sense – that an open attitude is apparent. It's clear that faith as a human 
faculty is open insofar as man reflects on the object of his faith and by this reflection 
intellectually grasps his distance from the object of his faith. 
 There is, however, another aspect in which man can be open. The problem of 
fundamental difference and immeasurable distance between God and man gains a full 
description in the main work of the German theologian and religious scholar, Rudolf Otto. 
Otto suggests a comprehensive ‘name’ for the object of religious experience: God is 
Mysterium Tremendum et Fascinans. Otto holds that man’s “creaturehood”, as one of the 
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main characteristics of the religious experience, points to a higher order, that is, that there is 
something to which our creature-feeling is addressed. He says:  
All that this new term, ‘creature-feeling’, can express, is the note of 
submergence into nothingness before an overpowering, absolute might of 
some kind; whereas everything turns upon the character of this 
overpowering might, a character, which cannot be expressed verbally, and 
can only be suggested indirectly through the tone and content of a man’s 
feeling response to it. And this response must be directly experienced in 
oneself to be understood.125 
 
Following the train of thoughts of Rudolf Otto, we can say that from the side of the creature, 
faith properly speaking is a response to divine revelation. Faith is conviction of the truth of 
something revealed to us through God. In the New Testament, a conviction or belief about 
man’s relationship to God and divine things, generally included the idea of trust and hope. As 
Saint Paul writes: “Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not 
seen.” (Heb 11:1) He uses the word ‘evidence’, quite a strong expression, which means that 
faith is a kind of evidence by which the unseen object of belief is manifesting itself with a 
certainty proper to the strong reasons and inner higher rationality, carried by grace, of the act 
of faith and the intelligibility and inner truth of its object. On the one hand, however, faith is 
hardly comparable with knowledge, in particular with scientific knowledge; on the other 
hand, it is far more evident or held by the believer to be true in a much more certain and 
unhesitating way than any scientific knowledge. 
 The definition and proper description of faith has been a problem for philosophy and 
theology from their inception. Alice von Hildebrand traces back the real origin of the 
exceptional character of faith and says that “the contents of faith are such that they lie totally 
beyond the ken of human competence. The only legitimate basis of a religious act of faith is 
an absolute divine authority.”126 According to Alice von Hildebrand, a kind of 
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communication exists between man and the divine being. The source of this communication 
is, however, not man, but God. Now, this suggests that we have to stress man's fundamental 
openness to being able to receive the communication of the Other. Given his status as a 
creature, it follows that man can recognize his contingency as well as his transcendence. In 
this context man is the one, who is ab initio communicated and addressed. The Christian, for 
example, believes that God has communicated some of the fullness of His nature through 
creation and, in a much more perfect and comprehensive sense, through Jesus Christ. The 
religious faithful believes that divinely revealed knowledge and events lead both to a deeper 
self-knowledge of man and prepare the ground, on which the highest acts of freedom can 
unfold, a freedom which, religiously understood, gets unfolded and exists primarily as 
openness to a divine revelation. In a certain sense, also a searching atheist, such as Edith Stein 
was in her youth, can be open to revelation and perform a free act of opening oneself to 
revelation “if it exists.” Such a conditional openness to divine revelation is of course very 
different from the one of the believer.  
The fact that man can be dialogically addressed by God means that he also bears the 
responsibility toward the self-communicating God. Now, any bearing and above all any 
assuming of responsibility also entails having a conscious and open relation to the other 
person, whether human or divine. Therefore, also in this sense of faith and of bearing 
responsibility man is open. 
 Faith and reason (fides et ratio) are commonly accepted by believers to be two distinct 
ways through which the human mind can gain knowledge. Faith in the proper religious sense, 
however, is often conceived, even by some of the greatest philosophers who have been open 
to religion, as Plato (though he introduces another higher meaning of faith when he regards in 
the Phedo127 a knowledge about life after death that we would receive through a “divine 
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word” from “the other side” as higher than philosophical knowledge) as an inferior form of 
knowledge (pistis/faith that does not even deserve the term knowledge) and is underestimated 
by some philosophers and seen in contrast to rational, natural knowledge. In the case of 
natural knowledge, one can obtain knowledge by inference, deduction, calculation, etc. In 
faith, what we believe, the content of faith stems neither from inference nor human reasoning. 
The personal interior conviction, acceptance and loving commitment to Divine Revelation 
and its call by the believer constitute faith in which “man surrenders completely and gives 
himself in an act of absolute trust.”128 Faith always contains a total turning away from worldly 
goods. We don’t refer here only to the ethical aspect of the conversion, because, even if it is a 
significant part of the conversion, it is not the most important part. The amelioration of the 
moral life is only one aspect of conversion. The word for conversion, already used by Plato 
for a similar phenomenon,129 and above all used by John the Baptist in the Gospel, is the 
‘metanoia’, usually translated as conversion or also as repentance, i.e. changing one’s mind 
for the better, abhorring your past sins, and heartily resolving to amend your life. But, I think, 
it is better if we translated it as a radical ‘turning away’ from one’s whole past life and 
‘turning towards’ God and relying on Him. In this sense faith is a radical answer to the 
mysterious divine holiness. We have to stress that faith, in the interhuman context, and in a 
new sense in the religious sense of belief in God and believing God, is a real act of cognition, 
and theological claims are intelligible. John Paul II in his famous encyclical Fides et Ratio 
uses a picture and characterizes faith and reason as two wings, which the same being uses and 
which help him to ascend to the contemplation of truth. He says, 
Faith and Reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises to the 
contemplation of truth; and God has placed in the human heart a desire to 
know the truth – in a word, to know himself – so that, by knowing and 
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loving God, men and woman may also come to the fullness of truth about 
themselves.130 
 
John Paul II thus softens the often exaggerated distinction between faith and reason and 
denies an irreconcilable chasm between them. The reason for this is to reaffirm that reason as 
well as faith have the very same object, namely, divine reality. This, however, means that 
reason is also able to ascend to that, which is tremendously important, or let's say, what is the 
most important both in itself and for man. The meaning of the notion of faith (fides) in the 
document corresponds to an act of belief, which is a personal decision committed to the 
Ultimate Reality and Truth. Similarly, reason (ratio) means reasoning analytically, being able 
to conceive, whereas intellect (intellectus) is the capacity of interiorizing, grasping 
synthetically. In this context faith is not something that is added from the outside to reason, 
but belongs essentially to the faculty of human cognition. In this sense one might apply all the 
observations we made concerning the intellect in the previous sections. Moreover, if we say 
that faith is a radical answer to the holiness of God, because God is a radically other object of 
faith than any other objects of belief in its everyday sense, then we can also say only here that 
we deliver ourselves in the full sense of the term to the object of faith. This delivering, 
however, has an incomparably higher value than delivering ourselves, as in the common type 
of belief we have mentioned, to the essentially unknown principles of physics and the like. 
Similarly, but far more properly so, in the case of the religious type of faith one can be open 
subjecting oneself to the object of faith. To believe in something means to lose and to subject 
oneself, and since in this type of faith the object is incomparably higher and eminent than in 
any other kinds of belief, man's openness in religious faith gains an incomparably deeper 
meaning.  
 There are, however, instances when man is closed in certain acts of faith. In this 
context, under the label closedness I understand religious acts, religious manifestations, in 
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which man doesn't have or has limited freedom and his particular belief or faith blocks man's 
natural yearning for the ultimate reality. My question here refers to the complete opposite of 
our principal investigation, namely openness. In order to understand openness better, I want to 
investigate its opposite: I want to know when man is closed in faith: under what 
circumstances can faith be considered a closed system?  
 In the first sense, an act of faith has to be considered closed when its object is not a 
proper object of a faith, that is, when its object blocks man. It can happen, for example, when 
man believes in things that are finite but are treated as if they were God, in other words when 
he believes in idols. There can be many finite things, ideas that can be – in a final analysis – 
false object of a false faith. I think, however, that from a strictly philosophical point of view, 
non-personal, non-living beings cannot be objects of faith in nor objects of adoration, and 
certainly not proper objects of adoration.131 The proper object of the adoration can only be a 
personal being. Now, if one adores a non-personal being, such as a tree,132 then one is 
browbeaten into the narrow content and context of a belief in and worship of non-personal 
deities and idols, and hence fails to see many aspects of a faith springing from an encounter 
with a personal, perfect being. 
 There are numerous other things that can be improper objects of faith. In the case of 
some, it is obvious that they are assumed objects of faith, in the case of others it is not. In the 
case of the Satanism, for example, it is more or less obvious, that, because of its object, it not 
only closes man into a limited and overly simplified system, but into an evil world and may 
even prompt him to murder others and to commit suicide putting an end to many persons and 
conceivably to the whole world. On the other hand, however, in the case of an everyday 
“materialist”, who regards his money almost like a deity (he deifies money), it is really hard 
                                                 
131 From the viewpoint of religious studies (which is neither philosophy of religion, nor theology), which 
investigates religious phenomena independently of their truth-claims, also non-living beings can be objects of 
adoration and veneration.  
132 As it is in the case of many Middle-Asian religions. They adore trees, fountains, stones, etc. 
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to tell whether what he does is a religious act or not. According to some scholars, however, it 
is. It is a secularized form of religion as for example varied types of atheisms and idol-
worship are. Max Scheler – as we have remarked already in this chapter – called this kind of 
installment of a finite good, an idol in place of God.133  
 Contemporary religious studies, since they try to avoid making utterances concerning 
the truth of statements, claim that in modern societies even shopping customs can be 
considered as a form of religion.134 From the very beginning, religious scholars have been 
raising questions about the common ground on which representatives of various approaches in 
the scientific study of religions could meet. Discussions have revolved particularly around 
conceptual frameworks that could be used to delineate the underlying structures of knowledge 
that justify the cross-cultural use of the notion ‘religion’. In order to theorize and analyze the 
variegated forms of religious representations and to identify the quality that makes them a 
member in the category of ‘religion’, scholars need to entertain a shared understanding of the 
corporate intelligence on which their knowledge about religious issues is based. Philosophy, 
however, is not interested in a “common ground”, but revolves around the true solutions to 
problems. From a philosophical point of view – since the present work intends to be 
philosophical – we have to say that not all forms of religious representations, manifestations 
and phenomena can rightfully claim the label of religion. Since philosophy concentrates on 
the truth of things and not on the mere empirical manifestations of things, as they actually are, 
virtually or in whatever form, present to us (as for example religious study does), we can 
apply value-judgments, that is, we can, and we have to treat some forms of faith and religious 
manifestations as pseudo or semi forms and some forms as real forms of faith and religion. In 
                                                 
133 See Max Scheler, Op. cit. 267 
134 Contemporary religious studies investigate religious phenomena, which, according to the classics of 
religious studies, such as Rudolf Otto, Gerardus van der Leeuw and Mircea Eliade have not much in common 
with the original categories of the field. For Otto and Eliade the essence of religion is the presence of the sacred, 
whereas modern authors talk about desacralized religion and desacralized forms of religiosity. To the 
contemporary movements of religious studies see Pyysiäinen, Ilkka - Anttonen, Veikko (eds.): Current 
Approaches in the Cognitive Science of Religion. London: Continuum, 2002. 
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the case of the man above, who handles the money in an inappropriate form and the money 
becomes the highest object of his adoration and the highest criterion, it is clear that it is not an 
authentic form of religious worship or belief. The essential transcendent extrawordlyness of 
the religious act is here absent.  
 The same can be said about our other example concerning the adoration of the tree. In 
the case of the tree, since it is a particular and finite as well as low being that poses as object 
of religious acts, it is also an internally contradictory and false object of a “divine tree” and to 
engage in such an idol-worship likewise results in a closedness into, and a closedness of the 
person in consequence of, such a “faith”. These faiths instead of making a contribution to 
liberate and perfect man do not conduce to the development of the personality of man. 
Normally faith helps man to overcome the difficulties of life, helps to find the right way as 
well as opens totally new dimensions for man, even though the value and truth-claims of 
religion can never, with Lübbe and others, be reduced to such effects on human existence.135 
It was Thomas Aquinas who said, referring to the self-transcending character of faith, that 
even if we can have only a small piece of knowledge of the divine, this is of incomparably 
higher value than any most certain and complete knowledge of lesser and worldly objects.136 
He says at another passage: “Therefore, although the human reason cannot grasp fully the 
truths that are above it, yet, if it somehow holds these truths at least by faith, it acquires great 
perfection for itself.”137  Faith, insofar as it has a proper object, invigorates and maintains 
man's original freedom. False objects of faith, in contrast to proper objects, close man's 
                                                 
135 See Hermann Lübbe, Religion nach der Aufklärung (Graz: Styria, 1986): See for a critique of this view 
Robert Spaemann, „Die Frage nach der Bedeutung des Wortes ‚Gott‘ “, in: Communio 1 (1972), S. 54-72, 
wiederabgedruckt in: R. Spaemann, Einsprüche (Einsiedeln: Johannes-Verlag, 1977), S. 13-35; see also Josef 
Seifert, “Person, Religöser Glaube und Wahrheit. Philosophische Analysen und kritische Reflexionen über 
Ludwig Wittgensteins Religionsphilosophie”, in: Wilhelm Lütterfelds/Thomas Mohrs (Hrsg.), Globales Ethos. 
Wittgensteins Sprachspiele interkultureller Moral und Religion, (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2000), 
pp. 176-204; and the same author, Der Streit um die Wahrheit. Wahrheit und Wahrheitstheorien. De Veritate – 
Über die Wahrheit, Bd. II/The Fight about Truth. Truth and Truth Theories (Frankfurt / Paris / New Brunswick: 
2009). 
136 “Nevertheless, as Aristotle observes, the smallest inkling of the highest matters is more desirable than certain 
knowledge of the least important matters.” Saint Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae I.q.1,art. 5, resp. 
137 Summa contra Gentiles I. 5. 
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striving toward the truth. In this sense, the object itself also can be considered as something 
that can block man, artificially precluding him from realizing his own essence.  
 To sum up we can say that there are basically three senses in which we can say that a 
faith is closed. Firstly, closedness can come not from the object or content of a religion, but 
from false human interpretations of it. In the case of religious fanatics, who think, for 
example, that beheading of someone being of another religion is justified, or in the case of the 
pharisaic practice of a religion, not the teaching of the religion is closed to the world and 
reality, but its interpretation. In the second sense the object of a religion is closed to truth. It 
means the replacement of the true “objects” of a religion by idols or other finite beings. If 
money, someone’s bodily appearance, war or warriors, are idolized, even if they will not be 
adored, they still are idols and are false ”absolute goods”; consequently, these idols are 
closing the mind of the idol-worshipper to truth and to the world. “Worshipping” a finite good 
or being one gets closed and narrowed and not freed and fulfilled and opened. There are other 
extreme examples which clearly show that the idolization and absolutization of finite goods or 
even of evils doesn’t lead to the amelioration, purification and sanctification (which would be 
the objective of a religion) of the “believer”, but many times will lead to his or her illness and 
religious monomania. Thirdly, there are less extreme forms of closedness in religion, when, 
for example, one is not committed to his or her religion insomuch as the religion would 
require. Also the narrow kind of practicing of a religion or the arbitrary selection and 
application of certain dogmas of a religion disregarding its whole context are examples when 
distorted objects of the faith close man.  
 Now, in the light of this brief discussion on the openness of different attitudes and acts 
of the human being what conclusions can we draw with reference to the phenomenon of 
world-openness? First of all it seems that world-openness constitutes an essential component 
of the human being and therefore differs from “world-openness” as an attitude. 
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Openness as an attitude, on the other hand, in its most profound sense, seems to be a 
fundamental attitude preceding all other specific attitudes of openness, the most basic attitude, 
which engenders other good attitudes, as I hold against my thesis director who holds that 
“openness” is too vague and abstract a term to designate the most fundamental moral or other 
attitude, and that we encounter openness (and this in extremely different senses) much rather 
as a consequence or as an element of other attitudes. In spite of this I hold that there are 
instances where world-openness cannot be considered as a primary datum. There are cases 
where openness is the consequence of other attitudes. There are instances where world-
openness is only a derivative phenomenon. We cannot say, for example, that fundamental 
moral attitudes are identical in respect of their origin with world-openness, since openness is 
not enough to characterize all attitudes (even if one can find the characteristic of openness in 
all attitudes). We cannot say with full justification that all attitudes, volitional and intellectual 
acts in man, are nothing but openness. Rather, we can say that there are attitudes, acts, and 
manifestations of the human being with the characteristic of openness. 
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2.4. The ultimate Understanding of World-Openness as God-directedness 
 
 In this chapter I shall give a brief overview on the issue that I call the most 
comprehensive understanding of world-openness. Insights of this chapter are based on the 
understandings gained in our previous investigations on the preliminary meaning of world-
openness, its understanding according to Max Scheler138 and its different aspects in the 
human being. We have distilled before out of the complex notion of “world-openness” the 
moment of “openness” as such as the deepest core of what makes “world-openness” in its 
different senses so important for understanding the human person and at the same time, as we 
saw with Max Scheler from the phenomenology of religious acts, as an openness that reaches 
essentially above and beyond the world. Thus the world-openness, by being openness, 
includes an openness to what is not identical with the world. This chapter intends to answer 
only one question: why is it philosophically more meaningful to argue for the understanding 
of the phenomenon of openness as God-directedness, and why are other interpretations less 
authentic? My thesis is that world-openness interpreted as including God-directedness has 
incomparably more profound implications than any other explanation. In other words, 
openness as God-directedness is the full philosophical understanding of the phenomenon.  
 This chapter is also dedicated to the elucidation of the problem of the relation of man’s 
world-openness and God-directedness. For the same phenomenon I use the term God-
directedness equated with God-openness in this thesis. It would be reasonable, however, to 
apply the expression of God-openness instead of God-directedness. Still, I think that the term 
God-directedness to a certain extent is more expressive, since it reflects also the dynamism of 
man’s ontological status. The term, God-openness, grammatically speaking, seems to set and 
define the aim of a more general human characteristic, i.e., openness. Insofar as we conceive 
                                                 
138 We presented and interpreted his most important text on the phenomenon of world-openness in chapter 2.2. 
 125 
man as a creature being on the way to God, we also have to emphasize and denote by this 
term that God is his eternal companion on the way and not only an extrinsic object.139 
Concerning this issue, since there is not a huge difference between the two expressions, I 
think that it is the context that defines which expression is more appropriate.  
 Now, we have to answer the question of why we hold that God-openness is the most 
comprehensive understanding of world-openness or, more precisely, of the moment of 
openness it is characterized by and the moment of the love of the truth about the world which 
leads us beyond the world.  
First of all, if we conceive world-openness as a peculiar, fundamental characteristic of 
man by which he can initiate and pursue acts, emotions, intellectual or volitional acts, etc., by 
which man relates to the world, then the proper determination of the possible object of the 
openness does seem to be a philosophically meaningful enterprise. Openness, however, 
always “searches” for the widest context that it can refer to. It means that openness calls for a 
meaningful context which provides a sufficient explanation for itself. It's clear that worldly, 
particular entities cannot be regarded as contexts in the widest sense. On the other hand, if we 
hold that the divine reality exists – for example on grounds of the Anselmian argument from 
the “definition”: quo maius cogitari nequit, or on other grounds – and if we also hold that in 
man there is a deep metaphysical ordination to see and know God (conatus, Eros), then we 
can immediately recognize that man's ordination (Hinordnung), prior to all experiences, had 
already comprised the divine reality as its possible “object”.  
So in the first place I would say that our experiences show in man a constant self-
deficiency (deficiency of his biological organization in comparison with animals, his 
                                                 
139  In the religious literature God’s eternal companion is beautifully expressed by the Psalmist: „The Lord 
is my shepherd, I shall not be in want. He makes me lie down in green pastures, he leads me beside quiet waters, 
[…] Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I will fear no evil, for you are with me;” 
Psalm 23,1-2,4 
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intellectual and spiritual unsatisfaction, etc.,), which is in need of an explanation: we have to 
postulate that the final explanation of his self-deficiency is a non-worldly reality.  
 This view is acceptable also for non-believers, since it proceeds from the phenomenon 
of world-openness and not from the existence of God.140 Theoretically also an atheist can 
conceive divine reality as the widest context for the phenomenon of openness. But it is also 
acceptable for those who have a restricted notion of world. Being open to the physical world, 
for example, can explain a lot of things, but there are so many aspects of openness in man 
(and also in non-rational beings) that a simple physical, three-dimensional world as one single 
object cannot explain and cannot satisfy.141  
One might say, however, that the phenomenon of world-openness is exclusively a 
worldly phenomenon and that it simply makes no sense to introduce any kind of religious 
explanation of it. Some might claim that introducing the notion of God and all kinds of 
religious implications just darkens the crystal clear construction of philosophy. On the other 
hand, others say that arguments for the existence of God, including, for example, the 
Anselmian ontological argument, are not essential requirements for a religious belief, since it 
cannot evoke (just urge) free human assent, which – in the final analysis – can be the 
beginning of a personal faith. There is, however, another explanation. This view sees the act 
of ultimate religious assent and the rational acceptance of the idea of God as organically 
linked. This view says that there is no strict border between philosophy and theology, that is, 
between the notional and the real assent of the notion of God. Philosophy and philosophical 
                                                 
140 I think we have to take seriously Anselm’s central figure in his “Proslogion”: the character of the fool 
(insipiens). The fool is neither atheist nor a man of neutral position in the question of God; the fool simply 
doesn’t know anything. The fool is, in my interpretation, insane, literally doesn’t know anything. The fool is not 
only unconscious or ignorant concerning issues of God, or in other words, blind for God – such as one can be 
blind for colors or for values –, but, as a matter of fact, he is not in contact with reality. He left this world, he is 
now in another world, therefore, and only in this sense can he say, that there is no God. (Or, as G. K. Chesterton 
says, the madman one is not the one who lost his mind, but still possesses everything, but the one who lost 
everything but the mind.) The idea behind this insight is that the real existence of God is undeniably manifest not 
only from the notional assent of the notion of God, but from the world itself. This insight says that there is one 
supreme knowledge, which is undeniable: the existence of God. 
141 See chapter 3.4. 
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insights such as the ontological argument142 can not only support faith, but ground and 
precede faith. Philosophy in this sense is not only an ancilla theologiae, but it is its fellow: 
socia theologiae.143 This view however is not a novum at all in the history of thinking; 
moreover, it has been always present mostly in the Catholic tradition. According to this view, 
also the implicit faith of an atheist or non-believer has in itself a deep religious value and 
significance, which can lead to explicit faith.144 In this sense, a religious explanation of the 
phenomenon of world-openness might be conceptually reasonable and acceptable also for an 
atheist. Consequently, when we speak about world-openness as God-directedness, we do not 
theologize.  
 Secondly, based on our previous insights, we can say that genuine openness belongs 
intrinsically to persons.145 It is only a human person who can perform it and can be open in 
the full sense of the word. On the one hand, the phenomenon that we usually call world-
openness in its full sense can refer to something insofar as its “object” is a person. Since 
openness is an utterly human, personal characteristic, its final object, the ultimate answer and 
meaning-providing, has to be also of personal nature. Now, at least three world religions in 
principle consider the supreme divine being as person (according to some interpretations – 
which I cannot accept – even Buddhism believes in the personal existence of the Supreme 
Being). It seems therefore, that it is philosophically meaningful to argue for the interpretation 
of world-openness as God-directedness.  
 Thirdly, if we consider world-openness as an attitude, then the object of it, beyond the 
metaphysical, is also the divine reality. In this context we use the word attitude in the sense of 
                                                 
142  In my view, Anselm’s ontological argument’s starting point is a purely philosophical one. 
143  See for example the main intention of the papal encyclical Fides et Ratio (Chapter 77.) or book of 
Balázs Mezei: Vallás és hagyomány. (Religion and Tradition) Budapest: L’Harmattan, 2003: 28. If I am not 
mistaken, professor Mezei applies for the very first time expressis verbis the expression of socia theologiae. 
144  According to John Hick and to the majority of Protestant thinkers notional, conceptual assent has no or 
little positive religious value. It is however not surprising, since in Protestantism the doctrine of fides (faith) has 
been prevailing from its inception. See: Hick, John: The Existence of God. New York: Macmillan Publishing 
Co., Inc. 1977: 18. 
145 In the chapter 2.1. I have made it clear why is world-openness more applicable to human beings than angels 
or God. 
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philosophical attitude. The philosophical attitude in its everyday sense is a particular way of 
seeing the state of affairs of life. In this sense, the philosophical attitude is a universal mode 
of explaining the phenomena of the world in their most general modus. There are however 
other definitions of the philosophical attitude. I think that the most appropriate and original 
one is Max Scheler's understanding. Scheler holds that the philosophical attitude is possible 
only for absolutely precious regions of being and value, where entities and values form self-
contained, self-consistent realms.146 For Scheler, the philosophical attitude is “an act through 
which a constitutional bond of human nature should be burst asunder and a veil that conceals 
Being lifted from the eye of the mind.”147 In another place he gives a further definition of the 
philosophical attitude: “a love-determined movement of the inmost personal self of a finite 
being toward participation in the essential reality of all possible.”148 A person is of a 
philosophical attitude insofar as he intrinsically possesses competence for problems and fields 
that correspond to the entirety of the world. It means that true philosophy and a true 
philosophical attitude are defined by the genuineness (the manner of regarding things) of a 
person’s relation to things. In this context, genuineness concerns the highest, ultimate and in-
itself-precious object. The ultimate object of openness as attitude receives its full meaning if 
we conceive it as a personal, ultimate entity, otherwise the original meaning of participation 
and love (from the part of man) is distorted. Therefore in order to fulfill the claim of the 
“love-determined movement of the inmost personal self” and “participation” we must suppose 
that the final object and context of openness as attitude is the divine reality. 
 Fourthly, if world-openness is a capacity of man then its extension towards God, that 
is, its understanding as a capacity for God seems to be philosophically acceptable. The 
expression capax dei was used by Thomas Aquinas, who adopted it from Augustine's “De 
                                                 
146 See Max Scheler, On the Eternal in Man, Hamden: Archon Books, 1972: 71. 
147 Max Scheler, op. cit.  73. 
148 Max Scheler, op. cit. 74. 
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Trinitate”.149 Nevertheless, they both used the term in the sense that man is designed to know 
and love God and held that this capacity is primarily intellectual. By virtue of the intellect, 
man is able to be in touch, communicate – in the widest sense of the word – with other 
creatures as well as with God. Human beings are capax Dei, that is, purely naturally speaking 
of gaining a fundamental knowledge of God through our reason and to love, thank and 
worship Him, to perceive His voice in our conscience. Capax Dei means that God created 
man in His likeness and endowed him with the capacity to know Him as well as the world and 
other creatures. Theologically speaking, and in Saint Augustine as well as in the Christian 
tradition, that we are capax Dei means that we have the capacity to see God eternally in a 
beatific vision in paradise, to become one with Him in love and in being loved by Him, and to 
receive, and participate in, God’s own divine life in grace and the sacraments. Capax Dei does 
not mean that we are identical with God, only a kind of participation in the divine nature, for 
example, by grace. Nevertheless, capax Dei signifies – in a very radical way – man’s ultimate 
goal of his being. Now, if we conceive world-openness as capacity, we have to ask what kind 
of capacities there are and the reason why openness as God-openness has a deeper 
philosophical meaning than any other capacities in man’s existence.  
 Capacities, being of whatever kind, can have objects, means, directions, etc. For 
example, the capacity of driving a car has certainly an object which is the good and safe 
driving. In the context of driving, openness' direction and aim is in connection only with 
driving. That is, if I am able to drive a car, in the capacity of driving I am open to the means, 
objects and ends of driving. In this sense, being open in driving a car means openness to 
affairs of driving, that is, keeping one's eyes on the road, shifting the gear in time, etc., etc. 
These objects, however, are finite. Having, however, the capacity to be open to the world,150 
                                                 
149 Augustine's XIV De Trinitate 8: “eo ipso quod facta est ad imaginem Dei, capax est Dei per gratiam.” 
Thomas Aquinas' Sth I-II 113.10co and Sth III 4.1.ra2: “similitudo imaginis attenditur in natura humana 
secundum quod est capax Dei, scilicet ipsum attingendo propria operatione cognitionis et amoris.” 
150 Of course, it is the very first insight of any anthropology that man is open to the world. 
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the real object of this openness must be something higher, non-particular, infinite and 
something sublime in the sense of comprising the totality of openness' possible scope.  
 To sum up we can say, that, either way we define world-openness, the theistic 
interpretation is the only proper understanding of the experience of man's infinity in openness. 
Now, the conclusion of our investigations on different aspects in which man can be open (in 
each case the main question concerned the true meaning and proper object of these 
opennesses) is that it seems that man is in need of certain conditions of life as well as 
something infinite. The only proper answer to man’s constant self-deficiency and strivings is 
that there exists a world-transcending vis-à-vis. If we concede that God is the ultimate object 
of man’s openness we do not do anything else but giving a reasonable answer to our 
absolutely world-transcending desires, volitional acts, demands, questions, questionings, 
concerns, etc.  
This, however, does not mean that we identify the world with God. In the 
understanding of man’s world-openness if we really want to identify the “world” (that is, 
man’s vocation) of man, by the expression “world as God” we mean that the nature of the 
world in respect to man’s openness has an incomparably higher quality and comprehensibility 
than in the case of animals whose world is their surroundings. Man’s world is neither his 
surroundings, nor his cultural, linguistic, social world, but the divine milieu.  
We have arrived to the conclusion of this section that man’s world-openness’ final 
understanding is man’s openness to God. In this sense, however, God-openness is the real 
condition of man’s world-openness. The negation of man’s openness to the divine reality 
would mean an illicit reduction of man’s primary vocation and would conclude in a distorted 
view of the human person. All those who hold that man is open only to the social world (in 
other words, man is an animal sociale) or man is open only to the physical, visible reality 
(animal materiale) misunderstand the phenomenon of man’s world-openness. Instead of false 
 131 
and reduced interpretations I say that man, in his openness, is ordained to the world-
transcendent vis-à-vis. The full understanding of man’s world-openness is found therefore in 
the divine milieu. We cannot thematize our world-openness without the thematization of our 
original God-openness. From what we have seen, thus far, it is evident that, on the one hand, 
God-openness is a most fundamental characteristic of the human being, and, on the other, that 
it is in no way just of practical importance to enable us to reach real world-openness. In this 
sense man is not in the first place a being characterized by world-openness but a being 
ordained to the world-transcendent absolute being and the supreme and living reality which is 
infinitely more than and different from the reduced and contingent world.  
Finally, answering the principal question of this chapter we can add that a purely 
biological and physical (and other as a matter of fact incompetent theoretical frameworks) 
understanding of the human person also presupposes the reality of the personal vis-à-vis, the 
Supreme Being. Biology and physicalism cannot explain man’s world-shaping character, 
which doesn’t stop at biological and physical borders. This world-shaping character of man 
clearly shows that man’s primary vocation exceeds his biological, social and cultural 
structure. In other words, one cannot understand man’s biological, social, cultural, etc., 
concerns without presupposing his preliminary ability to transcend all these phenomena. This 
is the phenomenon that theology expresses like this: God is the real condition of man’s 
concerns. But, as I said earlier in this chapter, here we must not do theology. 
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2.5. Being-in-the-world and World-Openness 
 
The aim of this chapter is to define the relation between being-in-the-world and world-
openness. In respect of our investigation this comparison is useful because one might easily 
confuse different phenomena which in fact bear only minor resemblance. The aim of this 
chapter is to tell what the notion of being-in-the-world is, and what its relation to the 
phenomenon of man’s world-openness is. In this chapter we deal with a concept which is 
apparently similar to world-openness. The focus, however, of our investigation is the 
phenomenon of man’s world-openness. Now, an appropriate delimitation and definition of the 
notion of being-in-the-world will help us to see what the world-openness is not. This 
methodological “trick” therefore helps us to get closer to what the true meaning of world-
openness is.  
One might challenge the importance of the notion of being-in-the-world in respect of our 
thesis. Before answering the question and contrasting the two notions, we have to apprehend 
the anthropological significance of the notion of being-in-the-world. By way of introduction 
we can say, however, that both concepts portray man as world-bound being. Secondly, both 
concepts affirm man’s original relation to the world. Thirdly, both concepts constitute the 
foundation of an anthropological investigation. Fourthly, both concepts define man’s place in 
the world. And fifthly, both concepts identify the direction of man’s openness. Being-in-the-
world and world-openness are similar concepts in many respects, but in the last two points 
they clearly differ. The similarity suggests that in an analysis on world-openness we have to 
pay attention to the idea of being-in-the-world. In this chapter, I would like to know in what 
sense they differ. Nevertheless, this chapter is not only a comparison of two concepts, but a 
valid approach to the real phenomenon of world-openness, since with every clearly expressed 
differentiation, clarification and delimitation we are closer to the phenomenon. 
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Being-in-the-world (in-der-Welt-sein) is a central category in Martin Heidegger’s Being 
and Time. Even if the Heideggerian path is strange sometimes and differs from the 
mainstream philosophical traditions, it serves our purpose to conceive the Heideggerian 
project as a real philosophical enterprise of re-defining the proper place of human being in the 
world. Since Heidegger’s system is an organic whole, where parts belonging to different 
scientific areas are inseparable, we have to discuss here ontological issues along with ethical 
and anthropological ones. 
Historical questions are not always philosophically significant. The presentation of 
Heidegger’s anthropological views would be an intellectually interesting, but finally 
insignificant enterprise in respect of the theme of the essay. The presentation of the 
foundation of anthropology and ethics, and providing Heidegger’s thought as a framework for 
this foundation, is not only intellectually-philosophically interesting, but also philosophically 
significant.  
In this chapter, I therefore make use of Heidegger and his insights as an example. It also 
means that this section is not (exclusively) on Martin Heidegger as one single person in the 
history of philosophy, but on a real philosophical topic. The reader might ask: why Heidegger 
and not someone else? My answer is that I consider Heidegger a unique thinker, whose main 
concerns – among others – were anthropology and ethics, even if he denied doing 
anthropology or ethics. It is precisely this denial which makes his thoughts interesting, and 
demonstrates the unique character of his philosophy; this disagreement makes his philosophy 
a controversial, but useful example.  
Heidegger’s main focus is not the single act of the human being and its evaluation, but 
what utterly human is. His ontology’s main problem is the humanity of the human being. This 
kind of anthropology approaches human beings from a very broad perspective. Nevertheless, I 
think, it is still anthropology – even if Heidegger denied the possibility of doing anthropology 
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– and not simply a thinking (das Denken) or world-view (Weltanschauung) deprived from all 
important contents and considerations, what we traditionally call ethical content and ethical 
importance. These ethical considerations are, as a matter of fact, very close to anthropology; 
the whole system (this kind of ethics) of Heidegger can therefore be considered as a rather 
anthropological approach.  
We will proceed as follows: firstly, I shall provide a brief introduction to Heidegger’s 
main thoughts on anthropology. Secondly, I will place in this context his views on being-in-
the-world, that is, I will investigate his path from ontology to fundamental ontology. And 
finally, I will compare being-in-the-world to my understanding of world-openness.  
I have to start with a remark though: it is simply impossible to provide a brief introduction 
to the main thoughts of Martin Heidegger. The reason I try to provide a short summary is that 
I consider the whole Heideggerian oeuvre as a continuing search for foundations and in this 
sense the main idea of his project bears a certain resemblance to ours. The idea of 
questioning, and as a matter of fact – as he referred to it – “destruction”, led Heidegger from 
theology to philosophy, from ontology to fundamental ontology, and finally, from 
fundamental ontology to the dedicated study of the existential structure of human being. One 
might immediately say that this is a very strange path. Independently of any reading of this 
path, however, I suppose that if we want to find the traces of anthropology, we have to start 
with his ontology.  
It would be over-simple to say that Heidegger’s philosophy is a hidden anthropology in 
every respect. As a matter of fact it is, but there is one thing that we cannot deny studying 
Heidegger’s views: his main concern (Sorge) is always the very essence of human being.  As 
he says:  
But, now, is there not in this claim upon man, is there not in this attempt to 
prepare man for this claim upon him something to be said for man? Where 
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else does “regret”151 lead than in the direction of bringing man back again to 
his essence? What does this mean except that man (homo) becomes human 
(humanus)?152  
 
Both human being (humanity) and ontology are at risk – says Heidegger. We can take for 
granted, that the crisis of ontology is the primary cause of the crisis of human being. For 
Heidegger both ontology and phenomenology stand in the sense of philosophy, but while the 
former has its object, the latter has its method. Ontology, that is, raising the issue of being, 
points to the existential analytic. In this sense, Heidegger’s study is of a specific type of 
being, the human being. Now, his phenomenological analysis and description start not from 
the view of what is given in experience, but from the understanding, which belongs 
essentially to the Dasein. Ontologically it means that it starts from the (self-)understanding of 
being (Seinsverständnis), in other words, its beginning is the fact that Dasein, encountering 
real things in real life, understands those data – and (world-)life itself – through a preliminary 
understanding and correlation.  
Now, the understanding of being, which would be in principle “ontologically” closest 
to the Dasein (and not only to the concept of Dasein, since here we talk about concrete human 
beings, the actually existing beings), is not that simple.  
But Being ‘is’ only in the understanding of those entities to whose Being 
something like an understanding of Being belongs. Hence Being can be 
something unconceptualized, but it never completely fails to be understood. 
In ontological problematics Being and truth have, from the immemorial, 
been brought together if not entirely identified. This is evidence that there is 
a necessary connection between Being and understanding, even if it may 
perhaps be hidden in its primordial grounds.153  
 
For Heidegger the most important problem of all time is the question of being, he 
claims that the history of philosophy, and as matter of fact philosophy itself, has forgotten the 
                                                 
151 I think “concern” (“care” is widely accepted) would be a more precise translation for the original German 
word “Sorge”. Cf. Paul Tillich’s term the “ultimate concern”.  
152 Heidegger, Martin: Letter on Humanism. (Trans. Miles Groth) 
www.wagner.edu/departments/psychology/filestore2/download/101/MartinHeideggerLETTER_ON_HUMANI
SM.pdf p. 5. (last retrieve 01.07.2009.) 
153 Heidegger, Martin: Being and Time. (Trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson) New York and Evaston: 
Harper & Row, 1962: 228. Or see the famous closing words of his “Über das Wesen der Wahrheit”: “das Wesen 
der Wahrheit ist die Wahrheit des Wesens.” 
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question of being from the time of Plato on. The rehabilitation of philosophy therefore 
consists in a genuine turning around, turning towards the real object of thinking. With this 
philosophical turning around – remaining within the framework of the philosophical gesture 
of searching for foundations –, I think, we have arrived with Heidegger to the field of 
anthropology.  
The question of being, however, is always the question of the existing human being, of 
the Dasein. Heidegger’s main concern, that is, his fundamental ontology, is to be found in the 
existential analytic. Consequently, fundamental ontology investigates the existential structure 
of human being. According to Heidegger, anxiety comes from one’s own indefinite existence. 
Fear comes from external sources, whereas anxiety comes to us from nowhere, but belongs 
essentially to man. Anxiety is concerned with our “thrownness in the world”, that is, with 
“being-in-the-world”. Anxiety is a peculiar way in which man becomes aware of his situation 
in the world. For Heidegger this world, as anxiety reveals it, is an alienated, not-home-like 
world. We must add that this conception of the world is in a certain sense pessimistic, rather 
than optimistic. For Heidegger, in his deep and formidable world, anxiety reveals to us that no 
individual can escape from death. In this sense man is indeed open to death (at least in the 
sense that he is aware of and cannot escape death); man is according to Heidegger, a “Sein 
zum Tode,” a “being-towards (or “for”)-death”, but Heidegger doesn’t say anything about 
other objects of man’s openness. 
Heidegger’s phenomenology of life can be conceived as dissociation from the 
phenomenology of mind, that is, from Husserl and from the psychologically burdened 
phenomenology in general. It is an undeniable fact that for Heidegger temporality was of 
highest importance. If the Dasein’s being is thoroughly temporal, then all of human 
awareness is conditioned by this temporality, including one’s understanding of being. 
Therefore, according to Heidegger, temporality belongs to the very essence of 
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phenomenology, but without a minimum realism in the background, I think, the notion of 
temporality would be no more than an expression of Heidegger’s sensitivity to everyday life. 
One can observe this in his example with the hammer in the “Being and Time”.154 Without 
realist explanation we cannot understand this overwhelmingly everyday example, which 
shows the “genuine positivism” of his phenomenology.155  
Heidegger lays immense stress upon temporality. This feature is the clue to understand 
his position in philosophy. His pathway from ontology to fundamental ontology, his analysis 
of the temporality of the Dasein for the re-establishment of the very meaning of being, can be 
called, in my view that might apparently contradict Heidegger’s own self-interpretation, a 
realist enterprise, and can rightly be called a realist phenomenological approach.156 The 
                                                 
154 Heidegger, Martin: Being and Time. (Trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson) New York and Evaston: 
Harper & Row, 1962: 98-99. 
155 With the relation of the concepts of temporality and realism I wanted to affirm that if there is a philosophical 
tradition called realist phenomenology, Heidegger would certainly belong to this tradition, while other 
interpreters (such as Josef Seifert) see his phenomenology as a confused form of subjectivism that denies any 
distinction between realism and idealism, thereby placing itself in a tradition of radical transcendental 
subjectivism that sees both being and truth entirely dependent on Dasein (man). (See on this Josef Seifert, „Die 
verschiedenen Bedeutungen von ‘Sein’ - Dietrich von Hildebrand als Metaphysiker und Martin Heideggers 
Vorwurf der Seinsvergessenheit“, in: Balduin Schwarz, hrsg., Wahrheit, Wert und Sein. Festgabe für Dietrich 
von Hildebrand zum 80. Geburtstag (Regensburg: Habbel, 1970), pp. 301-332. or by the same author: Wahrheit 
und Person. Vom Wesen der Seinswahrheit, Erkenntniswahrheit und Urteilswahrheit.  De veritate – Über die 
Wahrheit Bd. I (Frankfurt / Paris / Ebikon / Lancaster / New Brunswick: Ontos-Verlag, 2008), ch. 2. See also 
Josef Seifert,  Der Streit um die Wahrheit. Wahrheit und Wahrheitstheorien. De Veritate – Über die Wahrheit, 
De veritate – Über die Wahrheit: 2, Realistische Phänomenologie. Studies of the International Academy of 
Philosophy in the Principality of Liechtenstein and at the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Bd. V 
(Frankfurt / Paris / New Brunswick: 2009), ch. 7-8.) 
In my view however there are two main theses of “Being and Time”: the Dasein is temporal and the meaning of 
being is time. If we conceive philosophical realism as a thought which says that things exist independently of us 
and the way in which we find out about them, and in the investigation of the temporality of Dasein we inevitably 
encounter the world in its temporally (really) defined objects, then we can say that the starting point of realist 
phenomenology and the analysis of the Dasein is the same: the phenomena of the real world as they are given to 
us in our experiences, where we know things as they are in themselves.  
In the background of my observation there is a presupposition, that there is a so-called phenomenological 
minimum. Under the headlines of phenomenological minimum I understand the original and common ideas of 
the whole phenomenological movement. I claim that there are certain common features, stressing points in each 
phenomenologist (in each phenomenology). Under phenomenological minimum I understand that the starting 
point, the usage of the method and the ultimate intention of the leading figures of the philosophy of 
phenomenology can be characterized as something common. With the adjective “original” I wanted to indicate 
that among the different phenomenological schools I presuppose a basic similarity, an original “idea”, which 
gave rise to phenomenology. 
156 Even if he denied every realistic accusation: “…I still consider, as I did before, every form of the usual 
philosophical realism nonsensical in principle, no less so than that idealism which it sets itself up against in its 
arguments and which it ‘refutes.’ [Phenomenological reduction] is a piece of pure self- reflection, exhibiting the 
most original evident facts; moreover, if it brings into view in them the outlines of idealism [...] it is still 
anything but a party to the usual debates between idealism and realism.” 
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significance of the turning to fundamental ontology157 is for us to turn to the things 
themselves and to man as a phenomenon of high importance.  
My thesis is that Heidegger’s understanding of anthropology and his views on the 
place of man consist not in giving a special content to anthropology and similarly not in 
defining its proper method and placing it among other sciences, but in redefining its authentic 
connection to ontology.  
“The Letter on Humanism” provides another occasion for Heidegger to explicate his 
views on anthropology and ethics. The main theme of the letter is humanism, how humanism 
degenerated from its ancient roots. In this essay Heidegger says – and we can consider it as a 
definition – that man is ontologically in the closeness of being.158 Every other “metaphysical” 
definition of man – as he holds – fails to grasp the essence and place of humanism and man. 
Metaphysical definitions put man into the system of differentia specifica and genus 
proximum. Heidegger makes an exaggerated claim, he says all metaphysics of his epoch have 
a philosophically unacceptable vision of man. He says: “Metaphysics thinks man up from 
animalitas and does not think further on to his humanitas.”159 The dignity of man, that is his 
real humanitas, is to be found in the ek-static taking place in the midst of the truth of being.160 
Now, in the “Letter on Humanism” there are many other metaphors for defining man: man is 
“counterpart”, “tender” of being (Hirt des Seins) and “next to being”.161 
                                                 
157 Heidegger said once: “There is only one emergency exit for us: the phenomenology.”   
158 See Martin Heidegger: Letter on Humanism. (Trans. Miles Groth) 
www.wagner.edu/departments/psychology/filestore2/download/101/MartinHeideggerLETTER_ON_HUMANI
SM.pdf  p. 5. (last retrieve 01.07.2009.)  
159 op. cit. 8. We must add as criticism that this view is false. In the De Ente et Essentia, for example, where 
Aquinas shows in what sense man is placed in the genus animal, in what sense man belongs to the realm of 
separate, immaterial substances, and in what sense rationality introduces what is properly human in us. And 
there are of course countless other examples, which defy the one-sided Heideggerian observation. 
160 In my view, however, in classical philosophy the dignity is ontological and previous to any ecstatic condition 
(fetuses and babies have dignity). Human dignity is previous to any conscious act and a fortiori to any ecstatic 
act. But, once man is mature, his or her dignity can be manifested in the ecstatic union with God and other 
human beings that we call love or charity. This rational love responds to the truth of being, precisely. But 
Heidegger gives a strange meaning to the word “truth”, with which he departs from classical philosophy and 
from realism.  
161 See Heidegger, op. cit. 23. 
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The issues of ethics are problematized within this context. When Heidegger tries to 
determine the relation between “ethics” and “ontology”, he presupposes, on the one hand, that 
we already know what ontology is, and on the other, that the value (originality) of a discipline 
is provided by its being in the nearness of the truth of being which thinking has to think.162 In 
his seminal essay he refers to the original meaning of the Greek word ethos. Now, according 
to the Heideggerian etymology ethos means “dwelling” or “dwelling place”. Dwelling 
therefore is a metaphor; its components are man, the act of dwelling and the place of 
dwelling. In short, ethics, the proper ethical “behavior” is a dwelling in the truth of being.  
For Heidegger the introduction of the metaphor of dwelling as the translation of ethos 
is supposed to express that things around us are not completely strange, moreover, we must 
turn to these things in order to understand the exceptional position of man within the world. 
Heidegger comes to a conclusion and says that ethics as the study of ethos must ponder upon 
the dwelling of man. Consequently, in his view, ethics becomes identical with ontology. He 
says,  
That thinking which thinks the truth of being as the primordial element of 
man is itself the original ethics. However this thinking is not ethics in the 
first instance, because it is ontology.163  
 
This new conception of ethics is again a re-formulation of fundamental ontology 
pointing to a more fundamental, more rigorous attitude, that Heidegger calls thinking (das 
Denken), which exceeds any conceptual attempt. This thinking is neither ethics in the 
traditional sense of the word, since it investigates it “only” as ethos: the dwelling of man at 
his proper place, but not as ontology, since it is more primordial than ontology. His final 
conclusion is that “this thinking is neither theoretical nor practical. It comes to pass before 
this differentiation has been made.”164 The novelty of Heidegger’s project is obvious if we 
consider that he radically examined the foundations of metaphysics claiming that old 
                                                 
162 See Heidegger op. cit. 34. 
163 Heidegger op. cit. 36. 
164 Heidegger op. cit. 38. 
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differentiations, schemas, conceptual inventions of subjectivist metaphysics are less authentic 
than thinking on the truth of being.  
Now, what did Heidegger mean by the notion of “being-in-the-world”? It is hard to 
answer this question, since according to this scheme we are also at loss as to what Heidegger 
meant by the notion of ‘world’. To the question “what world do we live in?” however 
Heidegger has two answers. Sometimes the world is an existential-ontological concept 
referring to the historical and cultural context in which the Dasein exists. Sometimes it is the 
concrete thing-world, the universe, the world around us with all its particular entities. 
Independently of the solution we accept, the world of Dasein is not something external and 
constitutes its inner makeup. With the term “being-in-the-world” Heidegger indicated the 
inseparability of man from the world, whatever he meant by this. The task of the philosopher, 
therefore, is to reveal the structure of “being-in-the-world” by the help of existential analysis. 
In other words, for Heidegger the world essentially belongs to man and man essentially 
belongs to the world. This view of Heidegger, however, can be interpreted by many realist 
phenomenologists as a profound subjectivism, idealism and relativism. His opponents say that 
his almost entire lack of philosophical sense for moral values (relativists never accept 
independent moral values and values in general) expanded on in his books on Nietzsche (he 
was more nietzschean than Nietzsche himself), and expressed also in his own life (both his 
Nazism and the scandalous letters that reveal his marital infidelity and a peculiar meanness of 
it). 
For Heidegger “Being-in-the-world” means, first of all, the possibility of living an 
“authentic” life. It also means that man is ontologically related to the world and he is not an 
isolated self without any personal, socio-cultural, etc., relation as the Cartesian tradition held. 
Heidegger adds that our being is offered to one another, and introduces the notion of being-
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with (Mitsein).165 I can fully accept this view, since it expresses that man is always already 
involved in a shared world, that is, he is open to others and particular, finite things and – if I 
might to interpret his account in this way; even if many of his opponents would say that 
Heidegger was an atheist and showed disinterest in God – to the infinite. In this respect the 
vision of “being-in-the-world” might be understood being close to our understanding of 
world-openness. It is similar also in the sense that both concepts describe openness as 
subservience, that is, acquiescence of man’s real place in the world. There are, however, 
significant dissimilarities, and – as we will see it in the following pages – there is more 
dissimilarity than similarity. 
Besides these similarities, there are significant dissimilarities between the two 
concepts. Firstly, the Heideggerian openness depicts man as being open to a world, which is 
not given once and for all. Heidegger’s world is “alienated” and “not-home-like”; it is almost 
an evil world, where men just roam about without any determinate direction and aim. A world 
which reveals itself to man exclusively in anxiety cannot be but dreadful.  
Secondly – this is the main difference between the two concepts – in Heidegger’s 
understanding the openness of the “being-in-the-world” doesn’t set the course, his vision of 
man is – in my view – fallacious. The Heideggerian project therefore provides room for 
critique:  
The transcendental approach turns against itself; instead of leading us to 
secure ground, it only gives greater urgency to the demand for such a 
ground and returns us to the question: what is man’s place?166  
 
What Heidegger proposes, namely the “essence of resoluteness (Ent-schlossenheit) 
lies in the opening (Entborgenheit) of human Dasein into the clearing of being” is 
                                                 
165 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, New York: Harper and Row, 1962: 156. 
166 Harries, Karsten: Fundamental Ontology and the Search for Man’s Place. In: Murray, Michael (Ed.): 
Heidegger and Modern Philosophy. New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, 1978: 66. 
 142 
indefinite.167 In my understanding, however, openness has a definite direction and object. Its 
highest object is the divine reality, which provides full intelligibility for openness. The 
openness of the Heideggerian man, as a matter of fact, does not exceed his own world, 
therefore his world and his existence does not have full justification. The openness of the 
Heideggerian man is a minimized openness; the view of man resulting from this is also 
reduced. In contrast to this I think that the real openness of man does not stop at the borders of 
man’s cultural, personal or thing-world. In other words, man is not only a creature dwelling 
within the world having an access to the being, but as Max Scheler noticed, the human 
being’s main characteristic is his “being-outside-the-world”.168 It means that man is the only 
being that can objectify all entities, space, time and things of the world, though this 
objectification must also have an intelligible source. This source, however, is not identical 
with the objects of the spirit’s objectification, neither with the innermost part of the spirit; it 
must be “outside”. World-openness of man means therefore that his capacity of 
objectification does not restrict man to be only “being-in-the-world”, but calls for a more 
profound explanation. Our vision of man’s openness has a different label: man is 
ontologically a being-outside-the-world. In contrast to the Heideggerian understanding we 
localize man’s vocation, his “world” as something that exceeds the visible, physical, 
biological reality.  
                                                 
167 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, New York: Harper and Row, 1962, 40.§. and 60.§. Or see 
Spiegelberg’s interpretation. Spiegelberg says that Heidegger “maintained that even in Sein und Zeit existence 
meant the »openness of the human being, who stands open for the openness of Being« and that he »stands in this 
openness by enduring it« (ausstehen). A similar unacknowledged reinterpretation took place in the case of 
concern (Sorge), which is no longer confined to human being, but referred to being as such.” Herbert 
Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, A Historical Introduction. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1982: 418. 
168 See Max Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature, New York: The Noonday Press, 1971. The main point of Scheler’s 
work is that humans are not tantamount to “being-in-the-world” but being “outside” the world, because of his 
endless objectivations. 
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2.6. Openness of the non-living World and the organic, but non-spiritual World 
 
There are two different phenomena which we would like to investigate here. Firstly, 
we would like to know, whether the inorganic, non-living world can be considered in some 
way to be open; and if it can, then in what sense. Secondly, we would like to know, whether 
organic beings, like animals and plants, can be considered open; and if they can, then what is 
the relation between human world-openness and organic, but non-spiritual openness. I discuss 
the problem of the inorganic and the organic, but non-spiritual life under the same headline, 
since in my view there is only a quantitative – and not a qualitative – difference between the 
inorganic and the organic, but non-spiritual worlds. The real qualitative difference lies 
between spiritual and non-spiritual, that is, between man and all other creatures of the world. 
Within the phenomenological tradition Hedwig Conrad-Martius developed a 
comprehensive study on the philosophy of nature.169 Her attitude can be characterized as an 
exceptional love for nature and she undertakes an attempt to establish an accord between new 
findings of scientific research and philosophical reflection on them. My starting point in the 
question of distinction between human, the non-living, and the non-personal organic world is 
similar to that of Conrad-Martius. She says that „the human being in his totality, s/he in his 
personal wholeness, can’t say, want or do anything that does not come from the centre of 
himself (soul), in which his whole being is placed all in a time.”170 In this respect she follows 
Max Scheler’s view, who also stresses that human being is not a new stage, a „further step” in 
the alleged evolution of nature, but possesses an unparalleled feature, spirit (Geist), that no 
other creature possesses.171 Conrad-Martius accepts the classical distinction of inorganic and 
                                                 
169 Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Die Seele der Pflanze.  In: Conrad-Martius, Schriften zur Philosophie (ed.) 
Eberhard Avé-Lallement, Bd. 1 München: Kösel, 1963, pp. 276-362. 
170 Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Metaphysische Gespräche. Halle: 1921, 240. (My translation.) 
171 See Max Scheler, The Human Place in Nature. Evaston: Northwestern University Press, 2009. Here he says: 
“What makes the human being a »human« is not a new level of life – and it is certainly not just the only form in 
which life manifests itself: the »psyche«. The new principle is, first of all, opposite anything we call life, 
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living beings. She distinguishes inorganic entities (endowed with materiality), plants 
(endowed with dynamic nature), animals (with psychic features), and human beings (with 
mental capacities). I can fully accept (and this is the feature that I want to underline again and 
again) her view on the exceptional position of man within nature. Thanks to his specifically 
constituent element, spirit, man’s being presents himself as a place where nature becomes 
self-aware. It means that within nature human being stands out. Following Conrad-Martius 
thoughts I go further and take a more strict position: I think that human being is so 
exceptional that comparisons, analogies with other branches of living beings, such as animals, 
simply don’t work; and I also think that it would serve the purpose introducing new terms for 
“willing”, “thinking”, “affection”, etc., of animals since animal activities are structurally 
dissimilar to seemingly corresponding human activities.  
 Usually we call something inorganic and non-living, which – using Aristotle’s 
expression – is incapable of self-motion. According to Aristotle, self-motion is the indication 
of life. Nevertheless, Aristotle says that terrestrial natural bodies, like plants and animals as 
well as the sublunary elements (earth, air, water and fire) have a kind of circular motion. His 
train of thought argues that everything is in motion and exists for the sake of something.172 
Inorganic entities can also move. This movement, however, differs from the organic one, 
which is, to a certain extent, self-generated and self-maintained movement. Non-living 
entities are incapable by definition of autonomous motion (including locomotion). The 
emphasis is laid here on the non-autonomous nature of non-living entities, which excludes 
self-motion, but allows motion. The final conclusion of Aristotle’s thought is the proof for the 
existence of the first and divine mover, a topic we cannot pursue here any further. Instead, we 
return to our topic of the openness of non-human and non-personal beings. 
                                                                                                                                                        
including life in the human being: it is a genuinely new, essential fact which cannot be reduced to the »natural 
evolution of life« […] Already the ancient Greeks asserted the existence of such a principle. They called it 
»reason«. We wish to suggest another and more comprehensive term for this X […] this comprehensive term is 
»spirit«.” p. 26. 
172 See Aristotle, Physics 14.  
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 One might immediately say that non-living entities are open to the world, since they 
can move – even if this motion is not self-motion – and that they are not predestined to remain 
perpetually in the same form and position. In my view, however, this kind of motion, which 
cannot be compared to the motion of the organic, but non-spiritual life, does not necessitate 
that non-living entities should be open to some direction. The phenomenon of motion would 
require certain self-possession, knowledge concerning the direction of motion and possible 
conscious modification of it.173 This is the motion what animals can have, but this is precisely 
that non-living entities do not possess. In case of non-living entities the total lack of freedom 
explains the lack of openness. If, however, we say that openness means a certain type of 
incompleteness or imperfection or variability or capacity of receiving new forms, then with 
certain reservations we can say that the non-living, inorganic world is also open but mean 
then with openness an entirely different phenomenon from the world-openness of the person, 
the kind of openness Aristotle ascribed chiefly to prime matter that is “open”  to receive any 
form, a kind of total passivity and one that has nothing to do with spirit (even though Aristotle 
saw a certain analogy between prime matter that is open to receive any form and the intellect 
that is open to receive mentally any form and as such a tabula rasa). 
In the inorganic world we also find a different kind of imperfection and 
incompleteness that involves an openness in relation to persons in relation to whom alone 
these entities achieve their proper value and perfection. For example, our solar system is 
beautiful in itself; it is a wonderful formation. In my view, however, in spite of all its beauty 
and magnificence, it is still incomplete in the sense that all beauties like this are made for man 
or at least for some personal being who alone can know and enjoy them. I think that without 
their relation to a person, the beauty and magnificence of non-organic things becomes 
meaningless, and, in this sense, their beauty does not mean completeness.  
                                                 
173 Organic beings possess the movements of entelechy to some end but need not possess any awareness of 
anything. This is another type of motion. We must add that organic beings do not possess knowledge neither 
awareness properly speaking that man can have. 
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 All organic and inorganic beings in the world are incomplete in another sense since 
they are not self-sufficient; they call for an ultimate reason (this reason or cause of organic 
and inorganic beings in the world is usually called today in an imprecise sense by 
philosophically minded scientists “intelligent designer” instead of absolute divine first cause 
or Creator God in a metaphysical or religious literature).174 By this I don’t say that “ultimate 
reason” and “intelligent designer” are the same. In the religious literature we speak of Creator, 
“intelligent designer” is a kind of unphilosophical expression of philosophically minded 
scientists who avoid the metaphysical terms God or absolute being or Creator but mean this. 
The existence of God is also philosophically evident and not a mere matter of religion; 
moreover, an intelligent designer is presupposed for the construction of any machine, or tool, 
or any linguistic document, but in the 5a via of Thomas, well understood, implies by cogent 
reasons, infinitely more than an “intelligent designer”. All beings – including God - need a 
raison d’étre why they exist and why they exist precisely in this way and not in another. This 
reason can lie in a being (and so it is with the absolute being) or outside it. All contingent and 
limited beings require an ultimate sufficient reason outside of themselves. In this very 
different sense (opposed to the notion of a closed causal universe) the entire universe is open 
to an extramundane being and cause.  
Organic, but non-spiritual, entities encompass animals and plants. It includes organic 
beings as such which possess a movement of entelechy to some end but need not possess any 
awareness of anything. Animals and plants are capable of self-motion. We can observe in the 
natural world how sophisticated is the motion of a fox in hunting for a duck and how 
impressive is the slow, ponderous growth of a willow. Motion, however, even the spectacular 
form of self-motion of all living beings, does not imply openness in the full sense, since these 
motions (hunting, growth, etc., etc.) do not exceed their “contexts”; and if they have an 
                                                 
174 This view is in accord with the majority of thinkers who has ever dealt with philosophy of nature. Conrad-
Martius for example repeatedly points to the necessity of the purely spiritual foundation of reality.  
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object, it certainly remains within the context of their close surroundings. In other words, the 
significance and meaning of these motions never extends beyond their special and limited 
domain. Foxes, for example, in hunting a duck will never “ideologize” the purpose of their 
hunting. A fox will never refer to and will never differentiate between different purposes of 
hunting and will never put it into a special context, which would extend the act itself. It is 
only the person, who can objectify his acts and his objects introducing different purposes, 
reconsidering them and finally choosing from among them according to his free decision and 
will. We can conclude, even if the self-motion of animals and plants175 is sophisticated and 
even if animals, who possess an entirely different form of self-motion compared to that of 
plants, seem to act in the framework of a certain freedom, one essential point is missing in the 
self-motion of organic, but non-spiritual beings: this self-motion lacks the central requirement 
of knowledge properly speaking and free will.  
According to some theological views, however, man is not the ultimate possessor of 
freedom. According to Saint Thomas Aquinas, there are different degrees of being. He says, 
the higher the degree of being, the more freedom it possesses and the higher the perfection of 
a being, the more perfect its path is for self-realization. Considering these beings just from the 
perspective of their “motion,” we distinguish the following degrees of motion: the motion of 
non-living things, the purely organic self-motion of plants, the sentient and frequently in some 
sense “conscious” spontaneous self-motion of animals, and man’s conscious, free auto-
determination, movement, and action. 
Animals possess the capacity of a rather purely spontaneous but non-rational motion, 
whereas man is able to move and to act freely. There is, however, a still higher degree of free 
action and self-determination in angels, who are capable of absolute and instant self-
realization. According to Thomas Aquinas, the ultimate and final free self-possession and 
                                                 
175 According to Conrad-Martius, plants have a being that has its purpose the simple setting up of a shape.  
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action is a divine property and its highest manifestation in relation to the world occurs when 
God freely communicates and reveals Himself to men.176 Quite generally speaking, man’s 
dependence upon God is realized in ways completely different not only from any inner-
worldly causation but also from divine creation of nature, and this not merely because the 
creation of a person endowed with spirit, intellect and free will, is a far deeper and mysterious 
causation than the creation of impersonal beings. The theological understanding also unveils a 
unique and unparalleled relation of interpersonal relations and communications between God 
and man. In my view, authentic freedom culminates in the willingness of sacrificing one’s life 
for others, which means an original loving openness to the other incomparable to other kinds 
of world-openness. 
It seems that inorganic, and organic but non-spiritual creatures are unable to realize 
their freedom in openness taken in the specific sense. Freedom must be understood in the 
context of a relation to the other (this “other” can refer to different things: men, world, things, 
divine reality, etc.). Non-living things, animals and plants, however, do not possess this 
relational freedom; consequently they cannot be open to the other in the specific ways proper 
only to persons.177 We can draw the final consequence in the context of the openness rendered 
possible only through free will, that not even the phenomenon closest to the free action and 
motion of persons, spontaneous self-motion of animals, can be considered as an indication of 
openness properly speaking.  
An animal hiding itself in the scrub waiting for the victim or the tree silently taking 
root can be considered open to the surrounding world, but only analogously. In my view, 
there is a fundamental ontological and not only a qualitative difference between the freedom 
                                                 
176 Saint Thomas Aquinas in the De Veritate uses the expression of communcativum sui. See: De Ver. q VI. art. 
2. 
177 For the sake of clarity I have to explain that I hold that animals cannot only learn but also have an analogy to 
the spontaneity of freedom such as when a dog saves his master rather than fleeing from danger. Nevertheless, I 
think that this is not freedom in its full sense; this can be considered freedom only analogously. The act that the 
dog performs is not an act of self-sacrifice, since, in my view, the dog saves his master according to another 
instinctive impulse, which can be hidden for us, but still it is an instinct. It follows that animals do not possess 
dignity to the extent as human beings do, who possess free will in the full sense.  
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and openness of the inorganic and the organic, but non-spiritual beings. The real qualitative 
difference lies between spiritual and non-spiritual, that is, between man, who possesses 
freedom and openness and all other creatures, which can possess freedom and openness only 
analogously. 
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2.7. What World-Openness is not: World-Openness is not Instinct 
 
There are many phenomena that are similar to world-openness and there are others 
that are simply the antitheses of it. All those altogether are not the phenomenon what we are 
looking for. First of all, although the phenomenon of world-openness bears a certain 
resemblance to instincts (for example world-openness and instincts can both be considered as 
certain relations to the world; both seem working in the framework of some free spontaneity, 
etc.), it is obvious that they are profoundly different; as a matter of fact, it is even very 
questionable whether instinct is analogous to, rather than some opposite of, the phenomenon 
we are searching for. The aim of this chapter therefore is to define the relation between 
instincts and world-openness. In respect of our investigation this comparison is useful because 
one might easily confuse different phenomena which in fact bear only a minor resemblance. 
The aim of this chapter is to tell what instincts are. In this chapter (and in the forthcoming 
chapters too) we deal with a concept which is apparently similar to world-openness. The 
focus, however, of our investigation is the phenomenon of man’s world-openness. In this 
sense we cannot give a full physiological, biological account on the theme of instincts. The 
appropriate delimitation and definition of instincts, however, will help us to see at least what 
the world-openness is not, which can help us to get closer to the true meaning of world-
openness. 
At the first sight, it may seem that world-openness functions like an instinct. Instincts 
can be found in man as well as in animals, but instincts do not determine man completely. 
Human beings can, to a certain extent, master themselves; they are not “slaves” of their 
instincts as for example animals are. Instincts, independently of being inherited somehow 
shaped by experience, do not define the totality of the behavior and relations of the human 
being. Instincts are present in the life of human beings, but play only a limited role in it. On 
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the other hand, animals are completely governed by their instincts. They cannot have personal 
aims, decisions and desires, which are by their very nature superior to instincts. Although 
non-spiritual living beings seem to be able, for example by training, to control their instincts, 
their control constitutes a closed system. This closed system is in itself meaningful (that is, it 
has a clear structure) and seems to operate as if it provided possibilities of transcending the 
limits of the subject. Instincts, for example, can save our life, even without us being conscious 
of the danger we are facing. The same goes for animals. As to human life inasmuch as it is 
guided by the automatism of reflexes and instincts, we breathe or have heart-beat and blood-
circulation without having to think or to will any of these. Other instincts and experiences 
such as hunger or thirst and its satisfaction, keep us from dying from malnutrition or 
dehydration. It seems, therefore, that instincts help human beings to develop, and in this sense 
they seem to have a “transcendent” direction.  
The most decisive distinction between a person’s world-openness and that rendered 
possible by instincts concerns the possession and exercise of free will. As I did in the previous 
chapter, here I will argue that there is an essential difference between man and all other 
creatures of the living and non-living world. Our question here is, in what sense can – or 
cannot – we speak of freedom in the case of acts performed by instincts? Without going into 
details, suffice it to say that a human act performed by an instinct by its very nature differs 
from an act performed freely. To perform something freely means initiating a human act from 
the unconstrained inwardness of the person who performs the act. Furthermore, performing 
free acts includes a certain deliberateness of the person. If a person wants an act to be 
performed, then he calculates – that is, rationally considers – the circumstances, possible 
outcomes, gravity of its reasons – whether those are grave enough to perform the act –, long 
and short-term consequences and many other aspects of the action. Moreover, even if the 
person had performed a freely chosen act, he knows that he could have chosen another act to 
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perform; he could have done otherwise. In instincts the elements of the freely chosen act are 
completely missing. There is no deliberation, rational consideration, nothing that we could 
call free action. Philosophically speaking, instincts exhibit a total lack of freedom. Even if 
sometimes we are inclined to say that in instincts there can be found a specific form of 
freedom, I think it exists only in a very limited form or only analogously.  
Instincts in case of human beings are not acts initiated by deliberateness, and are not 
coming from the unconstrained inwardness of the performer; they are the results of causes 
standing outside of the human being. This is also true for animals and, since in the case of 
animals instincts play a more decisive role than in humans, and even an overarching role, 
animals possess no freedom. This also means that for animals there is also under the aspect of 
free will no room for world-openness in its genuine meaning. A closed, strongly determined 
structure cannot be considered as an authentically open system, as openness. Only where 
there is authentic freedom of choice in its full sense, can we talk about that dimension of 
openness that is linked to free will, a special characteristic that allows the person to reach, in 
its intentional and free acts, beyond the personal, ontological or other kinds of limitations and 
delimitations of his being, and even beyond the limitations of the cosmos which, as we have 
seen, makes for a special link between world-openness and God-openness and enables the 
human person to perform religious acts of love and adoration that cannot be conceived at all if 
man is conceived as a closed finite person striving only for his self-actualization or 
approaching being solely from the aspect of his own limited nature and desires.. 
The first philosopher who drew our attention to the fact that the body of animals is in 
full balance with their way of living and the means of their self-maintenance was Arthur 
Schopenhauer. Jakob von Uexküll, Max Scheler as well as Arnold Gehlen share in some 
degree a similar point of departure. According to them, animals do not perceive the richness 
and abundance of the world surrounding them. Animals, because of their instincts and lack of 
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intellect and authentic freedom, interact only in a limited sense with the world; they are 
unable to possess a world (Welt) in its original sense around them.178 Von Uexküll, Scheler 
and Gehlen, while they have some points in common regarding the notion of the environment 
(Umwelt) of animals, differ in certain other respects. According to von Uexküll,179 organisms 
can have different subjective Umwelten, which are distinctive from Umgebung. Umgebung is 
the objective world which the animal inhabits. Von Uexküll later applied the notion of 
surroundings or environment (Umwelt) also to the human person. In this view were to entail 
more than the obvious truth that humans also live in immediate surroundings and physical and 
social environments and maintained that human persons are entirely locked into their human 
environment, however, this opinion has been widely contested. The above mentioned thinkers 
all agree that animals strongly stick to their surroundings (Umwelt) in the sense that they can 
live only in, and are restricted to live, a specific environment which allows them only to 
perceive and react to a segment of the world. Living such kind of environment-bound 
(umweltgebunden) life, they are unable to go beyond in any sense of the word.  
From what we have said so far it is evident that in whatever form we try to depict the 
instinctively furnished world, its principal characteristic is an inevitable closed-ness. When 
animals – independently of how sophisticated they are; whether it is an insect or a dog trained 
to find survivors under the ruins after an earthquake – behave according to their instincts, they 
can only behave and “experience” according to their inherited patterns180 that they “knew” 
                                                 
178 See Scheler, Max: Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos. Darmstadt, 1928: 36. and Gehlen, Arnold: Der 
Mensch. Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt. Bonn, 1950: 37. and 77-79. 
179 See his Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere, where he popilarized his main ideas.  
180 This is not to deny that we might say that animals cannot only learn in an analogous sense to humans but that 
their reactions also demonstrate an analogy to the spontaneity of freedom such as when a dog saves his master 
rather than fleeing from danger. There can be made a great number of similar assertions concerning the animal 
world. I think, however, that all these assertations can be applied only analogously. This means that since the 
difference of nature and of the ontological status between human beings and animals are so huge, this makes real 
literal comparisons invalid.  
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before all kinds of experience.181 Knowing, experiencing and mastering (that is to transcend 
the limits of the agent) taken in their human sense, however, all presuppose real knowledge 
and freedom, and since instincts are not based on any understanding of their objects and 
meaning and cannot provide authentic freedom, instincts cannot be the basis of world-
openness. 
In contrast to the closedness of instincts, man’s freedom of will can be regarded as the 
authentic basis of openness. Free will belongs so essentially to personhood that no being can 
be called a person if he or she is determined by outer or inner urges, by physical forces, by 
other persons, or even by his or her own fragile nature. To see this clearly, we must recognize 
that there is a free center of the person, by means of which the person himself can generate 
free acts. One should note that with the denial of human freedom almost every dimension of 
human activity would be reduced to nonsense. As Augustine, following Cicero, would say: 
“Quod si ita [...] omnis humana vita subvertitur.”182 Free will is inseparable from human 
beings and cannot be reduced to something else. In other words, freedom is an arch-
phenomenon (Urphänomenon). Interpreting this problem from the viewpoint of the history of 
philosophy, we can say that every attempt to deny human freedom finally led to catastrophes. 
Communist and National Socialist pseudo-anthropologies destroyed the real nature of the 
human being, since they denied the free will of man, and led to inhuman anthropologies.  
One of the main characteristics of freedom is that we are free for something not only 
free from something. It was Augustine who said for the very first time that human free will is 
the freedom for the good. Basically – in terms of this very positive definition – we are free to 
perform (morally) good acts and not bad acts. 
                                                 
181 In this sense we cannot use the expression “experience”, since instinctively acting beings cannot have 
experiences in the genuine sense of the word. They don’t experience the world; the world simply happens to 
them and in them. They are unconsciously merged in the happenings of the world. 
182 Augustine: De Civitate Dei. V, 9. 
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Now, openness and the responsive character of free acts cannot be detected in the 
world of instincts. Instincts are fixed action-patterns, where there is no flexibility, since 
instincts are unchangeable, though they can in some ways adapted, develop by outside factors 
and stimuli, or be lost in an animal that is a pet and has left its natural surroundings. 
Nonetheless, especially in lower animals, certain stimuli will always initiate certain 
behavioral patterns and never others. An animal, for example, can perceive another animal or 
a human being, and in some astonishing ways be aware of their difference and behave 
accordingly, but its instinctual reactions will, in spite of certain modification, adaptations and 
losses, never entirely deviate from its preordained order. Actions like this lack the responsive 
character, even though human training can undoubtedly achieve astonishing patterns of 
behavior (in trained dogs or circus animals) that lie entirely outside of, and may even go 
against, what the same animals would do if entirely left to their instincts without human 
training and intervention. Whether we should call this a form of openness, is not that hard to 
answer. Insofar as we conceive openness as simple instinctual adaptations and reactions to 
surroundings, responses to stimuli or trained behavior dependent on training techniques, we 
can call animal behavior world-openness. Nevertheless, I think that this definition of openness 
is unsatisfactory. Insofar as we conceive openness as a conscious relation to the world and to 
other beings, in which responsive and self-abandoning attributes play the most important role, 
instincts and even the behavior of trained animals that depend on factors entirely outside their 
instinctual patterns of behavior but determined by the trainer, cannot be considered open. 
 There are, however, similarities between man’s being open to the world and the 
peculiar openness of instincts. Both are a certain type of relation to the world. Human 
openness is an organic characteristic, which can have many objects and directions. Man can 
control, direct and regulate his openness; in other words man has certain dominance over his 
openness. The openness of an instinct, on the other hand, ultimately only has one object, 
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which is the predetermined objective of the act. In contrast to the openness of man, instincts 
and even more, a behavior determined by instincts, are rigid forms also in the sense that they 
are not learned but inherited. It is impossible to pick up and learn instincts. Nevertheless, in a 
certain sense we can say that instincts not only also involve a certain type of relation to the 
world but allow a certain interaction with the world and with a great series of variation which 
the basic object of an instinct, for example the animal prey that attracts a carnivore, can take 
in the world and to whose particular nature and instinctual reactions the predatory animal can 
adapt We cannot really compare this, however, to the relation to the world of the human 
world-openness, which is a free, responsive and fundamental relation.  
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2.8. World-Openness is not World-view  
 
 The simple term “openness” is understood in various senses.183 Human beings can be 
open to different kinds of things. There are levels of the scope of openness as well as different 
objects of it. In this section we will investigate the object and content of a special kind of 
openness. The aim of this chapter is to define the relation between world-view and world-
openness. This comparison is useful because one might easily confuse different phenomena 
which in fact bear only a minor resemblance. The aim of this chapter is to give a brief account 
of what world-view is in respect of man’s world-openness. In this chapter we deal with a 
phenomenon which is apparently similar to world-openness. We are above all interested in the 
question in what their similarity consists and whether not rather dissimilarity between them is 
prevalent. The main focus of our investigation, however,  is the phenomenon of man’s world-
openness. The appropriate delimitation and definition of world-view, however, and its 
comparison to the phenomenon of world-openness can help us to get closer to the true 
meaning of world-openness. 
 World-views are man’s particular opinions about or conceptions of the world; in this 
sense, it seems that world-views are comparable and certainly related to world-openness. I 
think we cannot say more about the nature of world-views and their relation to world-
openness before entering upon an analysis on the nature of world-view; otherwise we would 
be judging the phenomenon and notion prematurely. Starting from our everyday experiences, 
we can say that we often refer to different kinds of world-views as a regulatory openness to 
something. The notion of world-view (Weltanschauung) was coined by Wilhelm von 
Humbold.184 On the basis of one’s world-view, for example, one can reject military service or 
                                                 
183 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, IV,2. 1003 a 33: “to on pollakos legethai.” 
184 The notion has an enormous history. According to Husserl, for example, world-views mean non-reflected 
philosophical views behind the statements of specialized sciences. According to Scheler, however, specialized 
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condemn abortion. We usually do not accept without further ado the decisions taken by 
individuals or collectives when they refer to their world-views, since world-views are, in the 
common understanding, to be rationally justified and must not become arbitrary visions of the 
world that someone follows blindly regardless any evidences about the real structure of the 
world. World-view of a person, in an ideal form, is usually one single world-view; there do 
not exist different world-views of the very same person simultaneously. If a person has 
different views on different questions, which as a matter of fact constitute as a whole one 
single problem, or holds contradictory statements concerning one single topic, or from time to 
time changes his view, we call this person inconsistent or charge him with not having a 
consistent world-view at all. 
World-view and world-openness, however, have something in common: they can be 
both conceived as attitudes towards the world. In its preliminary definition we would say that 
world-views can help to solve problems, questions and provides a conceptual framework for 
problems to be solved.185 In contrast to world-openness, however, world-view has a restricted 
scope. Its main target and field is rather of a political and philosophical nature. Nevertheless, 
even if world-view refers to the world (that it has to do with the world as an object) and thus 
seems to be a condition of world-openness, not all human beings have a determinate view of 
the world as a whole; there can be persons who have no distinct world-views at all but are 
skeptics and lack any view of the world as a whole, or we can imagine human beings having a 
strict opinion on one question, but none or a less developed one on another. Persons who have 
world-views in the strict sense of the word can take actions without any connection to their 
world-views, since world-view does not refer to the entire breadth of human activities. 
                                                                                                                                                        
sciences depend on world-views in a more radical way than Husserl thought. See Max Scheler, Man’s Place in 
Nature. New York: The Noonday Press, 1971: 63. 
185 This preliminary definition does not seem to be true in the case of a world-view, which is about what is most 
important in life. It is not an attitude but a vision of the world, nor does it seem to be helpful for anything Its 
effect depends on its content and a person’s commitment to live in accordance wih his Weltanschauung, which is 
not always the case.  
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Activities, such as sleeping or traveling in a vehicle, have no significance concerning one’s 
world-view. The Socialist who holds a Socialist world-view can sleep in the same way as a 
Conservative can. We, however, usually hold that world-view refers to the totality of the 
human being and of the world at large: we act according to the prescribed principles of our 
world-view. But many examples show that there are human actions that are independent of 
our world-view. 
As to the content of world-view, there are different possibilities: some people have a a 
very determinate world-view from the most universal aspects of the world and God to the 
most concrete political and moral issues that are essential enough to be called “world-view” 
other people do have practically none, or a mere negative skeptical world-view. The fact that 
there are persons who have no world-view whatsoever, or a mere skeptical one, clearly 
demonstrates that having an “all-embracing” determinate world-view is not a fundamental 
human characteristic. Moreover, and of course, having a world-view, as also world-openness 
in any sense, exists only potentially in embryos, unconscious, or mentally gravely impaired 
individuals. In other words, to be a human being in principle does not mean that we 
necessarily, by our essence, have world-views. 
Besides, there are many human activities in which world-view plays no role 
whatsoever, such as when we warm a cup of soup. While admitting that faith and conviction 
are sometimes more deeply rooted in human beings than a simple opinion or a limited world-
view, we have to acknowledge that there are situations and human actions in which faith, 
world-views and similar phenomena play no role. 
World-view seems on the one hand, be presupposed by world-openness which 
presupposes some concept of the world as such that is missing in animals; on the other hand, 
world-view as conception of the world in its most important aspects seems to be preceded by 
the more fundamental characteristic of being open to the world, and thus, in the degree of 
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being open to the world, forming a world-view. It is precisely the primary nature of the 
phenomenon of being open to the world, which makes possible the development of any kind 
of opinion, world-view, viewpoint and judgment.  
This does not mean necessarily that every person have a world-view. According to the 
common understanding to have a world-view includes certain reflectedness on the content of 
the world-view. We usually call a person having a world-view who is more or less aware of 
the main points of his or her world-view. World-view, however, like belief and opinion, can 
manifest itself for certain moments or in some aspects of life. There are apparently all-
embracing world-views like the Christian or the Marxist world-view (to have a world-view 
like this does not necessarily mean, however, that the person is aware in all moments of his 
life of the content, requirements of his or her view), and there are world-views, which concern 
only one aspect or small part of the entire life of a person like a “vegetarian world-view” that 
refers to food, health, and perhaps to the ways in which we should treat or not treat animals. I 
think, nevertheless, that without structural world-openness as one of the main characteristics 
of the human being it would be impossible to develop both limited and comprehensive kinds 
of world-views. 
Opinions and world-views can change. In world history, there have been so many 
converts who did one thing in one period of their lifetime and completely the opposite in 
another. Saint Paul, for example, persecuted the first Christians and presumably took part in 
the murder of a Christian. After he had himself become a Christian, he suffered from 
persecution and was murdered by the Romans because of his convictions.  
However, the fundamental characteristic of world-openness cannot be considered as 
non-functioning or non-existing at certain points during our lifetime.186 Man can change his 
world-view and faith, but never his fundamental structural openness to the world. Even if man 
                                                 
186 We have to constantly keep in mind the hopefully more and more clear distinction between an attitude of 
world-openness, which of course can change and a kind of constitutional world-openness. 
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becomes an utterly inhuman beast, a speaking monster, or loses his consciousness and 
becomes paralyzed, he can never change his ultimate ontological disposition, that is, his being 
open to the world, no matter how narrow the world he created for and by himself is.  
There are other dissimilarities we have to take into account. Although the very same 
indicates that a world-view is supposed a view on the world as a whole, the scope of the 
world-view as well as its content sometimes covers only certain parts of human reality, like 
the vegetarian world-view. World-views are also frequently politically and philosophically 
(theologically) oriented.  
World-views are ways of looking at things. In other words, they are only convictions 
or mental dispositions, which have a more or less developed content or firm structure. World-
views can color our more fundamental world-openness, but they will never reach the 
solidness, inalterability and ontological status of structural world-openness to the totality of 
being, to the cosmos and to the absolute being. 
Finally, regarding the relation of world-openness and world-view, we can say that 
without structural world-openness it seems we could not have any world-views, while on the 
other hand the attitude of world-openness appears to presuppose already some knowledge and 
conviction about the world; thus structural world-openness seems to precede world-view, 
while world-view seems to precede an attitude of world-openness which, in its turn, can lead 
to a better knowledge and more adequate view of the world, while an attitude of closedness 
easily leads to an inadequate or to a certain absence of world-view, replacing it by a kind of 
indifference towards the question of truth about the world. Thus there seems to exist a 
dialectical relationship between world-openness as an attitude and world-view. 
Structural world-openness not only precedes world-views, but gives us the possibility 
of developing different world-views. The very same world-openness can therefore be the 
foundation of different, even contradicting world-views.  
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2.9. World-Openness and Tolerance187 
 
In this chapter I will investigate another phenomenon, which is similar to the phenomenon of 
world-openness. Among the countless behavioral and reflective attitudes there is the 
phenomenon of tolerance, which shares some of the attributes of world-openness, while with 
respect to others it clearly differs. With the help of intuition, we can develop a preliminary 
definition of tolerance which we can use as a working concept. According to this preliminary 
definition, the principal components of the concept of toleration are: firstly, a tolerating 
subject and one or more other persons towards which the first person, society, community or 
state is tolerant (either one of these may be an individual, a group, an organization, or an 
institution); secondly, an attitude, action, belief or practice which is the object of toleration; 
thirdly, the act of evaluation and a negative attitude (dislike or moral disapproval) on the part 
of tolerator toward the object of toleration; finally, a significant degree of respect of freedom 
of persons and restraint in acting against the person who holds a negative opinion, takes a 
negative attitude, or performs acts which the tolerating party disapproves of morally or 
politically.  
 In this chapter I will argue that in respect to the tolerance-intolerance dichotomy we 
cannot identify tolerance with openness. There are instances where certain forms of intolerant 
actions can be considered as openness. In this chapter I will argue – in contrast to many recent 
political scientists – that the tolerance-intolerance dichotomy is not a universal principle, and 
there are higher universal principles which define our relation to the world.  
   What is tolerance then? Tolerance is an attitude of patient forbearance in the presence 
of some other person’s beliefs or actions that are disliked or disapproved of by the tolerating 
                                                 
187 This chapter is a completely revised and rewritten version of my previously published paper: “What is and 
what is not Religious Tolerance? (In) a Phenomenological Approach” Mozaik (2007) XI. 2006/2. pp. 28-31. 
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part. What are its objects? Tolerance has neither what one considers an error or wrong as 
object, nor the person to whom tolerance refers as such. Rather, out of respect for the dignity 
and freedom of the person, we tolerate that he defends theses or commits actions that we 
deem to be erroneous or wrong. Of course, tolerance of an individual or state has to have 
limits and must not extend to crimes.  
The question as to the range of tolerance, i.e., which things, acts and attitudes should 
or should not be tolerated, and the degree of restraint required by toleration are philosophical 
and political problems. John Locke was a bit perplexed in his essay “Letter concerning 
Toleration”, since he held that if we tolerate somebody who lacks the spirit of tolerance, 
toleration can lead to our own destruction; on the other hand, if we refuse to tolerate the 
intolerant, we will sacrifice the principle of tolerance to something else which is not tolerance. 
On the whole, for Locke and for us tolerance seems to be a strange attitude and at any rate it 
is hard to define the limits within which certain ideas, speeches, or actions can be tolerated 
without having to respond to them by different kinds of private or public force or even prison. 
If one tolerates the objectively intolerable, obviously toleration is turning into an evil. 
 Tolerance is an attitude of patient forbearance in the presence of something that is 
disliked or disapproved of. It seems that tolerance has many common characteristics with the 
fundamental world-openness and the attitude of world-openness. The strangeness of tolerance 
can be seen in the fact that it is contaminated by that very implication of evil which its 
meaning contains. 
It is clear that tolerance is not liberty nor indifference, nor love, nor some form of 
respect as such. We have to return to the question: What is tolerance? How does it differ from 
intolerance and from different tolerance-like attitudes? And what is its relation to world-
openness?   
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   The opposite of tolerance is intolerance. The decisive feature of intolerance is that 
patient forbearance of what objectively should be tolerated is missing. The second moment 
above and beyond the absence of “patient forbearance” is equally decisive. For if we deal 
with not tolerating something that ought not to be tolerated, we must not speak of intolerance. 
Moreover, tolerance does not have to do with the content of what we take to be erroneous 
convictions or bad actions, which the tolerant person may wholeheartedly reject, but with the 
respect for a person’s freedom and rights. For example, in a situation of religious 
intoleration,188 the right of a person to hold a different religious belief or practice his religion 
is not accepted, and the tolerator’s negative attitude toward the person whose holding beliefs 
and actions judged to be incorrect ought to be tolerated, is not suppressed.189 Acting against 
one’s own religious persuasion is not an intolerant action. If the action, however, attempts to 
force another person to abandon his religious conviction and practice or to suffer some  
disadvantage or persecution, it certainly can be called an intolerant action. A religious fanatic 
can act in such a way. Such an intolerant person not only despises the other religion and wants 
to see it vanish. Rather, the case of intolerance we do not respect the freedom of the other 
person and not only lack permissive conduct and not only decry religious acts that we hold to 
be based on error and blasphemous, but we also do not respect the other person’s dignity and 
freedom because we hate his or her conviction or religious practice. Now, in this sense, 
intolerance is a clear antithesis of openness in two respects. In the first respect it is an 
antithesis, because it deliberately disregards the possible richness and values in the religious 
search or act of the other person as well as in the elements of truth it may contain. An 
intolerant person is not open to the true meaning, nor to the potential benevolence, goodness 
                                                 
188 The central problem of tolerance in Western history had been for centuries the problem of religious toleration. 
This is one of the consequences the West faced because its religion had been Christianity, nowadays, however, it 
is rather a “secularized” Christianity. 
189 It always depends very much what kind of negative thing is tolerated and consequently „negative attitude” is 
not certainly negative simply where someone disapproves of something negative.  
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or values of the other person,190 which, while entirely absent in devil’s worship or awefully 
superstitious religions such as the cult to Baal, are encountered in most religions. Secondly, 
an intolerant person does not follow Saint Augustine’s word “Interfice errorem, ama 
errantem” (kill the error, love the one who errs). Instead, his actions are not guided by higher 
principles and by what is due to other persons, such as love or love for truth. Especially in the 
second respect, intolerance – and not only in its extreme forms – has to be considered as an 
antithesis to openness because an intolerant attitude aims not only at the views of the person, 
but directs itself against the person himself. This attitude contradicts the nature of love and the 
benevolent approach.  
Nevertheless, there are instances where it seems that tolerance ceases to be called for. 
In the last few decades there were so many horrible examples of religious or religiously 
induced intolerance. We remember the horrible crime of the Japanese religious sect called 
Aum Sinrikio (in English ‘Supreme Truth’) in 1995, when 12 people were killed and hundreds 
were injured and the events which occur almost daily in the occupied territories of 
Palestine.191 The social danger of acts like these is obvious. No one would behave in a 
permissive way against such religious groups. Nevertheless, it is important to remark that in 
this case it is not the subject (the group, or the members of this religious group) that is not 
tolerated, but the form in which its belief (if it is a belief at all) is practiced. Thus, we can say 
that not every form of intolerance is wrong, though we should not use this negative term to 
designate a limit of what can be tolerated and a situation in which toleration would be clearly 
immoral; for it is obvious that an infinite tolerance regarding any bad attitude, vice, and crime 
would be an absurdity. And it is equally obvious that to call a state that confines first degree 
murderers to jail “intolerant” would be a misnomer. It seems that there are some forms of 
                                                 
190 Of course none of these characteristics has to be always present in tolerance. 
191 But the most horrible instance of intolerance was Jim Jones’ sect, “Church of the People”. Jones claimed to 
be the reincarnation of Jesus and Lenin. The whole community had to take poison – 638 adult and 236 child died 
in 1977 in Guyana. 
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non-tolerance that also the policy of a democratic society should adopt and maintain. Now, it 
seems that the tolerance-non-toleration dichotomy and the primacy of tolerance are not the 
highest principles, which govern our everyday life. How can we solve this problem? The 
preceding examples suggest another explanation. The case of not tolerating intolerance shows 
that the very idea of tolerance is not an all-embracing principle; there is always the higher 
principle of justice, love and the love of truth behind tolerance, by which we must not tolerate 
any crimes and not even intolerance inasmuch as the latter offends against freedom of 
conscience and of religion. 
Positive tolerance of evils that are not crimes and cannot be eliminated without attack 
on human freedom is one of many forms of respecting human dignity and freedom but we see 
clearly that tolerance is not a universal virtue, not only because it has the described limits but 
also because it only refers to a certain moderate form of errors and evils and does not 
comprise all elements of openness to truth and values nor their realization, as for example 
love does. My question is, in what sense does tolerance differ from love and what 
implications does it have concerning world-openness?  
   How does tolerance differ from love? It is obvious that according to our pre-
philosophical understanding we suppose that there is a deeper relationship between love and 
tolerance and some may even be inclined to think that they are the same. In my view, love is 
essentially a relationship involving mutuality and reciprocity, rather than a polite way of 
forbearance. Love is an active interest in the well-being of the other; it does not stop at the 
patient forbearance of moderate evils that cannot be eliminated without violation of freedom 
(as tolerance does), and – because of its open character – it goes further and tries to change 
the other person if he or she is wrong according to the judgment of the loving person. One can 
observe this feature in Christianity for instance. The so-called baptismal-command of the 
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Gospel clearly states the active and obligatory mission of all Christians.192 In this sense, love 
does not endure without protesting the otherness of the other, it interferes. Moreover, love 
does not just or primarily refer to some evil of error or moral evils. Thus there is no similarity 
between love and tolerance as such. Their relation is restricted to toleration being one of many 
effects of love. But also here a toleration inspired by love is not the only form of tolerance but 
tolerance can be based on many other motives: justice, respect of human freedom, political 
prudence, fear of reprisals, wish to be oneself tolerated by other individuals and groups, etc. 
Unlike love, tolerance is based upon the negative judgment on the object of toleration on the 
part of the man who tolerates. Moreover, the loving person will first try to free the beloved 
person from his errors or vices; toleration is only the ultima ratio where all such attempts fail 
and where the harm of not tolerating an evil is greater than non-tolerance; the latter condition 
of meaningful tolerance is not met in the case of a crime or the plan to execute one. 
 In cases of the misuses of tolerance one tolerates everything indiscriminately, i.e., one 
disregards the evaluative moment. One cannot tolerate to the same degree two different kinds 
of religious groups if one of them is obviously dangerous. It would be a total 
misunderstanding and misuse of tolerance and of love.  
In the case of indifference, which is also one special antithesis of tolerance, one is not 
interested in the values or evils existing in another person or group. On the other hand, in the 
case of toleration, one is interested in errors or evils one perceives in another person or group 
because toleration always presupposes evaluation value judgment that x or y is an evil. 
Without such a negative value judgment there would be no basis for tolerance. In other words, 
in order to tolerate something one has to know what and who is to be tolerated in that 
                                                 
192 “Go into the whole world and proclaim the Gospel to every creature. He who believes and is baptized will be 
saved; he who does not believe will be condemned” (Mk 16, 15-16.) and “All power in heaven and on earth has 
been given to me. Go therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, 
and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you.” (Mt 28, 18-19.) We have to 
admit that this is a very bold claim. This passage explicitly expresses the “unicity”, “universality”, and 
“absoluteness” of Christianity. 
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phenomenon or action. One tolerates something because one is familiar with its negative 
aspects and its limits, i.e., one knows what is to be tolerated and what is not. This means that 
one is open towards the other, and one’s openness aims to investigate values and disvalues in 
another person’s actions and beliefs. This openness, however, does not go beyond the limits 
of value-judgment and does not want to change the person or the erroneous view of the 
person, either because toleration is motivated by love but is the ultimate loving step when all 
efforts to change a person have failed, or tolerance comes from one of the other motives 
distinct from love, in which case tolerance entails a certain degree of lack of interest in the 
other, an interest we find in love. Tolerance always contains a negative judgment about a 
moral evil or error, but, as tolerance, does not go and act against this negativity. In the case of 
indifference, one does neither tolerate nor dislike (love or hate) anything, because one does 
not have (or does not want to have) enough information about the issue in question or has no 
interest in acting against something, etc.193 Taking into consideration the preceding points, in 
my view, we cannot even compare love to indifference, because indifference is the total lack 
of openness toward the other group or person. The openness of a tolerant attitude is obvious; 
nevertheless it never reaches the level of the openness of love for the reasons we have 
explained.  
The main purpose of the chapter was to draw our attention to this very important 
distinction. Real openness means therefore not only being open to another person, but 
benevolently participating in his or her life including initiating changes in his or her life. 
                                                 
193 Lack of interest can have many reasons. A full explanation of this doesn’t concern the main point of this 
chapter.  
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2.10. Attention paid to Things vs. World-Openness 
 
 Based on the insights of the preceding chapters (chapters 2.2-2.9.) and the chapter on 
the preliminary understanding on world-openness (chapter 2.1.), we have been able to 
develop a working definition of the phenomenon we are looking for. Nevertheless, we have 
still not managed to encapsulate fully what the phenomenon of world-openness is. In this 
chapter we concentrate to a phenomenon which is apparently similar to world-openness. The 
aim of this chapter is to tell what attention paid to things is. The definition of attention paid to 
things, however, will help us to see at least what world-openness is not, which can help us to 
get closer to the true meaning of world-openness. 
 When we speak about world-openness in this chapter we mean the openness, which 
constitutes an essential part of human being, which, however, can be manifested in different 
ways.194 This openness belongs to my ontological structure. When I am sleeping I am open, 
as I am equally open in loving, in playing or in reading something. My openness surpasses me 
in different senses.  
 In contrast to this there is the phenomenon of attention, which is seemingly similar to 
world-openness, but certainly is not identical with it. Now, the task of this chapter is to clearly 
distinguish world-openness from the attention paid to things. We will proceed by examples 
and philosophical reasoning.  
 By the expression paying attention to things we mean an orientation toward a limited 
number of particular objects. It seems that in certain cases one can pay attention to the totality 
of things. This observation however cannot be justified, since the most attentive person 
cannot pay attention equally to everything. For example, the hunter’s attention is oriented first 
of all toward the deer, which is supposed to arrive at one point of the dawn; meanwhile the 
                                                 
194 Again and again I have to refer back to the basic insight we gained in the preceding chapters. There are two 
kinds of world-opennesses: the consitutional and the attitude of world-openness. See the conlusion of the thesis.  
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hunter also pays attention to the noises of the forest, to the activity of smaller animals, and to 
himself, intent on not moving, sneezing, and trying not to give any signs of life, since the deer 
will show up only once at the glade. We can say that theoretically the hunter is open to 
everything, but practically cannot be attentive to everything. Attention therefore can be 
directed only to a limited number of things. On the other hand, however, openness precedes 
and establishes attention.  
 The attention is the concentration of the human mind on a certain number of things (in 
an ideal case, on one thing). It includes conscious deliberation and aims at the thing. In this 
sense, human attention differs from animal attention. In the animal attention the element of 
the conscious and free reflection is missing. Animals also hunt and, governed by their 
instincts, are able to pay attention to things during the hunt. Nevertheless, animals will never 
suspend their hunt and change their attention because of free, conscious decisions and will 
never leave the glade because it is “tea time at home”. Animals can leave the glade because of 
the impulse of another instinct, but never because of free choice. The animal attention 
therefore differs from the human attention as the animal openness differs from the human 
openness. 
 World-openness differs from the phenomenon of attention paid to things also in the 
sense that it cannot be the result of a process of learning. One cannot develop skills in world-
openness inasmuch as it is an original characteristic of humanity,195 whereas attention is a 
faculty that we can constantly develop. This is the reason why one has to develop one’s 
faculty of concentration thoroughout one’s life. Children, for example, having not developed 
their capacity of concentration, will frequently suffer from a disorder of concentration, for 
example they will have problems with reading, since reading is a linear-successive 
                                                 
195 Note: one can always develop his or her faculties in openness if we are talking about openness as attitude. For 
example one always can and has to develop his or her capacities of openness in the basic moral attitude of 
goodness. 
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concentration of the attention. Attention is a learnt capacity, which can be the target of 
destruction, whereas constitutional world-openness is not.  
 Attention can be called forth by attraction, for instance. Human attention is not a fixed 
one; one can provoke and at the time extinguish it. In my view, animal attention seems to be 
somewhat stronger in this scheme. World-openness, on the other hand, as a fundamental 
human characteristic distinct from a free attitude of openness, is simply there without any 
previous provocation or cause.  
 Attention is a special care or action, mostly a practical consideration. It has a certain 
duration, after its completion it simply vanishes. World-openness, on the other hand, 
possesses a certain independence from temporality. This characteristic, when it is found in the 
free attitude of word-openness, can be called its superactuality. We underline – using von 
Hildebrand’s terminology – the significance of world-openness’ superactual character in the 
construction, depth and continuity of personal life.196 The structural world-openness, in 
contrast, is also lasting but, being a constitutive feature of the human nature, is not superactual 
as acts and attitudes can be. In this structural ontological sense, however, world-openness 
precedes and lays some foundation to the phenomenon of the specifically human attention 
paid to things. It is absurd to say that there will be a time when man will not be open in the 
sense of this lasting trait of the person, while we did distinguish in the spheres of attitude 
world-openness and closedness. On the other hand, it would be equally absurd to say that one 
is ontologically attentive to the totality of the world.   
  
                                                 
196 See chapter (2.1.) on the preliminary meaning of world-openness, and Hildebrand’s view on the superactual 
character of many personal attitudes in his Ethics. Dietrich von Hildebrand, Christian Ethics, 2nd edition 
(Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1978) Chapter 17.  
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2.11. Responsibility for the World and World-Openness 
 
It seems that the phenomenon what we call world-openness, taken in the sense of 
universal openness to the totality, entails a meaning which seems to be close to the concept of 
responsibility for the world. We must therefore have a closer look at this sense also, and 
explain the relationship of the two phenomena. What we are trying to do here is similar to the 
act that we previously called delimitation. Delimitation here means, firstly, circumscribing the 
notion of responsibility and, secondly, comparing the preliminary understanding of world-
openness as a feature which belongs to every people with the proper meaning of taking 
responsibility for the world. As a result of this comparison one can immediately see that 
“world-openness” taken in the sense of responsibility does not equal the structural-ontological 
understanding of world-openness. Accordingly we will immediately perceive that 
responsibility might have its origin in openness, but by no means is identical with it; by the 
same token, we will immediately see that bearing responsibility is different from taking or 
accepting responsibility. Taking responsibility might be a certain manifestation of the single 
act and attitude of openness - as we have discussed it in respect of man.197  
Among the many possible meanings of the term, we sometimes use the term “world-
openness” in an environmentalist context. In this context, the world-open person is the one 
who takes into consideration issues of environmental conservation and behaves in an 
environmental-friendly way. We call a world-open man responsible and sensitive to matters 
of environment who proves himself to be responsible for the future of the globe and acts also 
in tiny things in accordance with this view. This understanding of world-openness seems to 
have a comprehensive character (as the proper meaning of world-openness has), namely it 
says that man is responsible for the totality of the world. In my view however this 
understanding is erroneous and doesn’t convey the original meaning of the phenomenon of 
                                                 
197 See chapter 2.3. “Aspects in the person that can be open…” 
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world-openness in none of its understandings. Responsibility taken in the sense of bearing 
responsibility for the world does not necessarily imply any acceptance or taking of this 
responsibility. If a man pushes a button that will throw an atomic bomb on the entire 
humanity, he bears responsibility but maybe does not perform an act of consciously 
understanding, accepting, and taking on himself the moral obligation of taking care of 
humanity. If we consider only the ecological responsibility, we only consider a small portion 
of our responsibility for the world, the aspect of the enhancement of the environment. This 
meaning likewise disregards the epistemological, ontological, emotional, and many other 
volitional aspects of openness. We can say that world-openness taken in the sense of taking 
one’s share in the environmental responsibility for the world is not an all-embracing meaning 
of world-openness and not as fundamental as others that we have discussed.  
There are many other meanings of accepting responsibility which to a certain extent 
could be considered as particular kinds of openness. Nevertheless, none of these connotations 
equal the proper understanding of the phenomenon of world-openness. Responsibility is a 
moral phenomenon necessarily dependent on the existence of a person in possession of her 
faculties, but it is not a moral value nor a moral disvalue; taking responsibility or ignoring it 
or acting against it. When we say that we are responsible for something, our human 
responsibility always entails temporality and frequently lasts only for a certain time. For 
example, parents bear responsibility for their children. Nevertheless, after the maturity of the 
children parental responsibility largely elapses or changes to another kind of responsibility for 
a manifestation of affection toward the children and interest in their well-being.  
The conditions of responsibility involve that a consciously acting person knows what 
he or she is doing and that he or she has as a minimum degree of freedom to control (that is, 
to initiate and to complete) the act that he or she performs. In general, a man is legally and/or 
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morally responsible for an action because he or she is the one who performs the action 
directly or indirectly. 
It is widely accepted that free will and responsibility are tightly interrelated. Human 
free will, however, obtains its full meaning in the context of a more profound openness to the 
world, and not in the restricted context of the world-openness as a kind of limited ecological 
responsibility, because being in this sense responsibly open to the world shows only one 
aspect of the whole of the human existence. It is also true, that in order to be responsible for 
something, one has to be open, yet openness taken in the sense of being open in responsibility 
for ecological aspects of the environment does not comprise the full meaning of human 
freedom. Openness, on the other hand, being peculiar to man alone among all earthly 
creatures, and taken in the sense of ontological and all-embracing openness, while it itself is 
independent of responsibility and free will and bears no moral value at all, necessitates a more 
comprehensive understanding of freedom than it could be expressed in the context of such 
limited responsibility, although the deepest dimension of free will unfolds only in the moral 
sphere, the deepest value sphere, and there is always linked to moral responsibility that is 
absent in the structural ontological world-openness but can emerge on its basis in the response 
to our response to the whole world, especially to all personal beings which to refer to in 
loving affirmation is simultaneously the highest moral act and the supreme form of the 
attitude of openness, world-openness and God-openness 
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2.12. Antitheses of World-Openness 
 
 The phenomena which we have been discussing so far are not the antitheses of world-
openness, but its certain restricted forms and manifestations. They indeed reflect some 
characteristics of the phenomenon of world-openness, which in its principal understanding 
constitutes a substantive part of the human being and, in its second meaning, is a free attitude 
opposed to others. Using a metaphor, we can say that phenomena like instincts, responsibility, 
tolerance, etc., are “images” of world-openness. These “images” (like responsibility, 
tolerance, etc.,) cannot be considered identical with the phenomenon itself which they depict, 
but they bear indeed a certain resemblance to the original idea of world-openness. Now, here 
in this chapter, we are going to try to investigate antitheses of world-openness which bear no 
resemblance whatsoever to world-openness proper, but rather constitute its counterpart.  
 Thus in this chapter we are interested in ways, respects, actions in which man acts 
closed to the world. We have to proceed concentrating on man’s acts, on the acting person, 
since our findings of the previous chapters suggest that world-openness is an exclusively 
human character, in which man is open to the divine reality. We can give a comprehensive 
name for man’s attribute of being closed to the world: this is the world-closedness. In short, 
we are looking for the human manifestations of world-closedness. 
Now, insights of the previous chapters suggest that we have to distinguish basically 
between two types of openness: the structural and the attitude of world-openness. Here in this 
chapter I will speak about the antitheses of the attitude of world-openness, because attitudes 
can change or diminish, that is, can have antitheses, whereas constitutional world-openness 
can be absent in non-living beings or animals, but can have no antithetical, contrary opposite, 
but only the contradictory opposite of its non-existence or absence, that is, it has no antithesis, 
no hostile contrary. In stark contrast to this, the attitude of world-openness has clear 
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opposites. Moreover, while the structural ontological world-openness of the person cannot be 
absent in man, the attitude of world-openness certainly can.  
 There are six main aspects, in which man can be closed to the world. These modes of 
not being open to the world are overlapping. The first mode, in which man can be considered 
being closed to the world, results from egoism. Philosophically, an egoistic theory of ethics is 
a view which says that our actions are always motivated by a wish to benefit ourselves. An 
egoistical person always thinks about himself and what is the best for him. The man of 
egoism doesn’t care about what benefits the others, disregards the other and the world, that is, 
he is artificially cut off from the reality of the world. He is “imprisoned”, however not by 
other persons and not by the malevolence of others, but by his own ego. The egoistical man as 
a matter of fact does not recognize either the values or the existence of the other creature. An 
egoistical man is therefore closed to the values as well as to the real existence of the world. 
 The second sense in which a man can be considered as closed to the world is when he 
expresses hatred. Hatred is a specific state of mind which is opposed to love and charity as to 
other-directed acts. Hatred in the last analysis aims at the annihilation of the other. This 
however contrasts with the acknowledgment and above all the loving affirmation of the 
existence and value of the other. An act motivated by hatred, such as a deliberate murder, is 
closedness par excellence.  
 The third mode in which a man can be considered as being closed to the world is his 
denial of truth. In the context of closedness one can deny justice, necessary state of affairs, 
natural law and values, etc. The truth of all these states of affairs does not depend on mere 
observation. One can also deny physical and historical facts, but, since they are not 
“essentially necessary and incomparably intelligible”198 states of facts, their denial does not 
result necessarily in being closed to the world as such. The denial of a historical fact, the date 
                                                 
198 See Dietrich von Hildebrand, What is Philosophy? London and New York: Routledge 1991. Chapter IV. 
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of the beginning of the First World War, for example, does not mean that the person who 
denies it is not open to the truths of historical data and truth itself. In contrast to this, the 
denial of essentially necessary facts such as of the moral value of reverence – which, 
according to Dietrich von Hildebrand, is “the basis and at the same time an essential element 
of moral life and moral values”199 – necessarily results in a closedness to the world. By the 
denial of reverence one also denies love, that is, the self-surrendering interiorization of the 
world, and equally denies values. In other words, the irreverent man – as Dietrich von 
Hildebrand would say – is blind to values.  
Similarly, the statements and attitudes of the ancient and modern Sophists can also be 
considered as world-closedness. What did Plato have against the Sophists? He says that the 
Sophists endanger the human understanding and the common good of the society. Josef 
Pieper summarized excellently Plato’s thoughts concerning the method of Sophists:  
According to Plato, the danger of Sophist lies in the nuances of their verbal 
use and the formal meaningfulness of their statements. The Sophists 
overloading the application of verbal constructions therethrough destroy the 
dignity and meaning of the very same word.200  
 
By the abuse of words the Sophists negate and violate the real world. Insofar as words do not 
mediate reality, we are in delusion, or, in other words, we are in another world. Nevertheless, 
this delusion is not harmless; it has an effect on man, since “when words are corrupted man’s 
existence cannot remain untouched.” Plato holds that the brilliant use of words and their 
sophisticated combination has nothing to do with wisdom, which a real philosopher seeks for. 
Sophists juggle with words; they create illusory worlds, in which the only principle is the 
masterful game with words. Such an artificial language, however, is cut off from its proper 
origin, the truth.201 The point of the use of language of the Sophist is to illegitimately 
influence others and to abuse the language by the dethronement of truth. Socrates says that the 
                                                 
199 Dietrich von Hildebrand, Fundamental Moral Attitudes. New York: Longmans, Green and Co. 1950: 14. 
200 Josef Pieper, Abuse of Language - Abuse of Power, San Francisco: Ignatius, 1992: 14-15. 
201 See Josef Pieper op. cit. 20. 
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Sophist does not communicate with his partner, rather flatters. The Sophist flatters, since he 
interacts with his interlocutor not for the sake of conveying information and not because of 
love for the truth. This, however, results in the end of a conversation, since the Sophist treats 
the other not as a person, but as a means. The first thought of the flattering Sophist is to get 
the money and later the soul of his partner. Plato describes this method in his “Republic” in 
this way: 
And in what way does he who thinks that wisdom is the discernment of the 
tempers and tastes of the motley multitude, whether in painting or music, or, 
finally, in politics, differ from him whom I have been describing For when a 
man consorts with the many, and exhibits to them his poem or other work of 
art or the service which he has done the State, making them his judges when 
he is not obliged, the so-called necessity of Diomede will oblige him to 
produce whatever they praise. And yet the reasons are utterly ludicrous 
which they give in confirmation of their own notions about the honorable 
and good. Did you ever hear any of them which were not?202 
 
 According to Plato, the philosopher searches for wisdom and is concerned with the 
ideas, which signify the real world; for them our world is only a shadow. Sophists, on the 
other hand, are concerned with doxa; they conceal the world, that is, they distort and pervert 
words. The enchained and misled people of Plato’s analogy of the cave accept the Sophist’s 
pseudo world as a real world. Consequently, people of the cave will refuse to acknowledge 
the possibility of another real world in reality. From this follows, that it is precisely the 
essences of things that are concealed from them. They pretend to know something in the cave, 
but in fact they don’t know anything; they live in a virtual world fabricated by the Sophists. 
The analogy of the cave of Plato bears a startling resemblance to the screen-gazer man of our 
age befuddled by the “eternal Sophist”. This is the man who stares at pseudo pictures on the 
wall deprived of truth and reality. Plato says that every man is nurtured by truth. In order to 
live a human life, therefore, one has to be nurtured by truth and not by different substitutes of 
the truth. The substitutions for the real world can constitute their own “worlds”, which are 
                                                 
202 Plato, The Republic. (Book Five) 493 d – 493 e. 
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more or less similar to the real world. In comparison to the real world and truth, however, 
they are rather non-worlds, which obscure the real world. Consequently, the man living in 
such a “world” has to be considered world-closed.  
The fourth sense in which a man can be closed to the world is when he exercises 
negligence.203 Negligence means lack of proper care or giving attention to things that demand 
it. Negligence shares some common points with egoism and often comes from it, though it is 
not a part of egoism. It is also an opposite to an attitude of responsibility. In my view, if 
negligence entails deliberation, that is, if it doesn’t come from a simple ignorance, then 
negligence can be considered as closedness to the world. For example, if I do not help a 
person who needs immediate aid, then I reject the world of the other person as well as I lock 
myself up in my own world of egoism. There are many examples for negligence. The most 
known is the parable of the Good Samaritan.204 In this story Jesus contrasts the ethical 
standpoint of the priest and the Levite to the Good Samaritan’s behavior. The priest as well as 
the Levite “walks on by, on the other side” and even if they see the heavily injured man, they 
deliberately exercise negligence; they show no signs of pity. This means that they are not 
open to certain phenomena of the world, which by their value and importance surely deserve 
attention. The response-demanded half dead man requires an immediate help, the priest and 
the Levite are impassive and indifferent. In this sense the priest and the Levite reject not only 
to participate in the life of the injured man, and are not only closed to the other person, but 
they are also closed in their egoism.   
 The fifth way in which a man can be considered as being closed to the world is when 
he is insensitive. Being insensitive means disregarding and rejecting of inherent values of a 
                                                 
203 It might be that negligence is not the most appropriate expression for the state of affairs which I would like to 
expound here. Indifference, unconcern, disinterest, impassivity are synonyms of negligence. Nevertheless, I 
would like to describe here a phenomenon, that independently of its name, must have be shown as an antithesis 
of concern (Sorge) for someone’s well-being. I think the same can be said about all six main aspects in which 
man can be considered closed to the world. In each cases I describe a phenomenon which  
204 See Luke 10,25-37 
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person or a thing. When someone is insensitive then he lacks of openness to greatness in 
general. Greatness in this context might include – among others – ethical, aesthetic, personal, 
musical, philosophical values. For example, I think we can all agree that Leonardo’s Mona 
Lisa is one of the best and most beautiful paintings of the world. Now, to hold that the Mona 
Lisa is an utterly ugly painting would mean disregarding its undeniable values. The reason of 
this insensitivity is most of all lack of knowledge coming from poor education or bad 
upbringing. When a person is not responsive, it does not mean necessarily that he does it on 
purpose. Independently of the fact, however, whether it is deliberate or, as it is in the case of 
insensitivity, unintentional, it can be considered still closedness.  
 The sixth sense in which a man can be considered closed to the world has to do with 
those situations in which he becomes addicted to something that closes up the real world from 
him. Addictions in this sense are virtual worlds, which have no access to the real world. The 
contraposition of the virtual and the real, and being and non-being, is one of the oldest 
problems of philosophy. There are, of course, different virtual worlds and different degrees of 
addiction; we cannot discuss the problem of virtual worlds in all their respects: here we are 
talking about addictions as virtual worlds disregarding the degree of man’s submergence into 
the virtual world. Usually we call a person ‘addicted’ who is unable to stop taking or using 
excessively something as a habit. In this sense a heroin addict, for example, lives in his – 
virtual, non-real, sub-real or many times perverted – world with no contact to real values, real 
persons, real contacts and real truth. The man of addiction – as Josef Pieper says referring to 
virtual worlds resulted from abuse of language – is unable not only for finding the truth, but 
also searching for it.205 In my view not having an access to the world of real values and to the 
world of realities can be considered as closedness and a certain form of self-imprisonment. 
This happens to a person who lives in the virtual world of an addiction. The virtual world of 
                                                 
205 See Josef Pieper, op. cit. pp. 34-35. 
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the sex-addiction of the pornopages on Internet or the virtual world of child abuse, for 
example, frustrate man to have a real relation with the other sex, with a real, appropriate 
partner. This man, although he apparently lives in his virtual world, as a matter of fact, is 
closed to the real world. 
 We have discussed so far six main aspects (that is, ways, respects, behaviors and 
actions), in which man can be considered closed to the world. These aspects are attitudes in 
human beings. We have said previously that attitudes can change, whereas man’s structural 
characteristics – and we have argued that constitutional world-openness belongs to this 
category – cannot change. Now, according to the analysis of the chapter, it seems that man 
can act contrary to his essential ontological structure in his attitudes. We can say, but solely in 
this context, that the principal common characteristic of these acts (antitheses of the attitude 
of world-openness) is the implicit (or explicit) denial of man’s God-directedness.  
Nevertheless, if we want to collect all the possible instances of world-closedness, then 
we have to take into account instances which are not of human origin. In a certain sense, 
however, since we have considered constitutional as well as the attitude of world-openness as 
a specifically human character, all what is not of human origin can be conceived as an 
antithesis to world-openness. From the viewpoint of the full understanding of world-
openness, “openness” of non-human beings, for example, cannot be considered openness, 
rather an opposite or at best a faint analogy of it. Nevertheless, I wouldn’t call the “openness” 
of non-living beings and animals a world-closedness. As a matter of fact – constitutional as 
well as the attitude of – world-openness is absent in non-living things and animals, but has no 
antithesis there. The main reason for this distinction is that attitudes of world-closedness 
entail the element of a conscious206 “turning away” from the principal end of man, whereas 
animals don’t possess this conscious element. When a man submerges into the virtual world 
                                                 
206 We have to suppose that there is in each instances of the antithesis of world-openness at least the minimum of 
consciousness. Now, this minimum of conscoiusness indicates that it is a free, human act.  
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of a computer game and becomes addicted, he acts against his very nature and turns away 
from many higher and real natural values and from his supernatural end. In the animal 
openness, even if it is a reduced openness in comparison to the full meaning of openness, the 
conscious factor is missing. Animals (but it is true also for non-living and non-rational 
beings) cannot act against the laws of their pre-defined nature. It is only man who can act 
against his nature, because it is only man who has real freedom. The significance of this fact, 
however, is enormous, since it means that man is not the prisoner of the eternal flux, as the 
ancient Greeks taught, or of determinism and man is not only a finely structured piece of the 
matter, as Marxism proponed, but in fact can be open to the world and can be the embodied 
affirmation of the Infinite. 
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2.13. The pseudo Forms of World-Openness 
 
 Pseudo forms of world-openness can have their origin in different sources. The term 
“pseudo” signifies a thing or phenomenon, which is apparently similar to another thing or 
phenomenon, but in fact, differs in significant features. The difference between the two 
phenomena could be so great that it is sometimes really hard to tell whether it is a pseudo 
form or rather an antithesis of the original. My working hypothesis is to presuppose that the 
term ‘pseudo’ signifies a phenomenon which pretends to be identical with the original one. In 
our case, therefore, pseudo forms of world-openness are all phenomena, which pretend to be 
similar to world-openness, but actually aren’t.  
 In the light of this definition it seems that non-living and non-spiritual beings cannot 
be open to the world, not even in a pseudo manner. For living world-open in a pseudo manner 
would entail deliberate divergence from the normal, from the usual. Acting deliberately, that 
is, consciously, is something only man can do. Therefore, pseudo forms of world-openness 
can be found only in human beings. I consider pseudo forms of world-openness as special 
kinds of behavior (that is, I consider pseudo forms of world-openness as attitudes having 
incorrect direction and intention), in which man behaves against his very nature and against 
his openness.  
 There are many forms of behavior, which can be considered as pseudo forms of world-
openness. Man can be non-authentically open to world, when he pretends to behave as if he 
were open – but in fact he isn’t. Conceited persons can behave like this. When a man behaves 
as if he were omniscient, pretending to be an expert in different kinds of sciences or 
pretending to be familiar with facts, phenomena, rules and principles, which in fact surpass 
his poor knowledge and experience, we consider him conceited. A conceited person pretends 
to be open to different kinds of worlds, but in fact he is not open to them. The man of pseudo 
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knowledge, because of his incompetence, creates fake worlds, which distort reality. This man 
is so concerned with his self-importance that he cannot disregard putting himself in the center 
in every question and in all aspects. Reality, however, is not always and in all respects man-
centered, especially not individual-ego-centered. This man does not only create fake worlds, 
but causes self-deception: this man lies to himself. In this sense he is non-authentically open 
to two worlds: to the world as such and to his world, that is, to his concerns. 
 The so-called liberal attitude to the world also can be considered as a type of pseudo 
world-openness. Here I am talking about the liberal attitude in its everyday sense, as a world-
view, not in its specific political-philosophical sense, which can be attributed to certain 
figures of philosophy such as John Locke or Adam Smith. There are many different types of 
liberal world-views and aspects in which a person can be considered as “liberal”. There are, 
however, a few common points, which also characterize liberalism in its everyday (mostly 
political) usage. The most salient feature of liberalism is the protection and development of 
the freedom of the individual. Different forms of liberalism agree on freedom of conscience, 
freedom of religion, sexual freedom, freedom of knowledge, freedom of speech and thinking, 
private property and free market.  
From our point of view, the most important common feature of liberalisms is the way 
they relate to the world. Now, in this sense liberals are open to the world in a peculiar laissez 
faire-attitude. This means that for a liberal there is neither metaphysical nor epistemological 
absolute truth. The liberal person is open to the world in an “everything goes” manner. 
Nowadays, in the everyday usage, the term liberal became almost identical with the term 
world-open. In my view, however, world-openness is different from the liberals’ liberal 
world-view. The way of understanding the world of the liberals comes from their relativism 
regarding the truth of things. Liberals say that, since there is no truth, and even if there is truth 
we cannot take it for granted that we can know it, we have to be open to the world and accept 
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whatever comes and whatever it is. In my view this attitude is a pseudo form of the real 
openness, because liberals fail to do justice to the original motivation and object of this 
openness. For man is open to the world for its values and for its truth, from this follows that it 
is not only l’art pour l’art, that is, “openness for the sake of openness”-phenomenon.  
The openness of the liberals is a pseudo form of openness also in the sense that they 
deny the possibility of cognition of the truth of the world. Now, denying the cognition of the 
world makes world-openness pointless. Liberals are open to the world indiscriminately, which 
is resulted from the fact that in their “openness” the evaluative moment is missing. Now, the 
evaluative moment is, however, indispensable also for the correct understanding of world-
openness itself. In short, the liberal world-openness as opposed to truth cannot be regarded as 
real openness.  
Political liberalism is also pseudo-openness because of its relativism. Relativism is a 
world-view, which says that truth(s), values, arch-phenomena are not always and generally 
valid, but are limited by the nature of the human mind, or are relative to history, culture, etc. 
For example according to moral relativism, moral values can vary culture by culture. In this 
world-view moral is like etiquette: it varies country by country, family by family and epoch 
by epoch. Now, it is my firm conviction that truth and values and, generally speaking the truth 
of things cannot be based on the cognition of man. Human thinking is not the ultimate source 
of truth and values. Shakespeare says in his Hamlet: “There are more things in heaven and 
earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” It means, in my view, that there are 
countless things existing independently of us, they are out of our reach, or in other words, the 
majority of the reality is hidden from us. It is hidden in the sense that it surpasses our 
cognition because of its infinity and because of its quality. To hold that the human mind is the 
ultimate source of reality would mean the denial not only the cognition of the reality, but the 
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existence of many aspects of reality which the human mind cannot, or sometimes, is too lazy 
to reach.   
Relativism of liberals is a pseudo-openness also in the sense that it denies what it 
presupposes. For example in case of cultural relativism any attempt to compare different 
cultures would inevitably have to appeal to some assumptions universally found in human 
cultures, but, according to the principal dogma of relativism, cultural relativism denies that 
there are such significant cultural universals. The same goes for ethical, social and any other 
forms of relativisms. We have to reject relativism as incoherent, because it undermines the 
concepts of truth, meaning, understanding and objectivity. The main claims of relativism (all 
conflicting truths have equal values and all depends on the human cognition; anthropos 
metron panton – as Protagoras said207) are implausible. I think therefore that the relativist 
world-view cannot be considered as a world-open standpoint, since it denies truth and the 
cognition of truth as well as denies any common ground of dialogue and exchange of ideas.     
 Thirdly, I consider openness as pseudo if it is the kind of openness that is directed 
toward pseudo values. For example if a man says that he is open to the world of values of 
music, but in fact he is open (and listens) only to one type of music, which is as a matter of 
fact destructive and valueless mass music, then we cannot consider him open to the real 
values of music. This man is open to pseudo values, he pretends to be familiar with music, but 
in fact he knows neither the real values of music nor music itself. For pseudo values can 
seduce man and deprive him from developing and having access to the world of real values. 
Pseudo values are like intoxication: they paralyze man and often hamstring any further 
development in recognition of higher values. In this case, the man, who listens during his 
whole life mass music, such as pop music, will lose the sense for higher values of music. 
There are so many other forms and formulas of rhythm, ways of musical modalities, 
                                                 
207 See Plato, Theaetetus 152 A-B 
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thousands of musical solutions, which the XX-XXI. century’s pop music’s lower level value 
cannot express. In comparison to the grandiosity of Bach’s Saint John’s Passion, songs of the 
pop culture possess pseudo values. Traditional and authentic folk music has also high values. 
It is beyond doubt that folk music is beautiful but is different from higher classical music. 
Nevertheless, I wouldn’t say that folk music has no real values or it would have pseudo 
values. Folk music has real values and the popular modern music will never reach the 
structure, meaning, and musical complexity of folk music. The one who listens throughout 
one’s life to pop music will lose sight of the values of real music, or, in other words, after a 
while one will be deaf for the real values of music.  
 Perhaps another example can shed more light on the point I would like to make. The 
one, who sees the difference between a real work of art and a cartoon, will immediately see 
the difference between the values of fine arts and the values of a cartoon such as Disney’s 
Mickey Mouse. Nowadays, there are many who hold that cartoons are on the same level of 
values as classical works of art are, and by watching cartoons one can have an insight into the 
world of values. In contrast to this view I claim that cartoons and all similar sorts of products 
of man cannot exceed their limited structural framework and cannot point to higher levels of 
values. In comparison to the sublime values of classical art of painting, cartoons have pseudo 
values, which are more temporal than eternal, one-dimensional than all-embracing, 
disintegrative than all-integrated. In this sense, however, all those who claim to be open to 
values and to the world through cartoons are mistaken (this is also true for other artifacts of 
lower value), since they are open simply to pseudo values.  
In short, our last two examples show that in neither case we can say that one is open to 
the world in its real sense; in neither case we can say that one is open to values, on the 
contrary we confirm that in both cases one is open to pseudo values. Being open to pseudo 
values, however, is not world-openness as such, but its pseudo form. 
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The Object of Man's World-Openness – the World 
3.1. What the Concept of the “World” means? Interpretations of the Concept of the World 
  
In the previous sections of our investigations we presupposed that the phenomenon of 
(world-)openness, of which we said that its appropriate interpretation is God-directedness, 
conditionally contains two elements. It seems to be reasonable to say that in the phenomenon 
of world-openness there is the “one” who is open and there is “something” that the “who” is 
open to. The first “part” of the phenomenon of world-openness is the human element. 
According to our earlier insights, it is, at least on this earth, always and only man, who is the 
subject of the openness. It is man, who is open to the world in the full sense of the word and 
not other creatures, such as non-spiritual beings, and other non-living things. We came to this 
conclusion after a careful investigation of different possible subjects of the phenomenon of 
world-openness. The second element of the phenomenon of world-openness is its direction. 
Now, whether this distinction between the two elements is well-founded and justified 
can be ascertained only after reading the whole series of the analyses of the thesis. The reason 
for this lies in the nature of the phenomenological analysis. Since the thesis intends to be 
phenomenological, it has to go through numerous distinctions, differentiations, examples, 
which shed light on distinctions and differentiations, explanations and specifications. On the 
other hand, phenomenology can apply working definitions, which can serve as starting point 
for the whole analysis. It seems, therefore, that we cannot say anything essential concerning 
the phenomenon until we get through all these processes. It is true only in part; there are some 
points, which we would like to underline here. These are: firstly, that the phenomenon of 
world-openness as God-directedness has a highly intelligible, – in my view – necessary 
essence, and secondly, the basic attributes of world-openness also have intelligible essences, 
which enable the human mind to gain an insight into necessary states of facts, essentially 
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rooted in their nature. I think, without the intuitive presupposition of these conditions the 
whole thesis would be meaningless. It is true, however, that the justification of these theses 
can be fully ascertained only after completing all the distinctions to be made in the thesis. At 
this stage all that we can say is that world-openness interpreted as culminating and 
transcending itself in God-directedness might have two basic elements. The method of 
phenomenology will obviously help to overcome the misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations of all kinds of reductionist views on the human being and on his chief 
characteristic: world-openness. By the investigation of one specific human phenomenon, one 
can point to a characteristic, which essentially belongs to the human being. 
 In this section of the thesis, we are interested in the problem of the proper direction of 
world-openness. There are two main questions, which should be answered here. What or who 
is the proper object of man’s openness? And, whether there are other comprehensive objects 
besides world and God, which also can be an aim of a different openness? Now, since our 
main objective with the investigation of the phenomenon of world-openness is to define 
man’s place in the world, we will have a better understanding of the human being insofar as 
we are able to emphasize the proper subject of our inquiry. So far we have concluded that its 
proper subjects are not animals and non-living beings, but the human being. We have 
emphasized that the human being is an original openness, that is, man is a spirit (Geist), and 
the proper object of his openness (both metaphysical and attitudinal) is God. Now, this final 
statement is again based on intuitive knowledge gained from the reflections on the subject of 
openness. The task of the following analysis is to bring to light the proper object of man’s 
openness. 
 The question of the meaning of the concept of the world is more difficult than we 
supposed at the beginning, since it involves a whole series of other problems. We must 
distinguish first of all between different objects of man’s openness, namely when we speak 
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about man’s openness we do not necessarily mean (and understand) the “world” in its 
everyday meaning. Secondly, we must distinguish between the various meanings of the 
concept of the world proper. The concept of the world has diversified senses, such as the 
physical world, the natural world, the life-world, the virtual world, etc. These meanings have 
to be investigated as well. Thirdly, since there are various opennesses, we have to examine the 
possible object(s) of these opennesses as well. Now, it might be that, since there are less 
significant opennesses in respect of our topic, some objects bear also less philosophical 
relevance. The point of the investigation of these phenomena is to tell, after the analysis 
referring to the phenomenon, that this is not the interpretation what we were looking for. 
Finally, we must carry out our project in the light of God-openness intuiting that the divine 
reality is philosophically the most meaningful object of man’s openness. 
It is therefore the central aim of the third main part of the thesis to investigate the 
appearances, “types” of the world as much as possible including forms, which might also be 
the antitheses of it, such as the world of the non-being or virtual worlds. I will argue that there 
are meaningful interpretations of the object(s) of the phenomenon of world-openness. I will 
argue, however, that a good interpretation includes God-directedness of the human being and 
a theistic interpretation of his world-openness. 
Max Scheler distinguishes between facts (Welttatsachen) and archphenomena 
(Urgegebenes). According to Scheler, Welttatsachen can be proven (he uses the word 
Beweis), whereas Urgegebenes cannot be proven. Now, following Scheler’s train of thoughts 
I think that the phenomenon of the world is also an arch-datum. A very special philosophical 
method is required to understand its real essence. The phenomenon of the world as 
archphenomenon cannot be proven, but – as the phenomenological tradition would formulate 
– can be found. Scheler characterizes this method as the following: 
We can co-operate in this process by bringing before his notice all that can 
be found in other regions of the mind, already known and familiar, to 
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resemble, or again to afford some special contrast to, the particular 
experience we wish to elucidate […] In other words our X cannot, strictly 
speaking, be taught, it can be evoked, awakened in the mind; as everything 
that comes “of the spirit” must be awakened.208  
 
Now, the phenomenon of the world as Urgegebenes belongs to the realm of non-
provable things, namely they (as the “we”, the “ego”, the “existence”, the “religious 
experience”, etc.) are primordial phenomena. This insight suggests that the world is an 
archphenomenon of human consciousness and that there is nothing provable in this.209 We 
live in the paradoxical condition of both having the world and yet being part of it. It is 
paradoxical and in fact hard to understand that even if we perish, the world will still go on. In 
my existence the world is there, even if I am only one part of it. This my-world will once 
disappear, but in another sense the world will be there after my death. The paradoxical nature 
of the phenomenon of the world as Urgegebenes is very well expressed by Robert 
Sokolowski, the renowned historicist of the phenomenological movement. He says: 
So there are many things in the world, all given in different manners of 
presentation. There is also the world itself, which is given in still a different 
way. The world is not a large “thing”, nor is it the sum of the things that 
have been or can be experienced. The world is not like a sphere floating in 
space, nor is it a collection of moving objects. The world is more like a 
context, a setting, a background, or a horizon for all the things there are, all 
the things that can be intended and given to us; the world is not another 
thing competing with them. It is the whole for them all, not the sum of them 
all, and it is given to us as a special kind of identity. We could never have 
the world given to us as one item among many, nor even as a single item: it 
is given only as encompassing all the items. It contains everything, but not 
like any worldly container. The term “world” is a singulare tantum; there 
could only be one of them. There may be many galaxies, there may be many 
home planets for conscious being […], but there is only one world. “The 
world” is not an astronomical concept; it is a concept related to our 
immeditate experience. The world is the ultimate setting for ourselves and 
                                                 
208 Quoted in Scheler 1972: 170. (Here Scheler quotes Rudolf Otto’s The Idea of the Holy. 1958: 7.) (Italics are 
mine.) 
209 Perhaps Scheler’s example of the archphenomenon of religious experience can be used as a paradigm for the 
archphenomenon of the world. He says: ”The sphere of an absolute Being as such, regardless of whether it is 
accessible to experience or knowledge, belongs to the essence of man just as much as self-consciousness and 
consciousness of the world.” Scheler 1979: 89. We can reformulate our insights on the phenomenon of the world 
using Scheler’s words: The sphere of the phenomenon of the world as such, regardless of whether it is accessible 
to experience or knowledge, belongs to the essence of man just as much as self-consciousness. 
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for all the things we experience. The world is the concrete and actual whole 
for experience.210 
 
“There is only one world”, but it is “given in different manners of presentation.” The 
selection of various worlds that shall be analyzed in the following chapters is not a result of 
an arbitrary will. Having a preliminary understanding of what world-openness is, we can 
suppose that there are certain kinds of worlds, which cannot be the object and context of 
man’s openness. They are neither comprehensive nor have philosophical value. In one word, 
there are worlds that we can exclude from the scope of our investigation. This selection is 
important from a philosophical point of view, since the present analysis cannot be an 
encyclopedia of different meanings of the concept of the world, but intends to be a real 
phenomenological analysis. The analysis will also show whether the meaning of the above 
cited text of Sokolowski is true. In my view it contains many good insights concerning the 
phenomenon of the world; nevertheless the world that we are searching for is inevitably more 
and valuable than it is in his understanding. Our question is: what is the meaning of the world 
that corresponds to our understanding of world-openness?  
                                                 
210 Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000: 43-44. 
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3.2. Pre-philosophical Understandings of the Notion of the World 
 
 The notion of the world, which we are trying to delineate in this chapter, although it is 
indicated as non-philosophical and pre-philosophical, doesn't suggest at all that it would be 
anti-philosophical or something which hinders a further real philosophical investigation of the 
phenomenon. We have to consider these understandings of the world as preparatory, but still 
valid views. Take the example of the intellectual development of a philosopher. Our first 
thoughts can be considered as invalid, premature pseudo-philosophical statements – 
moreover, sometimes as humbugs –, although they can form the basis of our later mature 
philosophical views. These thoughts were less developed, they were incomplete; moreover, 
there was certainly no clear order or hierarchy among these pre-philosophical thoughts. Since 
there was no hierarchy there was no system either.  
 To think, however, prior to philosophy doesn't mean to be totally insensitive to the real 
questions and problems of philosophy and to the real method of philosophizing. I think that if 
one sincerely tries to trace things back, and wants to know the real origin and place of the 
things around him, that is, if one is interested in the problems of a genuine foundation 
(Begründung) or principles of the things, he is on the best way to be a philosopher in the strict 
sense of the word. Now, I think it is now clear what I mean by philosophical thinking. By the 
term philosophical thinking I mean an attempt for a structured intellectualization of the world 
as such in the manner of the deepest sincerity dedicated to the real problems of the world. I 
claim that traces of this truth-seeker attitude can also be found in the pre-philosophical 
thinking. Sokolowski also confirms this insight, he says:  
“The most important contribution phenomenology has made to culture and 
the intellectual life is to have validated the truth of prephilosophical life, 
experience, and thinking. It insists that the exercises of reason that are 
carried out in the natural attitude are valid and true. Truth is achieved before 
philosophy comes on the scene. The natural intentionalities do reach 
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fulfillment and evidence, and philosophy can never substitute for what they 
do.”211 
 
 Our question is: what is this pre-philosophical, naive thinking and what sort of a 
concept about the world it can have? I will begin by clarifying the sense of the terms of “pre-
philosophical” and “naïve”. By the term “pre-philosophical” I mean a certain thinking, which 
does not strive placing all its worldly data into one single structure. The term pre-
philosophical means, in my understanding, an unreflected thinking which is lacking a 
coherent system. Naïve thinking, however, isn’t necessarily a collection of foolish thoughts, 
due to of its innocence it can be considered as a certain type of wisdom. Generally we can 
say, that we call someone naïve, who is ready to believe what one is told, and ready to believe 
the way the world is around him corresponds to reality. In the naïve thinking there is no 
transference. Transference means that when, for example, one is kindly disposed towards 
another person without presupposing a possible wrongdoing or a betrayal of the anticipatory 
goodwill.   
 A par excellence pre-philosophical thinking is the intellectual world of children. 
Children (from 1 to 8 years) have certainly very interesting views about the world around 
them. Without going into details concerning the characteristics of the thinking of children – 
here we have to omit the clarification of this point, since the present investigation 
concentrates only on the notion of the world and not on the psychological or medical aspects 
of the development of the human brain system – let me have two remarks.  
 In my view, the thinking of the children is naïve thinking par excellence. Naïve in the 
sense that they take immediately seriously what they hear and what is said to them. They 
immediately believe in the real existence of the seen or heard being of whatever absurd 
character. There are many examples to prove that. Let me share just one example to the 
reader. Once a man told to a child, in a joking manner, that he was going to put him into the 
                                                 
211 Robert Sokolowski, Introduction to Phenomenology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000: 63. 
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refrigerator. After this joke the child was convinced that the adult was going put him into the 
refrigerator; the child was unable to understand this statement as a joke. Later, whenever he 
saw this man, he became desperately afraid of being put into the refrigerator. Moreover, he 
continuously feared the refrigerator. The child took seriously what the adult had said. Now, 
what is important and interesting for us in this story is the childlike direct contact with the 
world and the immediate taking seriously of the words related different segments of life, and 
not the lack of the ability of abstraction of children. To a certain degree children do possess 
the ability of abstraction, but they have to reach a certain age for the conscious use of 
abstraction. Mathematics, for example, as one of the stages of abstraction, does require a 
certain maturity. So does philosophy, which is – according to Plato and Aristotle – the third 
stage of abstraction.212  
 Now, according to this example, children are immediately ready to believe to be real 
what has been said by others. A child can be deeply disappointed or even shocked by the 
breaking of a promise. This is, for example, why children should not watch TV, because they 
believe indiscriminately what they see (as for example also adults can do who degenerated 
and remained mentally childish). Naivety means here a kind of thinking with the 
characteristic of believing of the immediate realized presence of what has been said, heard or 
seen.  
 My second remark concerns the imaginary faculty of children. Under the term 
“imaginary faculty” I mean a particular ability to place oneself in a given context or situation. 
It is not a capacity of theatricalism; it is more, since it contains the element of total self-giving 
to the context, which is in contrast to the temporary nature of any kind of pretending. It is 
astonishing as children can be animated and stimulated by tales. The way children listen to 
such tales, the depth as the tales occupy their mind and the incomparably living contact with 
                                                 
212 See Plato's division concerning the age of philosophers and Aristotle's substantial remark on this issue.  
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the figures of the tales show a unique capacity of children living in a completely different 
world. This imaginary potential has not only a superlatively rich content, but its duration is 
also exceptional. This is the reason why little girls from the first time of hearing a fairy tale 
with a prince, want to marry a prince. Or this is the reason why boys find interesting and can 
be so much involved in games related with fighting, which much more conforms to their 
character than pampering dolls.  
 At the beginning of this chapter I suggested that the intellectual world of a child can be 
conceived as one type of the pre-philosophical, naive thinking. I also said that this thinking 
defines the world of the child. This investigation, however, can only be a secondary 
reflection, since the intellectual world of children is inaccessible for us. The main question 
however is still the same: what are the characteristics of the naïve world of the children?  
 The remarks above suggest that children live in an “immediate” world. By the term 
immediate I mean a kind of tight but organic relation to the objects of the world, which 
doesn't question the existence of those objects and accepts its real being (reality). 
Immediateness comes from naivety. Children are not good liars, even if they are taught to lie; 
they cannot lie as adults can. Children cannot lie especially cannot hold a lie for longer 
period, because it would be an artificially fabricated (fearful, ungraspable) world, to which the 
child cannot have immediate contact. In other words, the child knows that the lie would 
represent a different world, but this is the world, that the child simply does not want, since he 
or she does not see the point of it and is afraid of it, because its unknown nature. 
Immediateness also means that even if the child lives in a fabricated world, he or she still 
lives in full contact with this world. This happens, for example, when children play a role. It 
might be that the child plays the role for ages, in his whole childhood.  
 Playing, however, which dominates the majority of the life of a child, is not an 
artificial and virtual world as, for example, the virtual world of a drug addict. Drug addicts 
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usually cannot stop taking harmful drugs. Drugs are substances (especially those – cocaine 
and heroin – which are habit-forming), which affect the nervous system and cause disorder in 
the mental capacities of the person. Now, the use of drugs from a philosophical point of view 
can be considered as an “entrance” into a virtual world, where man fabricates a totally 
artificial universe, which is dominated by his all-embracing but at the same time destructive 
“subjective idealism”. The virtuality of drugs has no contact of any kind with the real, 
external world. It is an in-itself-closed-system, where there is no way out. The drug addict 
loses himself in the labyrinth of the drug, which finally can kill the person. Nevertheless, drug 
addicts confess that they enjoy it and find the experience of the drug pleasant for them. They 
also claim that the experience can help them to overcome the tiredness and difficulties of 
everyday life. Others say that they need the drugs because it prevents mental derangement. 
They also say that there is no significant difference between taking drugs and smoking or 
drinking alcohol. Moreover, coffee – they say – can be considered as a legal drug, the 
legalization of different types of drugs is therefore only a question of time. The main point of 
their argument is that since the drugs are for man and for life, man can control drugs. In fact, 
however, – without going into a detailed description of the problem of the use of legalized, 
illegal, natural or synthetic, etc., etc., drugs – I think that the virtual world of drugs can have 
extremely far-reaching control over man. Under the influence of drugs one is controlled and 
dominated decisively by the drug. In other words, the use of drugs constitutes a new, but 
virtual world. This new world, however, is virtual par excellence. Its main characteristic is not 
that it is esoteric or simply obscured or hidden, but the lack of authentic connection with the 
reality of life, with life itself.  
 The world of the children bears in fact resemblances to the virtual world of the drug 
addict, but there are significant differences. The first difference is that even if the world of a 
child also defines itself as an opposite of the real world, it is still open to the real world and is 
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not a strictly closed status or situation. The playful games of children receive their full 
meaning in the wider context of life. Since the playing of children is for the life (that is, 
playing contributes to solve future problems, contributes to the personal spiritual growth of 
the child, etc.,) and not against it, neither a tacit demand to perturb it, it is a “world” 
necessarily belonging to human existence, whereas drug addiction is not. By the term “being 
something for life” I mean a specific moment or manifestation of life, which is in favor of it, 
which promotes it, even if apparently – to a certain extent – it can have negative tendencies. 
Games and playing, however, have definitive constructive and helpful qualities. It is helpful 
since it provides examples for the future life of a child. Playing cooking in a small kitchen can 
be considered as a preparation for the future real activities in a real kitchen. The same goes for 
playing with dolls. Children – boys also – play with dolls for “training” for bringing 
themselves to an unconsciously desired standard of efficiency or behavior. This practice will 
help in their real life in the upbringing of their children. The world of the games of children is 
therefore an open world, not as the world of the drug addict. Being open in this context 
signifies positive characteristic: being open to other realities, that is, being connected with the 
world. The playful world of the children serves as a preparation for their future life-events, it 
can be considered therefore as an organic connection with life; it is an essential part of the real 
world of man.  
 Theoretically in the world of the children there is always a “way out” from the present 
situation, whereas in case of drugs, there is only a one-way direction. Man can grow up 
leaving behind his childlike customs, which with adulthood find their right place and 
meaning. There are two main characteristics of the negative virtual worlds of all kinds (such 
as delirium tremens, special kind of addictions, the virtual world of dangerous computer 
games, which can lead to destructive obsession and addiction, etc.); firstly, that man might 
lose himself in them, and, secondly, that there is no real aim in these worlds. The virtual 
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world of the drug addict destroys his or her personality, in contrast to the constructive 
“virtual” world of the children, which contributes to the development of the personality of the 
child providing a real aim and meaning beyond childhood. The same can be said about the 
virtual worlds of poetry and works of literary art, various works of art and many other games 
such as chess. Insofar as they have in fact a connection to the real world and contribute to the 
development of the personality of man, or in other words, are not self-contained, they can be 
considered as good, constructive virtual worlds.  
 By addressing the problem of the pre-philosophical thinking we encounter the 
question of the definition of philosophy in a very special context, since it raises the question 
of philosophy before philosophy. I think we might formulate the point of the difficulty in a 
very simple way: what kind of philosophy was there before philosophy? If we define 
philosophy as a particular set or system of insights and beliefs resulting from the search for 
knowledge, which might be considered as guiding principle for behavior,213 then it seems that 
philosophy and humanity are of the same age. It doesn't help us either if we appeal to Plato's 
definition, where he says that philosophy “is the acquisition of knowledge”.214 If we take any 
definition of philosophy from any philosopher it seems that philosophy can be identified with 
thinking (even if one tries to define further the mode and object of thinking), I think therefore 
that the best way to deal with the problem of pre-philosophical thinking if we distuingish 
between philosophical and pre-philosophical thinking according to age and maturity. In this 
sense, thoughts are pre-philosophical uttered by a person who hasn't reached a certain 
maturity. If we do not identify philosophy with thinking, we might encounter again the same 
problem of differentiating thinking from philosophy.  
 To sum up we can say that the pre-philosophical world is only an apparently closed 
world, which is, however, only temporally closed and it is not at any rate closed by its 
                                                 
213 At least this is the definition of philosophy of the standard Oxford English dictionary. Oxford Advanced 
Learner's Dictionary of Current English. A. P. Cowie (chief editor) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.  
214 Plato Euthydemus 288d 
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essence. Living in a pre-philosophical world means unreflectedness to the totality, that is, the 
immediate reality suffices the person of the pre-philosophical world.  
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3.3. The Concept of the World in the Phenomenological Tradition 
 
 Immanuel Kant writes in his work from the year 1770 (De mundi sensibilis atque 
intelligibilis forma et principiis) that the world is the “cross of the philosopher”. He means by 
this that the philosopher pursuing his extremely hard conceptual and intellectual vocation with 
worldly matters encounters the world in an uncomplicated and at the same time in a very 
brutal and extremely complex way. This encounter requires an incomparably huge effort since 
the drama of the philosopher – if we consider the task of the philosopher from a general 
philosophical point of view – is to deal with the dual character of the world as it is supposed 
in naiveté and in its reality. The overcoming of this duality, reconciliation or confrontation of 
the worldly matters with reality, coming from the darkness to the light, the commitment to 
reality in contrast to virtual has been the eminent and eternal task of the philosopher.  
 From the point of view and relevance of the phenomenon of the world phenomenology 
is characterized in this chapter as an attempt to articulate the traditional questions of the world 
overcoming of all its immature views. It was not, however, the 19th century – nor the 
preceding ones – when the question of the world became of utmost importance, but the 20th 
century.215 This statement, however, does not want to say that thousand years of philosophical 
investigations of the world were meaningless or useless. For example, Plato's views on the 
world and the universe, as well as Saint Thomas Aquinas' colorful observations concerning 
the world are among the greatest achievements of the history of philosophy. With the 
statement above I want to say that the rapid technological, biological, communicational, etc., 
developments of the 20th and 21st century handed out man to the challenges of development 
and to the desperate and cruel historical circumstances, and the traditional philosophical 
                                                 
215 One might think that with the emergence of materialism the notion of the world has received its right 
appreciation. In the next chapter, however, I try to argue that materialism fails to grasp the plurality of meanings 
of the phenomenon of the world, since matter-world is only one aspect of it. 
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understandings of man were incapable of handle the problem, and this is precisely (along with 
the misinterpretation of the scientific knowledge – as Husserl claimed) which led to a crisis.  
 The subject of this crisis is man. Admitting the crisis of man we can still say with 
Wolfhart Pannenberg: “We are living in the epoch of anthropology”.216 Nevertheless, I think 
that the phenomenological philosophy is an adequate answer to the crisis.217 It seems that the 
crisis’ first object is man; however, from the point of view of our investigation, its second 
object is the world. The crisis concerns first of all the human being, and only secondarily and 
additionally all those issues which also belong to him. Now, the world has always been 
identified as a problem belonging essentially to man. In this sense the crisis of the man is at 
the same time the crisis of the world. For example, Edmund Husserl's oeuvre, especially the 
Crisis-book, can be conceived as a grandiose attempt to place man and his world into the right 
place. Husserl's notion of life-world comes from the insight that scientific knowledge is not 
the ultimate and only access to reality. As a matter of fact, the theoretical attitude is only 
secondary to a more genuine and fundamental relationship, in which the focal points of the 
relationship are: the human being and the world.  
 After the emergence of phenomenology the philosophical understanding of the 
phenomenon of the world has completely changed. Following the first half of the 20th century 
the phenomenological tradition of the philosophy was able to problematize anew in its full 
sense the notion of the world. The reasons for this lie in the radical nature of phenomenology, 
since phenomenology, in my view, is a philosophy which carried out a real anthropological 
turn. In my view phenomenology (besides the transcendental Thomist philosophy and certain 
                                                 
216 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? Die Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie. 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995: 5 
217 Without a further clarification of what I mean by phenomenology and what the characteristics of this 
phenomenology are, this statement seems to be an exaggeration. It was also Spiegelberg's concern how to define 
phenomenology, who belongs and who doesn't to the phenomenological movement. See Spiegelberg 1980, 1-6. 
It is clear, however, that there are many forms of phenomenology; though I claim that many common features of 
the immensely varied forms of phenomenology can be found. Let me just mention in short that what I call 
original phenomenology can be found in its most distilled form in the philosophy of the early Husserl, Max 
Scheler, Adolf Reinach and Dietrich von Hildebrand. This point I tried to make clear in the Introduction. 
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types of existentialism) is the only philosophical method which really shifted its focus on 
man.218  
The term anthropological turn can have various meanings. Its first meaning is when a 
philosophy takes anthropology, anthropological insights as its starting point and has an 
authentic account on man. This view doesn’t reduce theology and philosophy to 
anthropology, but presents the phenomenon of human being as the center of all philosophical 
inquires. It differs from the second type, which for example Kant held. It means a turning 
away from an objective world to only a life-word as constituted by subjective forms and 
categories. The third meaning of anthropological turn is a turning away from God. This is 
clearly an atheistic, and especially nowadays a post-modern view. 
Along with Wolfhart Pannenberg we can say that anthropologies of all the preceding 
centuries considered man existing in a peaceful and unshakable coexistence with and in his 
world.219 According to this view, man is a microcosm and consequently he is the image and 
likeness of macrocosm. Due to radical changes in world history and technology in the 20th 
century man's place in nature as well as his own existence suddenly became insecure, or in 
other words, man became his own question. As an answer to this crisis phenomenology shook 
what was unshakable so far, and showed that man, due to his destiny, is “alone” in the world: 
man faces the problem of the world. Phenomenology widened, clarified and at the same time 
challenged the notion of the world; it was not only the external world which could be 
considered as the world, but also his own thoughts, intentionality, his acts, the nature-world, 
the object-world, the other, the divine characteristics, God, etc. In my observation, therefore, 
if we characterize phenomenology as an attempt to re-articulate the traditional questions of 
                                                 
218 To this point see Balázs M. Mezei, The Concept of the Person in the Thought of Karol Wojtyla. In 
István Cselényi – Bulcsú K. Hoppál – József Kormos (eds), Aquinói Szent Tamás párbeszéde korunkkal. [Saint 
Thomas Aquinas in Dialogue] Budapest: Mozaik, 2009, pp. 197-200. Here professor Mezei argues that the real 
anthropological turn was carried out not by Kant and his followers, but by Edmund Husserl and his 
phenomenological circle. 
219 See Wolfhart Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? Die Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie. 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995. Chapter 1. 
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the world, we also have to consider that beyond this attempt there can be find another one, 
namely the re-approaching of the phenomenon of the human being.  
 Philosophies of the 20th century, such as analytic philosophy, existentialism, and 
hermeneutics, also paid distinguished attention to the philosophical articulation of the notion 
of the world. Nevertheless, after the experience of the real crisis of the First World War, the 
radicality of the phenomenological philosophy, its demand for the restitution and re-definition 
of immediateness220 and the re-thematization of the main problems of traditional philosophy 
enabled phenomenology to carry out its project also in the context of the problems of the 
world.  
 In this chapter I would like to reflect on the views on the notion of the world of the 
central figure of the phenomenological movement. What I am going to provide here is not a 
full report on his views, rather short commentaries, which serves as a historical-introductory 
preliminary to the understanding of the phenomenon of the world.  
 In Edmund Husserl's account the world is the horizon of horizons. For Husserl, our 
relationship with the world comprises sets of implications, where these implications are not 
always conscious, but can be actualized by the help of reflexive/reflective acts. It is therefore 
obvious that in our reflection on the world passive and active as well as hidden and non-
reflected aspects will play a decisive role. We are related to the world in whatever cognition – 
says Husserl. Now, our freedom and the knowledge concerning the horizon(s) enable us to 
transcend particular horizons. The horizons make possible the move and from time to time the 
possibility of self-situation of the subjectivity. The world is therefore the horizon of horizons, 
which comprises all the possible particular horizons.  
                                                 
220 The notion of immediateness pertains to the philosophical vocabulary of Martin Heidegger. 
Nevertheless, I think that this notion also loses its deep meaning if we don't provide a realist interpretation to it.   
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 Along with other philosophers221 Husserl was extremely interested in the 
epistemological errors of human being. His question was, how can we fail, how can we err, if 
we naturally inhabit the world and in a certain sense we possess the totality of being? I think 
that his question is twofold: “How can we err?” and “What is the bearer or basis of our 
inadequacy?” It is clear that our existence contains many elements of fragility. Our 
experiences show that we can err, even if the objects are given in the world as an a priori 
horizon. On the one hand, our experiences of objects are situated in the position of identity 
and difference, on the other hand, experiences of objects are not primary or firsthand 
experiences, but are transmitted by other objects. It is therefore the main characteristic of our 
existence that our demands, our projections, our will to grasp objects intellectually fail in 
most of the cases. In spite of this, however, our fundamental orientation towards the world 
never ends: all experiences of inadequacy strengthen the experience of world-horizon.  
 According to Husserl, the world as context and horizon is not given to us in the mode 
of objectivity. Objects are given in the modus of objectivity (Gegenständlichkeit), whereas the 
world is not. ‘Objectivizations’ take place in the horizon-like structure of the world. Husserl's 
main distinction lies between the modus of being of the objects and the modus of being of the 
world: experiencing, encountering objects – even if this experience is a misleading one, or 
turns out to be again an inadequacy – the experience of the world-horizon remains 
indispensable even if the experience of the horizon cannot be objectified as is the case, for 
example, of objects. Within the all-embracing horizon of the world particularities, other 
limited world-horizons, the world of things, the cultural world, etc., take place, but “despite 
the plurality of individual worlds […], Husserl always insists that all such worlds must be 
conceived as part of a single world. There is and can be, for him, only one world.”222 
                                                 
221 Such as Descartes, other medieval thinker, Rosmini and Balduin Schwarz. See Balduin Schwarz, Das 
Problem des Irrtums in der Philosophie. Münster: Aschaffenburg, 1934 
222 Dermot Moran, Edmund Husserl. Founder of Phenomenology. Cambridge: Polity, 2005: 199. 
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 There are some critics who say that Husserl withdraws the “world” from the territory 
of the traditional conceptual analysis and speaks of a “new concept”, which “governs the 
totality of entities”.223 Whatever we think of this interpretation, it is true that for Husserl, even 
in the “natural attitude”, (Einstellung) the world and the things appear in the structure of 
mediatedness.224 It is the indispensable character of our worldly life that we encounter and 
face objects within the frameworks of “natural objectivism”, where object are mediated and 
not immediately grasped. This is what Husserl calls the general thesis of the natural attitude. 
Husserl and the phenomenological movement are not exclusively interested in facticity, or in 
facts in themselves as quasi fundamentals, but in the a priori rationality beyond facts. For 
Husserl, and I think it's true for all phenomenologist, facts are only first steps to the real (or, 
in a transcendental phenomenological interpretation, transcendental) experience.  
 We have seen so far that the philosophical investigation of immediateness and the 
analysis of the notion of intentionality of the mind bring us closer to a “new” concept of the 
world. According to Husserl, a philosophy concentrating exclusively on intentionality is able 
to thematize properly the nature of subjectivity and the world. It means that if we concentrate 
on the constitution of the mind, which manifests itself in the immediate intentional acts of the 
mind, we will see that intentional relationships bear the character of immediateness. And this 
is the way (the unfolding of the notion of the ego) we have to follow to unfold the (new) 
notion of the world.  
  In the Ideas Husserl speaks about the “natural world” as the correlate of the mind and 
of the eidetic content of this world. In the Ideas, it seems that we can prescind from the 
“entirety of the natural world” as well as the whole “reality”.  
 In the pages of the Crisis-book, however, we find sings of another Husserl. This is not 
surprising, since Husserl in this book carries out one single project: he argues that the 
                                                 
223 See Ludwig Landgrebe, “Lebenswelt und Geschichtlichkeit des menschlichen Daseins”, in Bernhard 
Waldenfels (Ed.), Phänomenologie und Marxismus, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1977: 16.  
224 Mediatedness however presupposes the more fundamental immediateness.  
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scientific understanding of man cannot be grasped with the methods of the modern 
specialized sciences (Fachwissenschaften). On the basis of this anthropological context we 
can understand why Husserl introduces and applies the notion of life-world instead of the 
“simple” notion of the world. Here, the life-world, as the pre-given horizon of experience, is 
by its necessity non-thematized; on the other hand, however, it defines the limits of all kinds 
of experience.  
 Husserl distinguishes life-world from the world of the natural attitude. In the natural 
attitude the world is given as objectivity in contrast to man who is a distinct subjectivity. In 
the natural attitude man lives in his everyday world in a naïve manner. The notion of the life-
world is relevant in this context as well, since all the historical analyses of the Crisis-book of 
Husserl225 concerned the life-world of the natural attitude. Moreover, as a final consequence, 
he says that life-world manifests itself in the historically developing sciences as an always 
presupposed a priori.  
 Husserl says in the Crisis that the problem of the life-world is the principal problem of 
all sciences.226 In contrast to the method of abstraction applied in the objective sciences, the 
reflection on the life-world investigates the way (the how) of experiences. For this we need 
the epoché of the subjective sciences as well as of the natural attitude. This bracketing will 
result in the “total change” of the natural attitude.227 Within this is manifested the correlation 
of the objective world given in the natural attitude and the (world) mind pertaining to this 
world.228 Here Husserl's main question is: how is the world constituted for the mind 
pertaining to the world?229 To answer this question one has to apply the ontology of the life-
world by which one can unfold constant elements of the ever changing subjective life-world.   
                                                 
225 See Husserl Crisis 9.§ and the Appendices I-III. 
226 Crisis III/A 
227 Crisis VI, 39.§ 
228 Crisis VI, 41.§ 
229 47-51.§ 
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 Now, Husserl never completed this project, and it is still unclear whether Husserl 
identified the notion of the world with the life-world or not. His texts suggest that we have 
once again to ask the question: what's the point of calling attention to the problem of the 
transcendental ego world? What's the point of denoting the empire of the ego with the very 
same expression, if the ego receives its self determination from constantly referring back to 
the world? There might be a serious reason for that. I think that the point of the discussion is 
that the life-world would investigate the constant and common structure of the subject living 
in the world, in the ontology of the life-world, however, we have to prescind precisely from 
the very same subject living in the world. 
 To sum up, we can say that in Husserl we find at least five different concepts of the 
world.  
1. Husserl takes the notion of the world first in the sense of concrete life-worlds. 
There are many life-worlds, taken in the widest sense of the word. Concrete 
life-worlds, such as my life-world when I am working on a paper, or the life-
world of the professor, who supervises the very same work. There are also the 
life-worlds of other worldly situations: life-worlds of house-keepers, life-
worlds of philosophers, life-worlds of children in kindergarten. 
2. According to Husserl, there is a life-world preceding science. This type of the 
life-world is defined in contrast to the phenomenological attitude. Being in the 
life-world of the natural attitude we don't question (or in other words, bracket) 
our convictions concerning being and cognition. This is the life-world of 
naiveté, or in other words, a life-world under-clarified.230 
3. In contrast to the geniune philosophy, that is, to phenomenology, there can be 
found in the Husserlian corpus a pre-philosophical or pre-phenomenological 
                                                 
230 This first two types of life-world is almost identical what Bernhard Waldenfels applies in his 
understanding of life-world. See Bernhard Waldenfels, Einführung in die Phänomenologie. München: Wilhelm 
Fink Verlag, 1992. pp. 36-37. 
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life-world. This life-world is defined as a counterpart of the life-world of 
phenomenology. When, for example, Husserl criticizes Scheler, he claims that 
Scheler did not pay enough attention to the whole process of unfolding the 
essential elements of knowledge; consequently, his conclusions are mistaken.  
4. There are life-worlds in Husserl which can constitute one single life-world. 
Life-worlds like talking, eating, sleeping or playing of the same person can 
formulate one life-world, and this is what we call the life-world of the person. 
For example the world of my personality, or more precisely, my world is 
constituted of many (as a matter of fact no one can tell how many) life-worlds. 
Even if I am not aware all of my life-worlds – since the claim of being aware 
of all the situations of my life is simply impossible – I do possess a world, I am 
walking my path, living in my world: I do possess a world, which belongs 
exclusively to me.  
5. The fifth type of life-world is the opposite of the fourth type. This kind of life-
world is that what Husserl calls the “material a priori”. This life-world answers 
the question of the basis of different life-worlds.231 
Finally we can ask why is the philosophical articulation of the notion of the world 
important? At the beginning of this chapter I mentioned that phenomenology is an attempt to 
re-articulate the traditional questions of the world. I also said that phenomenology, on the 
other hand, is interested not only in the phenomenon of the world, but, in a final analysis, in 
man. It is the fundamental anthropological orientation of phenomenology, which enables us to 
give an anthropological interpretation to the Husserlian notion of world and life-world. 
Without presupposing the anthropological character of the life-world, we would miss the 
                                                 
231 These last two types of life-worlds are the explication of Waldenfels' (Waldenfels identifies three 
different types of life-world) last type of life-world. See Bernhard Waldenfels, Einführung in die 
Phänomenologie. München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1992: 38. 
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point of the philosophical development of the “beloved pupil”. Heidegger’s views on the 
problem are discussed in a separate chapter.232 
                                                 
232 See chapter 2.5. 
 211 
3.4. The natural World 
 
 In this chapter we would like to know whether the natural world can be considered as 
a real object of man’s world-openness. If it can be the object of man’s world-openness, in 
what sense does it differ from other possible objects. In short, we would like to know whether 
man can be defined solely by the natural world or man is open to something else (higher 
realities) than the natural world.  
The Pre-Socratic philosophy is called the philosophy of nature because it seeks for the 
ultimate material elements out of which the world (kosmos) is built. Even in the Pre-Socratic 
philosophy, but this is true also for today, nature and natural things stand in contrast to things 
made by men. According to Aristotle (in his book “Physics”, that is “On Nature”), nature is 
the origin of the change and stability of a thing. Now, discussing things being a compound of 
matter and form we encounter the problem of the final cause of nature and finally the problem 
of the unmoved mover. For Aristotle, the main point is always the final cause of things (where 
any scientific investigation must finally stop, anagké stenai) and not only the proximate 
cause. In his ethics nature has a different meaning: it is a tendency, an original conatus of man 
untouched by education and civil law, which is supposed to be fostered by ethics in order to 
arrive at man’s natural end. In both of its meanings, nature for the Greeks is something that is 
in need of a higher completion. Nature is unable to fulfill its own needs without assistance of 
others. This is a very important observation of the Greek mind, especially of Aristotle, who 
placed nature into the context of teleology. This position has been prevalent throughout 
centuries.   
 In the everyday usage nature has a similar meaning. In its first meaning nature is used 
to refer to the intact status of man’s surroundings. We denote with the term “nature” a forest 
or a national park, for example, which is unpolluted and undestroyed by man. In the second 
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meaning nature is the totality of things of the universe altogether with man. In both cases 
there can be observed a supposed hidden opposition between nature and man. Nature is 
usually contrasted to man, where man is the one who exploits nature. Views of the proponents 
of exploitability of the world has been disputed by many modern philosophers, who hold that 
man is not the “chosen vessel” of God or cosmos, but part of the nature, therefore has no 
rights to exploit it.233  
 In short, we can say that the phenomenon what we call nature has two main 
characteristics. Firstly, nature is always something that is not self-sufficient. It means that 
nature cannot give account for itself, that is, cannot give account for its being and so-being. 
“Being not self-sufficient” also means that nature is meaningless without an ultimate 
intelligibility, what we traditionally call God. Secondly, nature is always for something. Being 
for something means that none of the elements of nature fully justify themselves, and there is 
an invisible connection between all its elements. This is what connects one part and element 
to another, and holds the whole universe together. Nature, however, is not only in its parts for 
something, but also in itself as a whole is for something.  
Now, from the point of view of man’s openness we would say that insofar as man is 
open to this kind of world (in fact he is open to it), he is not open to it in the sense (God-
openness) we would like to expound in the thesis. Even if man’s biological body is composed 
of natural, worldly constituents, and he is “con-natural” with nature, it does not mean that he 
is open only to the world of nature. Man, however, is not only of this world, not only of the 
biological, physical nature. His biological composition, intellectual enterprises, questions 
overreach the borders of nature and his experiences gained through the world of nature.  
On the other hand, man cannot exist “naturally” in the world of nature as other 
creatures can. Jean-Jacques Rousseau describes the state of nature so enthusiastically that he 
                                                 
233 See the views of the proponents of eco-ethics or eco-phenomenology, such as Tomonobu Imamichi’s An 
Introduction to Eco-ethica or Peter J. McCormick’s When Famine Returns or The Negative Sublime of the same 
author.  
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fails to see that this state had never existed in the form as he depicts it. Rousseau held that 
human beings can live according to their original and natural character happily, peacefully 
and freely; especially freely from the disease and deformation of the society. According to 
Rousseau, living originally and naturally means to live in a peaceful coexistence with the 
nature as it was in the distant past in an idealistic form, untouched by man. Rousseau does not 
take account of the fact that even his “noble savages” also create and maintain culture, even if 
it is not as sophisticated as what we call culture today. By the term culture I mean every kind 
of framing nature and natural circumstances. Gehlen, Landmann, Portmann, Rothacker234 and 
of course Marx all agree that one has to find man’s definition in culture (which constitutes 
man’s “second nature”). In contrast to this, I think that man’s definition by culture provides 
an unsatisfactory view. It is true that man cannot live without culture; man – urged by his very 
essence – wants to live in the artificial world of culture. Consequently, man’s universe 
unfolds itself in the interaction of man and the world of nature. As a matter of fact, there is 
nothing natural for man in the world of nature: everything without exception is alien for man. 
The more he creates himself by the help of his culture, the stronger powers drive man further 
and further, faster and faster, deeper and deeper. The perpetual development and transitional 
mark of culture indicates that man’s vocation surpasses culture. We cannot explain the 
abundance and variety of spiritual and material goods, artifacts created by man without the 
presupposition of the “overflow of the creativity of man”. This, however, means that man’s 
aim is over the world of nature. Even if the first object of his creaticity is the world of nature, 
the real nature of his strivings, searches show that man doesn’t inhabit the nature by nature 
nor its counterpart, culture. Nevertheless, man is natural as well as a cultural being, that is, 
what builds up man is partly natural and cultural, but it is not only nature and culture that 
defines his existence. 
                                                 
234 See A. Portmann: Biologische Fragmente zu einer Lehre vom Menschen. Basel 1951. A. Portmann, Biologie 
und Geist. Freiburg: 1956. E. Rothacker, Philosophische Anthropologie. Bonn: 1966. M. Landmann, 
Philosophische Anthropologie. Berlin: 1969. 
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On the other hand, in the investigation of the peculiarities of man’s openness to natural 
world we have to take into consideration that there is a certain tension between man and the 
nature. Man is, however, fighting with nature. Culture and social order compensate man’s 
organic vulnerability in the struggle against nature. Animals can live in a peaceful harmony 
with nature, whereas for man nature is alien and he is also alien to nature. Man, as a matter of 
fact, wants to become free of the natural world. This is the reason of man’s “second nature”, 
culture: man creates “second nature”, because he wants to be delivered from nature, natural 
condition.  
In short, since in man one can observe a disposition to go beyond nature, the proper 
object and aim of his openness and personal needs have to be beyond man and nature as well.  
The world of nature is not enough for man. For man nature is like a “small room”, 
where nothing can find its proper place, where there is always disorder. Man’s encounter with 
the natural world is in fact an exceptional experience. This experience can provide significant 
contribution for self-knowledge, which says that man is not from the world of nature, but 
supernatural. This insight, however, does not suggest leaving and despising the world as 
Manichaeism or Sartre would do. For Sartre having contact with the external natural world 
causes a kind of feeling of disgust in man which he calls nausea. For Sartre nausea is a 
natural concomitant of physical existence. He says, 
This perpetual apprehension on the part of my for-itself of an insipid taste 
which I cannot place, which accompanies me even in my efforts to get away 
from it, and which is my taste – this is what we have described elsewhere 
under the name of Nausea. A dull and inescapable nausea perpetually 
reveals my body to my consciousness.235 
 
Sartre’s nausea produces vomiting he says; I think however that it is not only the natural 
physical world which produces vomiting for Sartre, but the whole world as such. Sartre 
simply dislikes to inhabit the world. In contrast to Sartre’s view I would say that the natural 
                                                 
235 Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay in Phenomenological Ontology. New York: Citadel Press, 
2001: 314. 
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world offer us a unique possibility to apprehend man’s contingency. The natural world is a 
“task” for man and not something utterly evil, that one should despise. This last statement has 
a postulate: one can utter this insofar as one holds that man is open also to something other 
and higher than the natural world. 
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3.5. The Object-World 
 
 In this chapter we will investigate whether the object-world can be considered as a real 
and final object of the phenomenon what we called man’s world-openness. If the object-world 
can be the object of man’s world-openness, in what sense does it differ from other possible 
objects and what are the peculiar characteristics of being open to the object-world. In other 
words, we would like to know whether man can be defined solely by his or her object-world 
or man is open to something else than the object-world.  
In the previous chapter we referred to Jean-Paul Sartre’s disgust of the physical-
natural world. His feeling of nausea can be applied without further ado to the object-world as 
well. Nausea in this sense can refer to everything that belongs to the world. It is undeniable 
that man’s primary harsh experiences with his contingency and physical existence occur 
through objects. In this sense, the object-world can also be the object of disgust and hatred.  
 There is, however, another kind of view of the object-world, which says that objects 
can help man to develop and aid self-knowledge. The significance of the problem of the 
object-world is enormous, since it is only man who can experience the world in an 
“objectified” manner taken in the narrow sense of the word. Now, if objects foster man’s self-
knowledge, then it is absolutely unjustified to hold that the object-world is abhorrent, 
disgusting and alien for man. Let’s see what we mean by the term object-world. 
 Object is a generic term for whatever can be referred to or assigned. There are physical 
objects, real and unreal objects, abstract objects, intentional objects and many others 
depending on which viewpoint we take in approaching reality. Nevertheless, principally we 
mean by object-world things that concern man. Since everything in the world concerns man in 
one way or another, we can say that the objectivity of the world is our primary experience. 
There are objects in the world, but the world itself also manifests itself to us as an object.  
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 Man’s principal experience with objects takes place through labor. Generally we call 
labor all our spiritual-bodily and mental-ideal activities, which guarantee our physical 
existence and the reproduction of our existence in an objective-instrumental way. This 
activity, as all other activities of man, is to a certain degree the manifestation, that is, the 
objectivation of the human essence. Man’s behavior, gestures, mimicry and others can 
manifest his inner tensions, feelings and mood. Nevertheless, these manifestations are still 
passive processes, since they are only a concomitant of a human activity. On the other hand, 
however, when man marks the world with his hands, that is, by work, then he rises above the 
whole bulk of concomitant gestures and behavioral tokens: man is concerned with the world 
more authentically. Labor is therefore an essential manifestation of man, in which his essence 
is reflected.236 The mediation of the objects of the world is indispensable for man’s self-
knowledge. Man, as a world-open being, always has to leave himself and subject himself to 
objects in order to look back upon himself in an objectified manner. From this peculiar point 
of view man can see objects of the world as well as his own place among these objects. The 
idea of man as objective being can be found in various authors. The Catholic Church, for 
example, issued numerous documents concerning labor.237 According to the Catholic teaching 
labour and the worker stand in the center of social and economical life. Following this train of 
thought, John Paul II says that labour is the participation in God’s creation and manifestation 
of man’s responsibility and creativity.238 Man realizes himself in his work – he says.239 Later 
John Paul II adds that since the main criterion of labour is this self-realization – and not 
efficacy, power and the market-value of labor, since the role of labor is primary to capital240 – 
it is unjustified to talk about equality in labor. Surprisingly we find somewhat similar idea 
                                                 
236 Let me add again that in labour man’s essence can manifest itself but not in its totality. 
237 Let me mention just a few of them: Rerum novarum, 1891; Quadragesimo anno, 1931; Gaudium et spes, 
1965; Laborem exercens, 1981; Centesimus annus, 1991. 
238 Laborem excercens 4-6. 
239 op. cit. 9-10. 
240 op. cit. 12-13. 
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concerning the object-world and labor in Karl Marx. According to Marx, man’s objective 
nature means that man can have self-knowledge only in the material-objective world as it is 
opposed to him. He says: 
The fact that man is an embodied, living, real, sentient, objective being with 
natural powers, means that he has real, sensuous objects as the objects of his 
being, or that he can only express his being in real, sensuous objects. To be 
objective, natural, sentient and at the same time to have object, nature and 
sense outside oneself, or to be oneself object, nature and sense for a third 
person, is the same thing.241 
 
I think we can fully agree with Marx on the significance of labor and object-world even if we 
cannot accept the final consequences of Marxism. My views are, however, obviously closer to 
the Catholic teaching. Since man can frame his surroundings according to his needs, he alters 
not only the surroundings but his knowledge, which he acquired regarding himself in the 
world. In his interaction with objects, man alters them as well as the measure to which man 
fits his own essence. Man has two basic experiences in his contact with objects. Firstly, man 
comes to know himself, in another way, as other. Secondly, man realizes that it is he and not 
others who can initiate changes like these. In other words, man realizes his capacities by his 
products. This is precisely what I called previously as contribution of objects in man’s self-
knowledge and self-understanding. 
 This view does not include any kind of fetishism of objects. It is, however, a modern 
trend in philosophy that man tries to find the manifestation of his inner essence in the world 
produced by him. The man of antiquity tried to decipher his vocation from the order of the 
cosmos. In the early mythical times the light of the visible world illuminated the shades of 
human existence. The modern man does not consider himself to be connatural with the world, 
but utilizes it as a raw material. There is something “cruel” in objectivization: man does not 
serve the world, but gains a firm hold over it. Man observes and conquers the world of 
objects. The modern man does not consider himself any longer in the likeness of God. 
                                                 
241 Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Karl Marx. New York: International 
Publishers, 1964: 154. 
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Especially Marxists emphasize that man sees himself in the “mirror” of his production of 
objects and not in the “mirror” of God. In this context, however, self-knowledge becomes an 
endless process, since surroundings of man theoretically can be framed ad infinitum. 
Although every new contact with the object-world is a new step toward developing the 
faculties of man, the closed system of object-directedness cannot explain the more 
fundamental openness of man.  
To sum up we can say that the object-world does not comprise the totality which 
would be the object of man’s world-openness. In this sense the object-world cannot be the 
final and ultimate object of man’s world-openness. We, therefore, would fail if we try to 
define the human being throught his openness to the object-world. In other words, the 
phenomenon of man’s world-openness doesn’t have its full justification in the openness to the 
object-world. From what we have seen, thus far, it is evident that the phenomenon of world-
openness must consist in something else than just the phenomenon of being open to the 
object-world.  
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3.6. The linguistic and the cultural World 
“Die Sprache ist das Haus des Seins” 
(Martin Heidegger: Letter on Humanism) 
 
 In our discussion of man’s openness toward various kinds of worlds, we have arrived 
at the analysis of a peculiar type of world, which has a tremendous philosophical relevance 
today, yet intuitively we immediately see that the linguistic and the cultural world cannot be 
the proper object of man’s openness. In this chapter our question is similar as in the previous 
chapters. We would like to know whether the world of language and the cultural world can be 
considered as real and ultimate objects of man’s world-openness or not. In this chapter we are 
interested in the nature of the worlds of language and culture in respect of the question 
whether they can satisfy man’s world-openness. There are many thinkers who tried to grasp 
the essence of the human being through language and culture. In this chapter, however, we 
would like to know whether man can be defined solely by the cultural and linguistic world or 
man is open to something else, something more comprehensive than these realities. 
But how do we know intuitively that the linguistic and the cultural world is not the 
world that we are looking for? In order to answer this question, we have to have a closer look 
at the linguistic and cultural world, by which the phenomenon of the linguistic and the 
cultural world will be manifested as absolutely different from the proper object of man’s 
openness.  
 Man’s peculiar openness, which distinguishes him from animals, in its final analysis 
entails the question of God.242 It means that man over-questions everything which he sees in 
his world and there is no worldy entity that would absolutely alleviate his “thirst” for the 
absolute reality and truth. One might say that this desire of man is rather an ascetic turning 
away from the world, and not a real openness to the world. Man has a special vocation, 
independently of whether we give a theistic interpretation to this or not, man behaves like a – 
                                                 
242 See Wolfhart Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? Die Anthropologie der Gegenwart im lichte der Theologie. 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1995: 13. 
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as many thinkers thought – “second god” in the created world. His status is endowed with 
lordship over the world; in a religious context we would say that man is the representative of 
God’s unconditional mastery. 
 The question is how can man secure his lordship over the world being world-open? 
Especially nowdays it seems that technique, engineering, and industry are signs of man’s 
lordship over the world. These phenomena, however, presuppose a more fundamental 
attitude, which finally led to the development of the language. In my view, language (and any 
kind of artificial worlds of man) of man is a primary, but an artificial system in order to 
overcome the apparent disorder in the world we experience. My thesis in this chapter is that 
all artificial worlds, including language and culture, are meant for man to master the immense 
abundance of the world he lives in. This, however, does not mean that the world in which man 
lives is only cultural and linguistic. In this chapter, therefore, I will argue that the real 
meaning of the phenomenon of world-openness, although comprises the openness to culture 
and language, is immeasurably more than just openness to culture and language. 
Arnold Gehlen devotes the second part of his main book to the development of human 
perception, motion and language.243 He says that man, because of his openness, confronts the 
world. Since man has a vulnerable nature, man’s first task is to orientate himself in this 
“chaotic” world. In contrast to animals that are lead by their instincts, man creates an artificial 
world. According to Gehlen, by the help of this artificial world man can control the stream of 
sensations and stimuli. On the other hand, however, reaching the mastery over external 
stimuli also means mastery over oneself.  
We can fully agree with Gehlen in his views on man’s symbolic nature of perception. 
It means that human perception, because of its symbolic nature, multiplies our sensory 
                                                 
243 Arnold Gehlen, Der Mensch: seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt. Athenäum: Frankfurt am Main, 
1966. pp. 149-387. Wolfhart Pannenberg also dedicates the second chapter of his famous book, Was ist der 
Mensch?, to language and culture, the reason however why I prefer to expound here Gehlen’s views is that 
Gehlen’s starting point is similar to mine, yet, he has dissimilar consequences, which makes a comparison easier.  
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observations; it arranges and locates them. Things are arranged and located when it is enough 
just to cast a glance at them and we immediately know and remember their function. With this 
the world becomes perspicuous. In the meantime there can be observed a growth in the 
number of known and located things and relationships; a fortiori man is open to the reception 
of other symbols. Now, Gehlen explains the evolution of language by the help of the notion of 
easing (Entlastung) and biological expedience. Here we cannot tell whether Gehlen’s theory 
of the biological origin of language is true or not, one point, however, is clear and we can 
accept: language, as an artificial universe, expands the range of the symbolic world. Gehlen 
holds the biological origin of language – which I cannot accept –, and adds that sound is the 
most basic communicational means of the pronounced language. For him language comes 
into being in the interaction of sound and the symbolic world of perception.  
In a certain sense, if we hold (with Gehlen) that man creates artificial worlds in order 
to overcome the chaos or unintelligible nature of the external world, it is (incontrast to 
Gehlen) unnecessary to distinguish between sounds, words, sentences within the virtual world 
of language, since sounds, as the most basic formulas in language, have to be considered a 
perfect virtual world in the same way as the most complex texts. In this sense there is no 
difference between sounds, sentences and culture (culture taken in the sense of a very 
complex artificial world). From the point of view of the essence of language, there is no 
difference between the language of a babbling child and the language of a polyglot 
professor.244 There is, however, a difference between the language of man and animals. I 
think it is totally unfounded to hold that animals can have language in the same way as human 
beings can have, because the animal openness does not share common fundamental 
                                                 
244 Cf. hereinafter p. 208. 
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characteristics with the human openness, consequently animals are not in need of overcoming 
the “chaos”.245  
From the process that child goes through to learn a language, we can have important 
insights relating to the phenomenon of man’s openness to the world. Children connect certain 
recurring objects with determinate sounds. Later this connection will form a constant bond. 
This phenomenon is in strong connection with man’s “objectivity”: man is – almost 
absolutely – free from instinctive reactions and external and internal things do not compel 
automatic answers. Children are able distinguish between objects and are able to name them 
not forgetting the relation between the name and the thing. Even if it is a simple sound, it is a 
self-manifestation and self-revelation of man. Children give voice to their curiosity in things. 
This is the origin of language, and, as a matter of fact, philosophically speaking this is already 
the full language, which differs from the matured, developed language only in its 
complexity.246 Children express their aliveness, their free and indefinite orientedness to the 
world, and their life contrasted to the world and things. In other words, children articulate the 
development of their outward-oriented essence. The expression of our experiences, desires, 
emotions is an original human wish, which is crucial in the development of language. This 
means, however, that man wants to communicate himself. On the other hand – and this is the 
point of our whole discussion – man can communicate himself insofar as he is open to the 
world, and man can communicate himself insofar as his openness exists in reality. In other 
words, if there is no openness, the wish of communication would not exist either. 
Nevertheless, according to our observations, language and communication exist; and this is a 
very strong argument for man’s essential openness. 
                                                 
245 For animals there is no chaos in the world. Their needs and the responses are balanced. Since animals do not 
possess freedom in the sense that human beings do, but are controlled by their instincts, for them everything is in 
order in the world. The animal world, that is, their surroundings is a perfect “answer” to their needs. For animals 
there is no need for transcending the limits determined by instincts.    
246 We have to emphazise the fact of man’s capability of communication indepependently of the complexity or 
factual manifestation of his language. If we deny this, we have to deny the human dignity of unborn babes, 
infants, and paralyzed persons, who are incapable of using a full-fledged language.  
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In this sense, sentences and other compound grammatical structures have no more 
philosophical value than a simple sound, the first articulation of man’s communicative self-
revelation can have. The central character of language can be observed even in case of the 
simplest sound: language correlates us with moments of reality and constitutes a “middle 
world”, which makes clear (that is, intelligible) the turbulent multiplicity of the world. It 
facilitates understanding and provides a preliminary order in the world. It is the language, 
which upbuilds our inner world. This can be evoked whenever we wish, independently of the 
external world. Language, however, is not identical with thinking; without language, 
however, we couldn’t think. Without exception all men think and dream or speak, if he or she 
can, in a certain language. It is due to the language that the human being can surpass the 
limitations of space and time, and also his own memories; by the help of the language things 
can be evoked (or can be put to silence) helping to find the right way in man’s life between 
Scylla and Charybdis. We are indebted to language for having relations with things and 
understanding them deeper – in a wider context – than they can appear. Language, as we have 
seen so far, however, is not self-sufficient; there is always the open existence of man behind 
it. In short, man’s openness finds language, and not the other way around.  
What has been said so far explains the relation of language and culture. The 
quintessence of culture is the expediently organized interaction with things of the world, 
which presupposes language. Gehlen’s main concept is the easing (Entlastung)-function of 
language and culture. He says that language eases man’s acts and helps man testing thousands 
of theories and plans without confronting the world.247 In my view, however, language 
essentially has to do with the factual world as well as with data which are beyond mere 
facticity. The principal role of language is to reflect the world (whatever we mean by the term 
                                                 
247 Arnold Gehlen op.cit. pp. 590.;592.;602.;605.;628.;672.;721. 
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world) and not hiding it. Language, as well as culture, however, couldn’t fulfill this task if 
there is not a preceding openness of the human being to the totality of the world. 
 Culture is also an artificial248 world of man in order to overcome the disordered nature 
of world. In other words culture is the shaping of the world. Culture in the first sense stands in 
contrast with biological nature of man and has been used to distuingish man from animals. 
The biological nature of man is a synonym for natural state of man, which – as I am arguing 
in this chapter – does not exist in its pure form. Everwhere where there is man, there is 
language and culture. Each culture is a pattern to answer the question of the world. Culture, 
however, concerns the everyday world and its entities. It also shapes the world, or at least, it 
shapes the world more radically than language can do. If we want to trace culture back to its 
source, we can say that it is the same as in the case of language: man’s essential openness 
evokes creating material, spiritual and intellectual culture. If we have a look only at the 
countless number of artifacts which man has produced and will be producing, it must be 
admitted that man’s demands surpass what he will ever be able to produce. No one can say 
that one day there will be no poetry and sculpture. Even if there have been geniuses in poetry, 
who are matchless, such as Shakespeare, it won’t keep the next generations from writing, in 
most of the cases, terrible poems. Culture is in substantive connection with man’s infinite 
vocation, which is manifested in art, law, ethics, religion, and as a matter of fact in all worldly 
activities of man.   
In this chapter we characterized the development of language as the paradigm and 
prototype of human culture. We have seen that man creates artificial worlds, which help to 
overcome his confused surroundings. This does not mean that there is a kind of irresolvable 
antagonism between the world and man. We have said in the previous chapter (chapter 3.5.), 
                                                 
248 In this context I call all worlds artificial insofar as these worlds are shaped and created in whatever form by 
man. As a matter of fact these worlds wouldn’t have an antonym, because theoretically there are no “places”, 
life-worlds, which would exist independently of man. This view comes from the insight that man creates 
language and culture; there is no world without man and his culture.  
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referring to the similar problem, that the mediation of objects of the world is indispensable for 
man’s self-understanding. Similarly, we can say that – even if the world is chaotic and 
confused – this world is not alien to man (and vice versa), but serves as the only “place” for 
man’s self-knowledge. Man acquired the world by a free gift of God for developing his self-
knowledge. In the light of this thought we can have a better understanding of the concept of 
being created in God’s likeness. If we say that world is the only and proper place of man’s 
self-knowledge, we claim at the same time the connaturality of man and the world. 
Consequently, everything that helps man to his self-knowledge is his partner and not an object 
of exploitation.249  
We have also said that language as well as culture can be conceived as artificial, 
symbolic worlds, which give answer to man’s fundamental openness. Among the numerous 
artificial worlds, religion is the most comprehensive and most appropriate to make the world 
intelligible and perspicuous for man. Religion is the quest for reality; it is a searching for 
answers for the basic questions of man. In this sense, it is undeniable that religion arises from 
the very essence of man. This however does not lessen the significance of culture and 
language, since the system of elaboration and cultivation of natural things aims at the 
satisfaction of man’s needs. 
The original question of this chapter was whether language and culture is the proper 
object of man’s openness. According to the preceding analysis, it seems that language and 
culture constitute an essential part of man’s existence. In this sense language is indeed the 
place and the house of being,250 in which man can develop his capacities and talents. Man, in 
his openness, is open also to language as to many other things, man’s openness, however, 
                                                 
249 So, we can answer those who hold that the world is a mere object of science and man is empowered to exploit 
it. But we can also overcome the views of those who have a certain aversion to the world and hold that the first 
and principal experience of man’s worldly life is anxiety (Heidegger) and disgust (Sartre). 
250See Martin Heidegger, Letter on Humanism. (Trans. Miles Groth) 
www.wagner.edu/departments/psychology/filestore2/download/101/MartinHeideggerLETTER_ON_HUMANIS
M.pdf (last retrieve: 20.06.2009.) 
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surpasses the limitations of language. The phenomenon of language “volubly” refers to a 
wider context: man is open to God in language as well as in culture. In this sense Heidegger is 
right saying that language constitutes an essential part of the human being. Language, 
however, doesn’t refer only to being and doesn’t assist to sound man’s relation only to being, 
but, in its finite nature, refers to a higher reality. 
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3.7. The social World 
 
 In this chapter we would like to understand the connection between man’s openness 
and the phenomenon of the social world. In this chapter we are interested in the nature of the 
social world, since we would like to know whether the social world can be considered as an 
ultimate, proper object of man’s world-openness. In short, we would like to know whether 
man can be defined only by the phenomenon of the social world or man is open to some 
higher reality than the social world. The problematization is again the same as in the previous 
chapters: it seems that the social world is the proper (and according to some thinkers, the 
only) object of man’s world-openness. We would like to know whether this view is justified 
or not.  
 Social relations of man are in strong connection with his material relations. There is no 
social formation that would be independent of materiality, since the order of social structures 
also defines the way we are supposed to deal with materiality. On the one hand, one can 
observe a constant change in the cultural-social world, one the other hand – and it is also an 
observation –, man always tries to sustain himself in this changing world. A double and 
mutual interaction can be seen between man and his social world: man shapes the social 
world, but the social world can also shape man. Changes in the social world result in the 
formation of further forms of human life. It seems, however, that it is always the man who is 
the standard of all changes and not the social world. Wolfhart Pannenberg calls this mutual 
impact “social process”. In this process, says Pannenberg, man's relation to the nature is 
interwoven more and more into the social relationships between human beings.251 Karl 
Rahner emphasizes rather man’s historical nature. He says that man is an essentially historical 
                                                 
251 See Wolfhart Pannenberg, Was ist der Mensch? Die Anthropologie der Gegenwart im Lichte der Theologie. 
Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1995. 
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being, since he received revelation in history and must realize his nature in history.252 Either 
way we proceed, we must acknowledge that the conformation of social (and historical) 
process is of vital importance regarding man’s vocation.  
On the basis of our previous anthropological investigations we can say that man is a 
spirit, but in his worldly existence he is undeniably connected with sensibility (in the sense of 
Latin sensus, or in the sense of the German sinnliche Erfahrung) and man is a socio-historical 
being. From the viewpoint of man’s openness to the totality of the world and God and his 
connectedness to senses and sense experience we can say that man’s transcendental self-
reflection and self-knowledge necessarily takes place in an objectifying manner. It is of 
utmost importance, therefore, to analyze the notion of historicity, since man realizes himself 
in the social context of history. In this sense, man encounters his own essence where he faces 
history and the social world: in his transcendence, more precisely, where he transcends 
history and the cultural world. Here, historicity (Geschichtlichkeit) means basic structure of 
man, in which he is in time and is opposed to the world. Having a historical nature is a 
peculiar challenge, and at the same time, a task for man. Man fulfills his task when he 
interacts with the world: modifies it, changes the world into his own world. The stress must be 
laid upon the fact of acts of the human being, for the reason that man is – using Karol 
Wojtyla’s term – an “acting person”.253 For Wojtyla, the person manifests himself in action. 
John F. Crosby gives a very good summary of Wojtyla’s idea of the acting person: 
Wojtyla has pointed out personal acting by contrasting it with a certain 
opposite: he contrasts what is merely happening in man, “such as feeling 
hunger or thirst”, with “what man does himself”; in other words he contrasts 
undergoing or enduring with acting through oneself (very much as Aquinas 
contrasts aguntur with per se agunt). He calls the former “activations” and 
reserves for the latter the term “acting.” This leads him to follow many 
recent authors in distinguishing between “person” and “nature” in the 
makeup of human beings, person being the principle of acting through 
                                                 
252 See Karl Rahner, Hörer des Wortes: Schriften zur Religionsphilosophie und zur Grundlegung der Theologie. 
(bearbeitet von Albert Raffelt) Solothurn: Benziger Verlag, 1997. 
253 Karol Wojtyla, The Acting Person. Dordrecht / Boston / London: D. Reidel, 1979. 
 230 
oneself, nature the more passive principle of undergoing. We, too, want to 
make our own this contrast of person and nature. It is a personalistic way of 
expressing the peculiar “mixed” character of man, that is, the fact that in 
him there is something coming from above and something coming from the 
earth, something of “spirit” and something of “matter”.254 
 
In Wojtyla’s philosophy of the person action becomes efficacy. In order to understand it, one 
has to distinguish between the classical understanding of the notion of ineffabilitas and its 
dynamic conception. According to the classical understanding, man has an incommunicable 
inner, static essence: the ineffabilitas is within man. According to the other view, man is 
“outside” himself; his acts, as manifestations of his personality (which are also 
incommunicable), have an outward direction, which, however, essentially belong to man. 
Now, in Wojtyla, the inner core, the essence of man receives a dynamic interpretation: man 
realizes himself through his acts.255 
Now, the meaning of historicity and man’s openness to the social world has to be 
taken precisely in the sense as we have seen above. According to this, man is essentially a 
social being, since he has to realize himself through his acts in the context of the social and 
historical world. In this sense, the phenomenon of the social world is a task for man, yet, man, 
because of his contingency, can never be through with it. This, however, does not mean that 
man cannot transcend the sequence of social-historical events. His failure of being through 
with the social world shows his real openness surpassing finite, though immense, social 
happenings. Man belongs to the social world, he is a social being, but decisions of his 
freedom always transcend it toward the direction of the final definiteness. From this it follows 
that the social world is in need of a higher justification that the dynamics of the social world 
cannot provide in itself. In a religious context we would say that it is divine salvation, which 
                                                 
254 John F. Crosby, The Selfhood of the Human Person. Washington: Catholic University Press, 1996: 38. 
255 In another book Wojtyla claims that the Aristotelian metaphysics of human nature runs the risk of “reducing 
man to the world”, of failing to do justice to the proprium of man, to what distinguishes him as a person. The 
cosmological focus of Aristotle needs to be completed by a more personalist focus. He says that “new” terms 
like subjectivity, self-presence, self-donation should replace terms like substance, potentiality, rationality. See 
Karol Wojtyla, Person and Community: Selected Essays, New York: Peter Lang, 1993. pp. 209-217. 
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would consummate man’s social being showing the ultimate aim of the social world. This 
view says that man is open to the social world, but since the world is finite and contingent in 
its social structure, man has to turn to another reality, which can provide a sufficient 
explanation of the ultimate aim of the social-historical world. According to Karl Rahner and 
the transcendental Thomist tradition, historicity belongs to man’s basic structure 
(Grundbestimmung): man’s historicity as theological concept means, that man is open to 
God’s free will so that he will await his and his world’s salvation from a historical-personal 
event.256 Now, along the same lines with Rahner’s thought we also want to give a theistic 
reading to man’s participation in and openness to the social world. Social processes are of 
high importance regarding man’s place in the world. Man cannot realize the unity and 
integrity of his existence without well-balanced and consistent relation to the world and 
others. In this sense, man can approach step by step his aim through social processes.  
There is another philosophical attempt to understand man’s place in the social world. 
It has been a long-discussed question in philosophy whether man moves toward his aim in the 
course of social changes or deviates from it. There are numerous philosophers, such as Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Oswald Spengler and many 
others, who doubted in social progress. According to them, civilization is a dead end for 
humanity. The majority of the thinkers, however, are of the opinion that social process is 
apparently positive; it is a progress and not only a degeneration. According to Condorcet, 
Herder, Hegel, Lessing and others, in the course of social evolution the division between the 
human race and the individual will disappear. Herder says for example, that progress is not 
only an appearance; humanity develops physically as well as politically.  
Immanuel Kant was also of the opinion that social progress is the “hidden plan of 
nature”. Nevertheless, it seems that progress sometimes is against the will of the individual. 
                                                 
256 See Karl Rahner, Hörer des Wortes: Schriften zur Religionsphilosophie und zur Grundlegung der Theologie. 
(bearbeitet von Albert Raffelt) Solothurn: Benziger Verlag, 1997. 
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According to Kant, the solution of the paradox is to be found in the fact that the idea of 
progress concerns humanity and not the individual. Kant says in his philosophy of history that 
identification of the individual with humanity will dissolve freedom. Furthermore, if there is 
no freedom and everything is a natural mechanism then politics can indeed make use of this 
mechanism for dominating individuals. Our experiences, however, show that “we are dealing 
with beings that act freely, to whom, it is true, what they ought to do may be dictated in 
advance, but of whom it may not be predicted what they will do.”257 For Kant rejection of the 
natural attitude can help to overcome the opposition of nature and freedom as well as the 
opposition of humanity and the individual. Kant cannot accept the naturalistic view of 
progress and holds that progress will not change man’s nature by course of natural law. 
Nevertheless, there is progress, which concerns man’s history and his nature. Kant 
emphasizes that history is the progress of humanity toward the development of its real nature. 
The aim of this progress is the perfect civil constitution of the state, which can guarantee 
individual freedom.  
According to Karl Marx, social circumstances withhold the development of the real 
humanity of man. The aim of Marx is therefore to change radically the inhuman relations and 
to develop a real humanism. In Marx progress is a task in the world-history for man. Later 
Marxist thinkers modified Marx’s thought and, influenced by the developments of chemistry 
and physics of the 20th century, held that progress is also a visible physical evolution of 
humankind. The new “Soviet type of man”, is the one who not only possesses a faith in the 
organizing power of reason, but is able consciously and mathematically to build himself up 
and his society.258 According to this view, the self-realization of the Soviet “homo novus” 
depends exclusively on man.  
                                                 
257 Immanuel Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties. University of Nebraska Press, 1992: 149. 
258 To Lenin, for example, the creating of the Soviet Union was more the remaking of Russia and a problem of 
anthropology than a problem of class struggle.  
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Now, my critique concerns precisely this point. Firstly, it seems that man on his own 
cannot be the source and the aim of his own self-realization. Even if man has to do essentially 
with the social world, it does not mean that a perfect social world would be the ultimate end 
of humanity. Secondly, if we say that man is open to the social world, we have to ask what 
kind of a social world it is. We would be happy to give the example of a perfect society in 
world history. That kind of a perfect society that could be the object of man’s openness, 
however, has never existed. We can hold up societies as a model, which were perfect with 
respect to the organization of the society. The Incan, Mayan, Egyptian, or Sumer theocratic 
states as well as the Nazi and Soviet Empires were very well organized. The good 
organization of a state, however, does not imply that the society or the social world in 
question is a perfect one. Thirdly, nowadays no one can argue with the question of unjust 
social circumstances, the social alienation of man, and inhuman policies. Criticism of and 
intervention in these situations has no justification if we do not previously suppose that man is 
open to eternal reality. Fourthly, if we face social inequality, unauthorized aggressive power, 
and the continuous repression of human rights we have to intervene and we have to fight 
against it. This does not mean that social world will bring redemption for man in his socio-
cultural and socio-historical stance. Being prompted by humanity, one has to act even if one’s 
ultimate end is not of the social world, since without deeds humanism is a self-deceit, and 
religiosity is hypocrisy. Fifthly, even if this social world is not the only place of man’s self-
realization and we clearly see that man is unable on his own to achieve self-realization, we 
cannot disregard the consequences and effects of socio-economic processes. No one can think 
seriously about man not taking into account the social world. We can say therefore that man is 
open to the social world, yet, it isn’t the final object of his openness. The ultimate completion 
is found beyond the social world. 
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To sum up we can say that evolutionist, Marxist and any similar views on the nature of 
man run the risk of reducing man to one single phenomenon of the world, to its social aspect. 
Man, however, is not only an animal sociale, and those who think that man can be defined by 
his social circumstances fail to do justice to the characteristic element of the human being. In 
his openness, however, as this short investigation has illustrated, not the openness to the 
social world, but his openness to the divine reality is what distinguishes him. 
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3.8. The World of the Non-being and Fiction 
“Omnes scientiae et artes ordinantur ad unum,  
scilicet ad perfectionem hominis” 
(Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ) 
 
 This chapter is dedicated to the unfolding of the connection between the phenomenon 
of man’s world-openness and the phenomenon of the world of non-being and fiction. Here the 
hermeneutical point of departure is similar as in the previous chapters: we suppose that the 
phenomenon of world-openness’ proper object is the world of non-being and fiction. In this 
chapter, however, we will argue that the proprium of man cannot be characterized by being 
open to the world of non-being and fiction. We will argue that all definitions will fail insofar 
as it understands man’s world-openness in a reductionist way and reduces it to the openness 
to the world of non-being and fiction.  
The term fiction indicates at least two meanings. In the first sense fiction is a type of 
literature describing imaginary, but not necessarily untrue, events and people. In the second 
sense we call something fiction, which is invented or imagined and not strictly true. In 
general, we can say that non-being and fiction are the antitheses of being. If I might to say so, 
the world of the non-being and the fictional are virtual. In this short chapter therefore I would 
like to concentrate on the nature of the virtual world(s) and to see in what sense man can be 
open to the virtual world.  
 Our first question is: what kind of and how many virtual worlds there are? In my 
understanding the term virtual world has a wider meaning. I call virtual not only the world of 
the Internet and three-dimensional technologies, but all phenomena, which are not real and 
have limited or no access at all to the real world. In this sense, for example, an advertisement 
on television also can be considered as a virtual world, since it gives us to believe that we will 
be as young and beautiful as the lady in the advertisement. The “world” of this advertisement 
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is also a virtual world, because it imposes us a non-existent “reality”. Virtual worlds share the 
common trait of pretending to be real, though they aren’t.  
There are various types of virtual worlds. For example our own fantasy and memory 
or a painting, a poem or an erroneous philosophical reflection to the world can also be 
considered as virtual worlds. There are, however, “innocent” virtual worlds, which try to 
maintain the connection with the real world. The difference between a fictitious story and the 
virtual world of the media is that the latter has no connections with the higher sphere of truth, 
whereas an artistically valuable artifact can have an authentic relation to the truth. The 4000 
year old heroic poem of Gilgames beautifully unfolds the essence of friendship through the 
friendship of Gilgames and Enkidu. Through a particular friendship we can see the eternal 
and the real idea of friendship, notwithstanding that the Gilgames-epos is also a fictitious 
story. In contrast to this, the virtual world, for example, of a soap-opera has no relation to 
anywhere. The fictitious world of soap-operas of the media or the valueless writings is not 
open to anywhere; it closes man into its narrow world. Nevertheless, man cannot live in the 
limited or pseudo world of soap-operas for longer period, because this world doesn’t reach the 
level of intensity of the “actual” virtual existence. Classical literary works can urge us to leave 
and ameliorate our environment and our own world. The fictitious world of the literary works 
of lesser value doesn’t encourage us to leave its limits, but, because of its shallowness, 
doesn’t enchain man either. On the other hand, the virtual reality of the media doesn’t let man 
enter his own field, that of reality. We have to distinguish therefore the virtual world of 
modern technology from the fictitious artworks of art and fiction, and we have to define the 
virtual world, which is in fact closed.  
 The virtual world of the media made possible by modern technologies is a radically 
new phenomenon. This phenomenon is a virtual world par excellence. It demands the degree 
of appearance to such an extent that man believes himself to exist and act in a real world, 
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although in reality man encounters only virtually real objects. This type of virtual world has 
reached such a degree of imitation that it (virtually) can take over the role of God. This new 
world of the media imitates God, like a new deity who creates the world and maintains it in its 
pseudo being. This world tries to imitate God’s every manifestation, by which it becomes a 
fake horizon of life. This world is virtual for the reason that it does not point to any higher 
reality beyond itself. The inhabitant of such a world is deprived of all his transcendence and 
cannot realize that his transcendence should point to a real horizon. Such a person – in the 
“prison” of his virtual world – will never perceive that his transcendence is ordained to the 
self-revealing God and not to contingent and in most of the cases non-existent realities.  
 As a matter of fact the main distinction between the real world and the virtual world is 
that the real world has real existence, whereas the virtual world has no real existence. The real 
reality is in actual existence by reason of actus essendi. Now, the question is how can one live 
and what is man open to in a world which possesses no actus essendi?  The question is of 
highest importance, since it concerns man’s ethical being in the world. The human being is, 
however, ordained to truth;259 man is searching for the truth. Similarly, in ethical sphere too, 
man is leveled to the real good and to the real bad, and man has to be connected with real 
persons. There is no point, however, to speak about real moral life without the condition of 
reality. As Saint Thomas Aquinas says: the good presupposes the true.260 Without real good 
and real bad there are no oughts and there are no morally bad acts. If man is ordained to a real 
world (and I think he is), then he is ordained to truth as well. The real truth in itself however 
cannot be virtual; the virtual world therefore can be considered as a negation of truth, a 
categorical no to the real world and its values. This negation however has ethical 
consequences for man. A man living in virtual “reality” can seriously do harm his own self-
identity. In such a situation he cannot find his place in the world, and cannot value his 
                                                 
259 As Saint Augustine said: Quid magis desiderat anima quam veritatem. 
260 „Bonum presupponit verum.”  De Veritate 21,3. 
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connections. Finally, he loses all connection with the real world and lives in a false horizon. 
The false valuation of the world and self-identity results in a distorted idea of man. Man can, 
for example, confuse the two worlds and can transpose his addictions (sexual addictions, 
violence learnt from video games and movies) from the virtual world to the real world. In this 
case, for example, man abuses the dignity of the other person and considers him not a person 
but an object. In cases like this the perpetrator’s as well as the victim’s human dignity is 
injured. Living in a virtual world deprives man from his freedom, since he cannot do 
otherwise as the virtual world dictates. Man living in a virtual world believes he has freedom, 
although he has limited freedom. Acts of such a person are also limited. Now, the act, losing 
its transcendence, cannot give an appropriate response to real values, the good and the bad. 
The loss of freedom and transcendence is, however, the strictest slavery. In short, we can say 
that since the virtual world is closed in the strictest sense of the word, man’s openness loses 
its dynamism and results in a closed and perverted system, which is unable to reflect the real 
world and any transcendent, God-directed intention. 
Now, the world of the media, of course, does not exist in reality in its ideal form as we 
have described it above. It was only an analysis of one virtual world from the many. Besides 
the fantasy world of literature and the virtual world of the media as it is visualized by modern 
technologies, there are other fictitious worlds such as the world of totalitarian regimes. 
Totalitarian regimes also tried to compress man’s freedom and create a virtual world. From a 
philosophical point of view we can say that the two most drastic dictatorships of the 20th 
century also had aspired to shape the world and man according to their conception. 
Communism and Nazism, from a philosophical point of view, had tried to achieve destruction 
of reality and total negation of the world. Nevertheless, they failed, since neither Communism 
nor Nazism was able to enter the person’s most intimate sphere. There always had remained a 
small room for real freedom in family, or in interpersonal relations, in friendships, or at least 
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in the free and sober thinking of the individual. In this sense, these totalitarianisms were not 
as perfect as the dictatorship of the (post-)modern phenomenon of the media could be.  
Freedom is a peculiar human character, which distinguishes us from animals. The 
crucial point of human existence is the use of freedom. The inner order of freedom reflects its 
practice in perfect form, which is possible only in truth. Thus freedom has to incorporate truth 
and has to dwell within the positive framework of truth. From this it follows that freedom 
without truth is not freedom or is a pseudo form of freedom. The human being can develop 
himself in accordance with his dignity only in freedom. Communism and Nazism sought to 
deprive man of his transcendent desire to truth, by which man could possess his identity. 
Dictatorships had created “their truth” replacing transcendental truth. This, however, means to 
negate the real dignity of the person. In this sense we can say that totalitarian regimes are 
based indeed on relativism.261 In the framework of relativism, dictatorship can deprive man 
from that which essentially belongs to him: freedom and truth. 
From what we have said so far it is evident that all virtual worlds, the worlds of non-
being and fiction are closed worlds. It means that, on the one hand, they do not reflect any 
higher sphere of the reality; on the other hand, they reduce man’s openness to a particular, 
limited sphere. Man, however, cannot live in a limited and, in the final analysis, destructive 
world. In this sense the proprium of man cannot be characterized by being open to the world 
of non-being and fiction.  
                                                 
261 On relativism in totalitarinisms see the publications of the International Academy of Philosophy: Alexander 
Solschenizyn, Macht und Moral zu Ende des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, hrsg. v. Rocco Buttiglione und Josef 
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Universitätsverlag C. Winter, 1994)¸and Dietrich von Hildebrand, Memoiren und Aufsätze gegen den 
Nationalsozialismus 1933-1938. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Zeitgeschichte, mit Alice von 
Hildebrand und Rudolf Ebneth hrsg. v. Ernst Wenisch (Mainz: Matthias Grünewald Verlag, 1994); Josef Seifert, 
(Hg.), Dietrich von Hildebrands Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Carl 
Winter, 1998); Rocco Buttiglione, Augusto del Noce. Biografia di un pensiero (Casale Monserrato: Piemme, 
1991) 
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3.9. The limited “World” of Surroundings of Animals  
 “Man is the being who can say ‘No,’  
the ‘ascetic of life,’ the protestant par excellence,  
against mere reality.” 
(Max Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature) 
 
In this chapter with the characterization of the limited world of surrounding of animals 
we would like to get closer to the proper understanding of the world of man, and eventually to 
the phenomenon of world-openness. The limited world of surrounding of animals is one 
among the many “worlds” that we investigate in the course of the analysis of the objects of 
man’s world-openness. In this chapter we would like to know whether the world of 
surroundings can be considered as real and ultimate objects of man’s world-openness or not. 
In this chapter we are interested in the nature of the world of surroundings of animals in 
respect of the question whether it can satisfy man’s world-openness. In other words, we 
would like to know whether man can be defined solely by the world of surroundings or man is 
open to something else than the world of surroundings. 
It was Max Scheler who applied the distinction between man’s world (Welt) and the 
surroundings (Umwelt) of animals for the very first time in philosophical context.262 In this 
chapter I will follow mainly Max Scheler’s train of thought, but I will add some criticisms. 
Scheler adopted the world-surroundings distinction to express the fundamental difference 
between man and animals. According to Eugene Kelly, there are four main theses in Scheler’s 
“Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos”,263 which constitute the framework of the distinction 
and which are inseparable from its proper interpretation. Scheler’s first thesis: the living body 
and the Psyche are a unity, and ascended together in a four-step evolutionary process. The 
second: (human) spirit is a non-emergent and autonomous phenomenon that stands in 
                                                 
262 Insights of Jakob von Uexküll might have influenced him. Von Uexküll published a book in 1909 with the 
title “Umwelt und Innenwelt der Tiere”. In this book he introduced the term Umwelt to denote the subjective 
world of organisms.  In a certain sense von Uexküll was more precise since he distinguished also Umgebung 
from Umwelt, and within Umwelt other different kinds of worlds such as Wirkwelt, Merkwelt, Tastwelt. 
263 It has two standard translations in English: Max Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature. (translated by Hans 
Meyerhoff) New York: The Noonday Press, 1971. and Max Scheler, The Human Place in the Cosmos. 
(translated by Manfred S. Frings) Evaston: Northwestern University Press, 2009. 
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opposition to impulsion. The third thesis says that spirit pertains to the very foundation of the 
universe and the fourth that the role of the human being in the cosmos is the infusion of life 
with spirit.264 Scheler’s characterization of the spirit centers on the distinction of world and 
surroundings.265 The distinction applied in the Western philosophy between spirit, reason and 
understanding is sometimes presupposed in philosophical texts. According to Scheler, the 
traditional usages of the word “spirit” have devastatingly been confusing. In contrast to the 
traditional usage, therefore, Scheler proposes a new one with the implication of 
characterization of the spirit as being “impotent” and “powerless”.  
The main point of Scheler’s Man’s Place in Nature is to tell us that the human spirit’s 
capacity of experiencing all entities or things as objects implies that, ontologically, the human 
place cannot be found in space, time and the cosmos, but must be “nowhere” yet relative to 
whatever is “somewhere” as objectified by spirit. The expression of “outside” (gegenüber) the 
cosmos does not have the meaning of a scientific distance between man and the cosmos, 
because distance, too, is an object for humans. Man is, says Scheler, “world-open” and this 
again would imply that man is not tantamount to “being-in-the-world” as Heidegger said, but 
is a being outside the world because of his endless objectifications.  
Now the surroundings of animals, and as a matter of fact every kind of world, which 
differs from the human being’s world, gets thematized around the theme of spirit (and 
person), which is, according to Scheler, “ultimately an attribute of Being itself which becomes 
manifest in man, in the unity of self-concentration characteristic of the person.”266 The 
essential characteristic of the spiritual being is that it is absolutely free from the bondage of 
life, from its addiction to everything that constitutes life. The human being is especially free 
                                                 
264 See Eugene Kelly, Introduction. In: Max Scheler, The Human Place in the Cosmos. Evaston: Northwestern 
University Press, 2009. pp. XI-XVII. 
265 See Max Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature. New York: The Noonday Press, 1971. 36. ff. 
266 Max Scheler, op. cit. 56. 
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from instincts, “including its own drive-motivated intelligence”.267 In short, freedom, more 
properly speaking, the totality of freedom determines his life and not surroundings-dependent 
instincts nor surroundings themselves.  
Only that being, which objectifies the world, can live in a world-open manner. Man is 
free from his surroundings; the world of man therefore can be characterized as a possible 
object of objectivization. Man’s world is open to various types of interactions with other men. 
Even if there are pre-programmed behavioral patterns in this world, they do not determine his 
whole existence: it is a real interaction; man can form the world as well as freely subject 
himself to the world. In this sense not only is man open to the world, but also the world to 
man. To be the possible object of objectivization means that in the world of man there are no 
hidden or impassable parts for spirit (this is the meaning of the frequently quoted Aristotelian 
dictum anima est quodamodo omnia, that is, each individual soul is to some extent all things). 
On the other hand, in the case of the animal world there is no freedom and interaction, since 
every action and reaction, even in an animal that is highly developed, such as a chimpanzee, 
is the result of instincts, drives and sensory perceptions. Since everything is pre-set in the 
animal environmental world there are no sudden, unexpected events, to which animals should 
give an answer in a totally different life-structure. As a matter of fact, even if an animal lands 
in an unexpected situation, it will never perceive that it is a completely new situation and will 
never decide itself to accommodate to the new circumstances. This is because of lack of 
objectivity: animals cannot observe themselves and the situation from outside. Of course, 
animals will give an “answer” to the new situation, but this answer reflects the previous 
closed instinct-world of the animal and has no real connection with the new situation. An 
animal will never recognize the qualitative otherness of the changed surroundings, since 
instincts preset everything according to one type of world. Scheler says: 
                                                 
267 Max Scheler, op.cit. 37. 
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The structure of the environment is precisely adapted to the psychological 
peculiarities of the animal, and indirectly to its morphological characters as 
well, and to its instincts and sensory structure, which form a strictly 
functional unity. Animals only notice and grasp those things which fall into 
the secure boundaries of their environmental structure.268 
 
Owing to his openness, man can act against his instincts. On the other hand, animal 
behavior is incapable of performing acts against instincts. The world of animals is a system of 
questions and their answers, in which each question has only one proper answer. Animal 
cannot go against their instincts giving a counter-answer. Even if some animal seems to have 
freedom and seemingly can give unexpected answers, it is because there are other, for us 
invisible or hidden, but for the animal manifest, pre-packed instinctive answers. In my view, 
one has to severely separate real human freedom from the animal naturalistic behavior, where 
there are no traces of freedom in any sense of the word. By the same token, I think one has to 
reject attributing emotions, rational considerations and similar phenomena to animals. I think 
that if we do not reject from the beginning all of these conceptions, we would go too far, as 
far as the animalization of the human being. If we accept, for example, that animals can feel 
generosity we also have to accept that animals have souls, heart and will. That animals have 
some sort of a soul, had been a common view prior to Descartes. According to this pre-
Descartian view, animals have soul (or something similar), but certainly a soul that is not a 
rational personal soul and thus is decisively different from a human soul. From the 20th 
century regrettably there are numerous thinkers, who claim that animals should have the same 
(human) rights as humans. The common point of their error is the insufficient distinction 
between human freedom and animal instinct-patterned behavior. Sometimes Scheler also 
seems to suggest that there is only a quantitative difference between human and animal 
behavior.269 
                                                 
268 Max Scheler, op.cit. 38. 
269 “We find in animals the capacity for generosity, help, reconciliation, friendship and similar phenomena.” Max 
Scheler op.cit. 34. 
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In the limited world of the surroundings of animals we can talk about openness only in 
a limited sense. Man is open, that is, he can show evidence of behavior which is open to the 
objects of the world. Moreover, the scope and spectrum of his behavior is unlimited. Animals 
– as Scheler says – have no “objects”.270 It means that animals, and other non-spiritual beings 
cannot objectify, cannot transform their world into an object. The animal world is therefore 
limited in comparison to the human world, since animals cannot open up the limits of their 
surroundings to other possible worlds or surroundings. On the other hand, it means that in the 
animal world there are no acts of detachment and distance which would signify that the 
animal transforms a “surroundings” into the “world”. In the animal world, therefor,e there is 
no possibility of reflection, that is, rational reconsideration, to the ontological situation of the 
animal.  
Another deficiency can be found in the surroundings of animals. Man is not only able 
to reflect on the rational reconsideration of acts, but he is able to reflect on that it is he who is 
performing the act of reflection. This is what we call self-consciousness. Animals, as 
experiments show, might have other kind of consciousnesses, such as body-consciousness, 
when for example a mammal can make a distinction between itself and its young. This 
consciousness is based on a very primitive form of identification; it is not a developed and 
conscious knowledge of the self. From this follows that when surroundings motivate (by 
effecting the instincts) an animal, it does not even experience the drive as its own. Similarly, 
in the limited world of surroundings of animals, there is no reflection on hearing and seeing, 
nor in the subject of hearing and seeing; there is no reflection on movement, nor on the 
subject of the movement, etc.  
A further characteristic of the world of surroundings of the animals is that in a world 
like this there are no categories of thing and substance. The reason for this is that in animals 
                                                 
270 See Max Scheler op.cit. 39. 
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spiritual qualities are missing. It means that animals lack the unitive faculty, which would 
relate the experiences of different senses and would form a spiritual “picture” of the object 
seen from another aspect. Scheler illustrates it with a very good example: 
Even the highest animals do not have a fully developed thing-category. The 
ape that is handed a half-peeled banana will again run away from it, whereas 
he will eat it if it is completely peeled, and he will peel and eat it if it is not 
peeled at all.271  
 
The animal world also lacks the so-called points of reference. An animal does not wait for an 
experience, since it is closed to a world, in which everything works according to 
predetermined happenings. In this sense the human world is an empty world, where man has 
infinite possibilities to develop his activities and to gain new experiences, which he has never 
encountered before. Man is open to the world, which means that man can really have 
experience. The world of animals, because of its closedness and lacking of points of 
references, precludes the possibility of growth and increment in knowledge, spiritual and 
mental experiences, etc.  
In simple surroundings there is no possibility of behaving “intelligently”. Behaving 
intelligently means to be open to new situation, and to be not determined fully by previous 
events. Now, in the animal world there is no possibility to secede from the environment, in 
this sense there is no possibility to transcend it. Animals will always remain in their 
surrounding and will never have real world space.272 Animals in their surroundings will never 
go beyond themselves and transform everything into an object of knowledge. A surrounding 
in contrast to the world is limited. Since there are only schemes in surroundings, there is 
nothing that could be an object of transformation. Surroundings therefore are not enough to 
the unlimitedly world-open being. Even if when man is in his surroundings, he immediately 
transforms it into a world. The main reason why we have to reject the idea that surroundings 
would be the object of man’s openness is because of man’s ontological structure: the house 
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that man dwells in cannot be the “world” of surroundings. Man who lives an active, free, 
responsive life and – as Scheler remarked – can say “no” to the happenings of life 
ontologically is incapable of living only in the frameworks of surroundings.  
Now, the question is whether we can give any kind of religious interpretation to the 
“world” of surroundings? According to Scheler, one has to see also the religious significance 
and not only just the basic phenomenon of world-openness. In other words, he tried to grasp 
also the object of openness asking what we can and what we have to be open to. In short, he 
answered the question of what human openness is open to. He says that man’s essence is 
defined in contrast to issues of being involved and concerned with the world: in short, 
concerning his essence, man has nothing to do with the world; his essence is extrinsic to the 
world. In this sense the limited world of surroundings is also just one step in the realization of 
the extrinsic essence of man. This realization is originally religious and is gratified in religion.  
 It seems therefore that surrounding in itself has no religious significance. It can have, 
however, if we relate it to a more comprehensive world, which can in fact be open, in other 
words, which can guarantee access to higher reality for man. This other, more comprehensive 
world is as open to divine reality as man is open to the world. This thought, however, is not 
tantamount to Scheler’s idea of the God-creator man.273 All I wanted to say with this is that, 
since human being has a world-transcendent structure, – if he is concerned with surroundings 
– he immediately forms surroundings into a world and at the same time – owing again to his 
ontological structure – transcends this world as well.  
We can conclude that since man is “against mere reality” and the “protestant par 
excellence”, he can say “no” to the limited world of surroundings in his world-transcending 
position. We can fully agree with Scheler that the limited world of surroundings of animals is 
a closed world. It means that, on the one hand, it does not reflect any higher sphere of the 
                                                 
273 See the last pages of Man’s Place in Nature. 
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reality; on the other hand, reduces man’s openness to a particular, limited sphere. In this sense 
the proprium of man cannot be characterized by being open to the world of surroundings of 
animals. 
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3.10. The World as Being 
“Man is but a reed, the most feeble  
thing in nature, but he is a thinking reed” 
(Blaise Pascal, Pensées) 
 
 As we have seen in the previous chapter Scheler characterizes man as the protestant 
par excellence, who can say no to the totality. Let’s continue the train of thought of the 
previous chapters by asking whether man can say “no” to the world as being too. Besides this 
metaphoric understanding we are especially interested how can philosophical anthropology 
characterize man: as a being open to being as such or as a being not open being? Well, the 
answer at first sight seems to depend on how we define being. To provide a characterization 
for being is one of the most difficult tasks of philosophy if not impossible. It seems that we 
cannot start our investigation with a definition since any definition would presuppose being 
and thus become circular. Many philosophers, such as Aristotle claim that we can unfold the 
nature of being, distinguish its different moments and kinds, but there is no definition for 
being.  
As a matter of fact, we are in trouble with being, since if we say – with Gehlen and 
Scheler – that man is in an eccentric position, then we would like to know whether man can 
be extrinsic to being as well. Approaching the subject matter from a different angle, however, 
we can say that the fact of man’s eccentric position already includes that man can say “no”, 
but at the same time man can say “yes” to the world as being. This peculiar characteristic is 
due to man’s fundamental openness to being. 
 If we say that the question of being is in substantial connection with the question of 
God, that is, being is transparent to God, we would think that those who hold man’s openness 
to being, at the same time claim man’s openness to God. Heidegger, on the other hand for 
example, holds that man is able to know being, and says that man is not the cause of himself, 
but strictly rejects any common point or strong connection of common being and God as well 
as any hierarchy between them. The thesis of this chapter is formulated in contrast to the 
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views which say that one can understand human being without metaphysical 
problematization. I claim that without an ultimate metaphysical-philosophical 
problematization and answer and without a turning to being one cannot give a meaningful 
explanation to the question of what man is and cannot explain the proper object of man’s 
world-openness. 
 Some thinkers of the German classical philosophical anthropology do not proclaim 
themselves atheists, but consider marginally the problem of God. Plessner and Gehlen, for 
example, hold that “before theology” – that is, in a scientific framework – one cannot tell 
whether divine reality is man’s projection or not. According to them, the task of philosophical 
anthropology is to show peculiar human traces based on the comparison of man and animals. 
They claim that in the course of the evolution of species man “became open to the world” and 
as “second nature” started to build culture. Man, freed from instincts, creates an artificial, 
secondary world, that is, culture. The precondition of culture is the “overflow of instincts”, 
more precisely, the overflow of motivations. According to Gehlen, culture and social order 
compensate man’s “organic backwardness” (organisch mittelose) and provide help in the life-
struggles of man.274 Although Gehlen stresses that there is qualitative and not only 
quantitative difference between man and animals, he cannot explain – neither his fellows – 
the origin and nature of man’s spirit (Geist) nor its essential attributes. In Gehlen the pure 
word, “overflow of motivations”, cannot give sufficient explanation to concerns of man like 
habits, tradition, art, world-view, openness, experience, etc. The central aim of a good 
philosophical anthropology should be to give an answer to the question why man needs 
concerns like these. In my view, the answer is that man is spirit with openness to the totality 
of being; this answer, however, is unacceptable and annoying for philosophical 
anthropologies of today influenced by physicalism and evolution theory. We can say therefore 
                                                 
274 See Arnold Gehlen, Der Mensch: seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt. Athenäum: Frankfurt am Main, 
1966. p. 499; p. 504; p. 687. 
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that the non-speculative, that is, purely physicalist anthropology (of Gehlen, Plessner, Freud, 
or Marxist thinkers such as Gramsci, Lukács, etc.,) is entirely agnostic and atheist.  
 Another example from Plessner can well illustrate the weak point of this reductionist 
anthropology. Plessner holds that, as a by-product of evolution, man is a theoretical being. 
Man’s capacity for (intellectual) reflection results in an outstanding situation. Plessner calls it 
“eccentric position”. I think that, although eccentricity provides a fairly good description of 
man’s place in nature, without postulation of spirit and being (as the proper object of spirit) 
Plessner’s term has not so much sense. As a matter of fact Gehlen, Plessner and Freud also 
cannot give answer to man’s spirituality. Consequently, they cannot give answer to being 
either. 
 They tried to define the human spirit functionally, i.e. in terms of the visible 
“functions” of the spirit. After such a functionalistic explanation of spirit they certainly will 
be interested only in the functional definition of religion and being. According to Gehlen, for 
example, religion has its origin in totemism.275 He says that after its inception religion proved 
to be “useful”, people therefore institutionalized it as they did with every secondary 
expedience. Gehlen as well as Plessner hold that belief has a function of a higher governing 
principle. Now, I think that in this naturalistic context man’s all self-transcending strivings 
and intentions become historical and socially conditioned. The functional-historical 
explanation of man rejects the idea of the common human nature and advocates relativism in 
everywhere: in hominisation, culture and religion. According to Plessner, we don’t know 
whether the universe is intelligible, this can be answered only theologically. “In our profane 
life we have come to terms with pluralism, world and multiplicity […] in which man is 
developed as an organic being among the many.”276 
                                                 
275 Arnold Gehlen op.cit. 468. ff. 
276 Helmut Plessner, Conditio humana. Pfullingen: Neske, 1964: 25. 
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 Anthropological systems like this reject metaphysics and the metaphysical 
investigation of human being. Nevertheless, I think that one cannot grasp fully man with the 
method of rationalistic positivism. The rejection of metaphysics leads to serious 
consequences. The anthropology which excludes the notions of being and spirit and God’s 
reality is not only methodically, but essentially atheist, or it is not anthropology at all. If we 
compare it to our scheme above, interpretations like this are on the first level of explanation. 
They cannot give answer to the most important attribute of human being, to the phenomenon 
of his spirit. They can describe man in many situations and can depict him, for example, from 
the viewpoint of evolution (which is of course extremely useful and contributes to the 
paleontological, scientific debates on man), but they cannot problematize the real reason, 
origin and aim of man’s inherent dynamism. Now, in order to meet these requirements we 
have to turn to metaphysics. Without metaphysics and metaphysical explanation human 
existence falls into absurdity. 
 In contrast to this, on the basis of a real philosophical anthropology we can and we 
have to determine theses, which are based on strict necessity. These like “man is spirit”, “man 
is open to being and God in an unlimited extent”, “man is free” are very modest insights. On 
the other hand, however, these insights open up enormous perspectives. I claim therefore that 
reality cannot be grasped fully in its totality without exceeding the instrumentalistic and 
relativistic explanations. Metaphysical answers, that is, answers, which suppose that there is a 
common being and this being can be known and isn’t stuck on the first level of inquiry, 
provide a more comprehensive explanation of man. Historical-relativistic approaches cannot 
give any answer to the question of man and being. Hence we have to turn to being in order to 
answer the question of man.  
 We can ask the question, what is man open to when he is open to being? First of all, 
man is open to his fellow-beings. His openness makes possible to enter communication with 
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other human beings. When man is open to being, it means that he is open to the productions 
of human mind. He is open to language, culture, art, science and countless other specifically 
human activities. In the very same act of openness to being man is open also to himself. It 
means that with this capacity man can overcome his fears, indiscipline, can face new 
situations and ideas. Of course, in being open to being man can be open to many bad and evil 
matters. It is however not the original disposition what makes openness bad or evil. 
Nevertheless, if man “uses” his openness for bad things, he can close himself into a limited, 
exitless world. In its final analysis, being open to being means that man is open to God. In 
short, we can say that in all these acts of openness man realizes himself and step by step 
approximates to his ultimate goal.  
The world of being is, however, not the ultimate object of his openness. It’s true, we 
implicitly know being in every cognition of individuals. The world of being, however, is the 
horizon in which the real final goal can appear and, as a matter of fact, appears in all instances 
of cognition. Man’s dynamism towards the infinite unfolds itself through the different objects 
of being. Being on the other hand is also an object of man’s openness. Man in order to come 
to a self-knowledge turns to the material and spiritual things of the world and implicitly 
grasps being too. In this context “knowing implicitly” means that there is no special cognitive 
or volitional act, or special organ or faculty which would be assigned to grasp the world of 
being as object. Man implicitly knows about being in all explicit knowledge. 
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3.11. The World as Cosmos and God 
“interior intimo meo et superior summo meo” 
(Augustine, Confessions, III, VI) 
 
 The central insight of the previous chapter was that without a metaphysical-
philosophical problematization one cannot answer the question of the proper place of man. 
We would expect that in this chapter we will speak about God as a more comprehensive 
meaning-providing reality presupposing a certain gradation between different “types” of 
worlds. Our question here is, however, somewhat different. We would like to know how we 
can speak about man’s openness to God intelligently in the language of philosophy.  
In this chapter we will investigate whether the world as cosmos and God can be 
considered as a real and ultimate object of the phenomenon what we called man’s world-
openness. In short, we would like to know whether man can be defined solely by the world as 
cosmos and God, or man is open to something else. Here we wish to study whether the world 
as cosmos and God can do justice to the proprium of man, to what distinguishes him as a 
person. 
 First of all, we have to make it clear that God and cosmos are different. We do not 
identify cosmos with divine reality. It’s true, however, that they both seem to be 
comprehensive objects. At least they are more comprehensive than, for example, the object-
world. The world of cosmos, although it refers to an immense expansion, is still something 
that is incomplete in itself. Under the term cosmos we usually understand some temporally 
and spatially extended physical entity which encompasses also spiritual realities. Even if we 
use expressions like “universe” as totality of things or “world” as a comprehensive term for 
everything visible and invisible around us, we usually refer to something that belongs to our 
world, that is, which is only the extension of our world. In this sense if we say that man is 
open to the cosmos, we cannot really define what openness is. To say that man is open to God 
means far more than the simple expansion of the world around us.  
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No doubt, the main idea of the modern anthropology, man’s openness to the world, 
comes from the religious thinking. It is very interesting that in the ancient Mid-Eastern 
languages a word standing for the “world” did not exist! In the Biblical description of the 
creation we read that God created man after his likeness and let him to “have dominion over 
the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and 
over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth”.277 In one word, man has dominion 
over the earth, the world - but for the expression of the idea of the world the Hebrew has no 
word. The biblical as well as other Mid-East creation-myths like the Babylonian Enuma Elis, 
however, can clearly express that man as God’s servant stands above all creatures. Even the 
sun and moon and the stars had been created for him. Man is first of all committed to God and 
not to the world. Man’s relation to the world therefore receives a different meaning. Man is no 
longer (and as a matter of fact he has never been, since it is an ontological endowment) the 
subject of the world. The deep theological (and philosophical) message of the majority of the 
creation-myths is twofold. Firstly, it clearly states God’s transcendence. Secondly, it 
demythologizes the world and it subjects it to man, in other words, it “delivers the world into 
his hands”.  
 We have characterized man as a being who has an inner metaphysical capacity to 
challenge everything that faces him. Scheler called this attitude world-openness.278 According 
to Gehlen, man’s openness to the world is a principal feature of man and this is what makes 
us human beings; this differentiates us from animals.279 It seems that Scheler like Gehlen 
defines man with the world. Scheler’s principal aim was to define man in contrast to the 
world. Concerning this point we can fully agree. Now, how can we understand that man is 
open to the world? 
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A possible way to answer this question would be to define the object of openness. In 
this sense, if we say that the proper understanding of man’s openness to the world is God-
openness (which is our thesis and as a matter of fact the answer to the question), then all we 
have to do is to tell what the object of our world-openness is. On the other hand, if we say that 
this “object” or final aim is God, we cannot give a definition of God as we did in the previous 
chapters concerning different types of worlds. If we want to know the proper direction of 
man’s openness then we cannot follow the method of our previous descriptions and 
characterizations. The “world” of God is not like the object-world, which visibly differs from 
other forms of the world and is therefore easily definable. The “world” of God is not like the 
world of language, which has distinct limits, audible and visible manifestations. There is only 
one way to proceed: we have to tell what God means for man. Our questions are: what is and 
what the divine milieu means for man? Here the term “milieu” will be thematized in contrast 
to any other worlds. 
The animal world comprises all what an animal needs in order to maintain its 
existence. Animal necessities of life are in correlation with their specific surroundings. In case 
surroundings change, that is, conditions change, animals can no longer maintain their 
existence. Animals are in a sense open to their surroundings. On the other hand, the fact that 
human beings are open in all their acts and manifestations shows that there must be something 
other and more comprehensive object for their aspirations than just the extension of their 
surroundings (surroundings-world). This is the “world” what we call “divine milieu”. The 
divine milieu for man is the condition of man’s world-openness. Without this condition we 
are unable to define the proper meaning of our world-openness.  
There can be observed in man an aspiration for searching for truth and reasonableness, 
which reveals that man is ordained to God and not to other finite goods and worlds. In this 
sense God as “world”, that is, the divine milieu means final reasonableness for man. 
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Reasonableness means that man’s infinite yearning, striving, questioning, and acting must 
have a reason, which gives full justification for all these acts. This conclusion – which echoes 
what Saint Augustine said in his Confessions and what is the motto of this chapter – says that 
though in a certain sense we don’t know who and what God is, we know that He is in our 
inmost soul and He is the one where we want to arrive at.  
In short, we can say that being oriented and open to God is the condition of man’s 
world-openness. Its negation would mean a misunderstanding of man’s world-openness. In 
this sense, man is not ordained to the world, and not ordained to language, etc., but is open 
and ordained to God. Insofar as we can see signs and ciphers of God in man’s acts and 
existence, we can understand properly his main character. It also means that man is indeed 
cultural, historical, etc…etc., being, but cannot be understood only culturally or historically. 
Man, however, surpasses culture as well as history. Similarly all other definitions fail if they 
do not hold man’s primary transcendental character. On the other hand, it also means that this 
is the only way to understand the essence of culture as well as of history and all other 
phenomena that we tried to apply to man in the previous chapters.  
Now, what does God mean as world for man? God means for man what surroundings 
mean for animals. In other words, animals live in their surroundings, man live in the divine 
milieu. In this sense, man living in the divine milieu is at his place: this is his home. 
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Conclusion 
The understanding of man’s world-openness 
The study of philosophy does not aim at knowing 
 what people thought but what the truth of things is. 
(Thomas Aquinas, De Caelo at Mundo, I,22,9) 
 
In the conclusion of my thesis I try to summarize what I mean by man’s openness to the world 
and God. In this thesis we pursued anthropology: we wanted to give an answer to the 
problems of man’s nature and vocation from the viewpoint of his openness to the world. It is 
clear, however, that the “world” taken in the sense of common usage cannot give a 
satisfactory answer to these questions. The same conclusion was presumed by the Greek as 
well. Plato dedicates a whole dialogue to the “inexhaustible desire for knowledge” and 
“Eros”, which can be defined as the longing for wholeness, a “daimon” whose aim is to reach 
wisdom without ever owning her and is used to describe fulfillment between human being and 
Gods. By the help of Eros one can ascend step by step to the beauty and the good, which 
fulfills man’s all desires (Symposium 210-212). In other words, Eros is a means of ascent to 
contemplation of the Divine. In spite of this observation of the Greeks, however, it was our 
modern history which contested and raised the question of man in a radically new way, and 
said that there is no question concerning man which wouldn’t raise further series of questions. 
In my view it was the modern (19th century) anthropology that first realized man’s exceptional 
place in the world.  
In the footsteps of Max Scheler we have said that man’s peculiar characteristic is his 
greater independence from his surroundings. Unlike animals man has a world and not only 
surroundings. The term “world-openness” is the synonym of this independence or freedom. 
But what the peculiar meaning of this expression is? Basically this is the main question of my 
thesis. Practically speaking what is man open to? It seems that man is open to new things and 
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experiences. Other beings, however, experience only a few, species-dependent stimuli. We 
have discussed the difference between man and animals in many parts of this thesis; but since 
we have arrived to the crucial part of our work we have to raise the question again: does 
man’s world (Welt) differ from the surroundings (Umwelt) of animals? And if yes, in what 
sense do they differ? Is man just simply “tuned” to his world as animals are to their 
surroundings? Or is there a deeper meaning of his world-openness? If this is not the case, that 
is, there is not a deeper meaning of his world-openness, then there is only a quantitative 
difference between the relation of man and the world, and the connection of animals and their 
surroundings. The wording, however, can mislead us. It might suggest that the world of man 
is no more than a very sophisticated surroundings. According to the ancient thought, the 
kosmos is the house of man, who lives his life within its walls. This kosmos-world had clear 
borders and those who tempted to cross these borders were pronounced to be foolish – as for 
example Dante chanted about Ulysses, the sailor. I think, however, that those who think that 
the “world” is a closed dwelling-place cannot understand the real, substantive difference 
between man and animals. In this thesis I tried to show that the difference is not only 
quantitative, that is, man is not only less dependent from his surroundings than animals. No. 
Yet again, the problematization can mislead us, since we don’t want to say that man is open 
only to the world and receptive only to the world. On the contrary, we wanted to claim and 
underline (in all analyses and conclusions of the thesis) man’s unconditional openness; in 
other words, the definition of man (that is, the understanding his world-openness) is his 
constant indefiniteness. I mean by this that man essentially transcends all aspects of his life: 
he is wide-open to further experiences and new tasks coming from new experiences, and 
finite beings can never satisfy his aspirations, aims, desires, etc. Man does not look up to the 
world, because he ascends above the world and is above all images what he has ever 
developed and will develop about the world. Man’s openness is the precondition of the 
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possibility to question the entirety of the world. Without this openness man cannot thematize 
the world as world in his experience. If there is not the restless inner aspiration or the 
continuing search for the knowledge of objective truth – let’s call it again Eros – in man to 
transcend every finite being, then there is no search and inquiry about the world either. This is 
the first conclusion of the thesis. 
With this, however, we did not answer the question of the nature of man’s world-
openness. Where does this unusual character and attitude of man come from? Where does this 
unappeasable restlessness spring from? Shall we refer to the culture – as Gehlen, Portmann, 
Rothacker and Marx suggested? According to them, we find man’s definition in culture (they 
suggest many definitions for culture, which I discuss in the thesis). In my view, however, 
man’s relation to the culture over again raises further questions, since man cannot find his rest 
in his productions either. It is our common experience (and the main presupposition of the 
thesis) that finite beings cannot satisfy man: man is dissatisfied with his world, as well as with 
his artificially developed worlds, such as culture. The more man produces, the more he wants 
to produce, simply because of the reason that man is able to create more and more worlds 
beyond his actual cultural world. The constant development of the culture also shows that 
man’s original vocation and defining properties (that is, his essence) are beyond culture. 
Moreover, man raises above all his possible worlds, since man exerts more – intellectual, 
effectual, volitional, etc. – power what the aim of the world in question requires. As a matter 
of fact man’s experience of his contingency was supposed in every train of thought of the 
thesis.  
It was one of the main concerns of the thesis to list and analyze different worlds. In 
this thesis I analyzed from the point of view of man’s openness the cultural world, the world 
of language, the object world, the natural world, the social world, etc. My main question was 
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whether these worlds can satisfy man’s all-transcending openness or not. Or, in other words, 
my question was whether these worlds are the proper objects of man’s openness.  
Animals, in order to maintain their existence, stand in need of something else; they are 
dependent on food, definite whether conditions, definite physical conditions, etc. Animal 
necessities of life are in correlation with their specific surroundings. In comparison to this 
observation man’s aspirations are continuous and interminable. Animals stand in need of only 
their surroundings; man always stands – as our experience of contingency shows – in need of 
something infinite. Man has no particular aim, which would fulfill his strivings. As a matter 
of fact there are in man biologically non-understandable factors as well, such as when one 
risks one’s life in order to find new inventions, new “worlds”. In this sense – says Gehlen280 – 
there is no difference between the Polynesians who sailed the Pacific and the first aero plane 
pilots. They all risked their life for something, that is as a matter of fact biologically and 
evolutionary contra-productive. Yet, this kind of attitude is the very origin of the human life. 
A comprehensive theory of man, therefore, has to answer the question of this biologically 
paradox phenomenon as well. We called this phenomenon world-openness. We, however, 
wanted to define the proper understanding of this “world”, since – as our experience has 
shown – it cannot be “just” the world around us, the more sophisticated surroundings.  
 
Man as God-directed being 
The principal question of the thesis concerns the nature of man’s world-openness. In 
order to answer this question we analyzed different worlds that can be the object of man’s 
world-openness. In this respect we analyzed the world of language opposing our 
investigations mainly to Heidegger. We analyzed the world (surroundings) of animals basing 
our investigations mainly on Scheler and Gehlen. We applied in the third main part (part 3) of 
                                                 
280 Arnold Gehlen, Der Mensch: seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt. Frankfurt am Main: Athenäum, 
1966: 64. 
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the thesis many similar distinctions. Now, the common conclusion of all of these 
investigations is that it seems that man is in need of certain conditions of life as well as 
something (and this is his real “world”) infinite that, however, recedes and remains intangible. 
We concluded that the only answer to man’s constant lack and strivings is that there exists a 
world-transcending vis-à-vis. This was that point of the thesis when we finally discovered the 
proper understanding of man’s openness. If we say that God is the ultimate object of man’s 
openness we do not do anything, but we give a reasonable answer to our absolutely world-
transcending desires, volitional acts, demands, questions, questionings, aspirations, etc. It was 
one of the main concerns of the thesis to introduce different aspects, in which man can be 
open (chapter 2.3.). In this sense I analyzed the openness of the intellect, the openness of the 
will, the openness of other faculties of man. In each case the main question concerned the true 
meaning and proper object of these opennesses. If we say that the world for man is God then 
we affirm that it is not the man who creates the object of his desires as for example Feuerbach 
thought. There is no other explanation for man’s continuous yearning for the reality of the vis-
à-vis but the assumption that this (that is the real existence of the vis-à-vis) is precisely what 
lays the foundation of the yearning.  
In the course of the conceptual groping for the boundaries of man’s world and saying 
that its proper understanding is found in a reality that we call God, however, we are not in any 
sense identifying the world with God. In my view pantheism cannot give a good answer to the 
question of man and his openness and God, and completely misunderstands man’s openness. 
If we still want to use the word “world” and, accepting Scheler’s distinction between man’s 
world and animal surroundings, we still wants to know what the world means for man, with 
the expression “world as God” we mean that the phenomenon of the world in respect to man’s 
openness has its real understanding in the divine milieu. The world which we see, which we 
experience, which we try to unfold, which we love and hate is always more and other than 
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what can be seen, experienced, loved and hated. (This is basically the conclusion of the third 
part of the thesis, in which I differentiate between different types of “worlds” that can be the 
object of man openness.) The more we see and experience in this world, the less we seem to 
possess, since there are always more and more horizons opening up before us. The more we 
see and experience, the more we are open to, therefore the closer we are to God. The 
conclusion of the analyses (chapters 3.1.-3.12.) of the different worlds to which man can be 
open was that these worlds cannot provide a full interpretation of the phenomenon of man’s 
world-openness and they all point to a higher reality.  
The divine milieu for man is the condition of man’s world-openness. The fact that we 
are open in our all acts and manifestations (as the analysis of different aspects in man 
[chapters 2.3.] and the analysis of different worlds show in the thesis) reveals that there must 
be something higher than just the world, and all its manifestations; “a being than which 
nothing greater can be conceived.” Without this condition we are unable to define the proper 
meaning of our world-openness. Heidegger, for example, had been struggling throughout his 
life with the problem of man’s infinite horizon. He couldn’t tell whether it is the nothingness 
of being or the existence of beings, or God. He intuited that there supposed to be something 
that makes reasonable all of man’s strivings. Practically speaking Heidegger was not an 
optimistic thinker: he could not believe that there is real justification of man’s openness, and, 
as a result, he substituted it with the “nothinging of nothingness”. Now, in contrast to 
Heidegger, we must ask whether it is not our continuous search for God that shows that we 
are unconditionally ordained to Him. I claim, precisely it is. 
Also the biological theory of man presupposes the existence of the vis-à-vis, whom we 
are ordained to (chapters 2.7. and 3.4.). Without this condition it is impossible to define the 
exact meaning of world-openness. In this sense God as world, that is, the divine milieu means 
reasonableness for man. Reasonableness means that man’s infinite yearning, striving, 
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questioning, and acting must have a reason, which gives full justification for all these. This 
justification is supposed to be not only a leitmotiv or principal idea or object of the 
phenomenon, but that which is in the closest relation with man, constituting his innermost 
(interior intimo meo) part, which is inseparable from him.  
The divine reality had many forms and names throughout the history of religions. It is 
the task of a religious scholar to list all these names. Here we cannot discern whether religions 
were right in their various concepts of God. Nevertheless, I think, that a possible justification 
of religions depends on their understanding of the openness of man’s existence: whether they 
negate, or see it in a relativist way, or hold it acknowledging man’s openness as well as God’s 
transcendence. 
We can recapitulate our main insights in the following points. These points can be 
considered as the main conclusions of the thesis: 
1. World-openness is a many-faceted term: it entails a structural metaphysical 
essential trait of man as a finite person, which has no proper opposite except 
the absence of it in animals and in other non-personal beings. Every human 
person is characterized by  this structural world-openness regardless of his 
acts and attitudes. World-openness can also mean something that requires 
human intellectual and volitional or affective conscious acts and culminates 
in the attitude of world-openness, an attitude which is free and which not 
every human person possesses but which is opposed to many forms of 
closedness. We contrasted man’s world-openness to other opennesses and to 
various objects of the same openness. We came to the conclusion that man’s 
world-openness’ final understanding is man’s God-openness. The corollary 
of the main thesis is that God-openness is the real condition of man’s world-
openness. Its negation would mean a misunderstanding of man’s world-
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openness. Its negation means that the world would be the object of man’s 
vocation, despite the fact that questions of man transcend his all experiences 
gained in the world. Man is ordained to the world-transcendent vis-à-vis 
reality. We understand properly the distinguished feature (differentia 
specifica) of our existence insofar as we understand it in respect of the 
problem of God. Our transcendental vocation is, therefore the precondition 
of our world-openness.  
2. The constitutive ontological word-openness that exists in each human 
person potentially, even in the retarded or unborn, but in the awakened 
human person actually, has again many parts. These refer on the one hand to 
the structural intellectual (and logical-linguistic), volitional and affective 
sphere of the human person: intellectually it means that the human person 
can form a concept of the physical spatio-temporal cosmos as a whole that 
infinitely transcends the narrow sphere of his immediate environment and 
allows him to have a world-concept; it also entails the capacity of being 
open to the being (Sein) or the intellect’s openness to all beings, an openness 
that, as we have seen, goes beyond world-openness, because it is an 
intellectual openness to all beings and also to all spiritual and human beings 
which we only know in a tiny part but of whom we can think and to whom 
we can be related to in love and in various forms of solidarity, for whom we 
can pray, etc. Intellectual, volitional and affective world-openness also 
entails the capacity to have concern to respond to value-bearing goods for 
their own sake, to give them a due response. It thus also entails a vocation of 
the human person to reach solidarity in many senses with all other human 
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persons.281 It also includes an openness to the cultural, social, linguistic, 
scientific, and religious world. 
3. But this structural ontological, intellectual and moral capacity and vocation 
is not yet the attitude of world-openness that is an element of fundamental 
intellectual and volitional and moral virtues and attitudes that entail world-
openness in an entirely new sense such as love of truth, humility, reverence, 
love, etc. opposed to various forms of closedness and close-mindedness 
through lack of love of truth, irreverence, egotism, pride, etc. We surveyed 
many forms of closedness throughout this thesis contrasting to forms of 
openness.  
4. God-openness is the final understanding and real condition of man’s world-
openness. Its negation would lead to a misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation of man’s world-openness. Its negation means that the 
(cultural, linguistic, and many other forms of limited) world would be the 
object of man’s vocation, despite the fact that questions, search of truth, 
hopes and desires of man and most of all his vocation transcend all his 
experiences gained in the world and the whole world of finite beings. 
5. We cannot understand the essence of man’s openness as long as we 
find it only in culture, language, etc. Man’s language, social world, 
culture, etc., cannot be understood only on biological grounds. 
Similarly all other definitions will fail if they do not hold man’s 
primary transcendental and indefinite character. This also means that 
that is the only way to understand the essence of culture as well as 
history and all other phenomena that we tried to apply as possible 
                                                 
281 See Josef Seifert, Max Scheler’s ‘Principle of Moral and Religious Solidarity’, Communio, XXIV/1 (Spring, 
1997), pp. 110-127. 
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definitions to man in this thesis. In this sense, man is not ordained to 
the world, and not ordained to language, etc., but is open and 
ordained to God. Thus our transcendent vocation to God-openness is 
the precondition of our world-openness. 
6. From what we have seen, thus far, it is evident that God-openness is a most 
fundamental trait of the human person that is in no way just of functional 
importance to enable us to reach real world-openness. 
7. Man is not in the first place a being characterized by world-openness but a 
being ordained to the world-transcendent absolute being and the supreme 
and living reality that is the true spiritual vis-à-vis of man and is infinitely 
more than and different from the world. This no doubt it is what Augustine 
means when he says “Fecisti nos ad Te, Domine, et inquietum est cor 
nostrum, donec requiescat in Te.” We understand properly the distinctive 
feature (differentia specifica) of our nature and existence insofar as we 
understand it in respect to the comprehensive dependence of the world on 
God and the ordination towards God that includes our radical causal 
dependence on God not only at the beginning of our existence but at any 
moment in the concursus divinus. Likewise includes many other forms of 
relation of man on God besides this radical causal one: on the knowledge of 
God as source of our supreme happiness, on divine pardon and mercy in the 
face of our sins and, as the religious person thinks, on divine redemption, 
but likewise as supreme final cause and more than that: as supreme object of 
love and worship. The openness that lies, for example, in the religious act as 
adequation of our will and heart and intellect to God “for is own sake”, 
because it is dignum et iustum, is a God-openness and God-directedness that 
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is in no conceivable way just part of world-openness or reducible to enable 
us more adequate world-openness, while it remains true that only if we 
reach this God-openness of which we spoke do we also have a proper world-
openness and even a recognition of the concept of the world in its finitude 
and contingency and are able to overcome a superstitious idolization of the 
world and world-openness. God means for man what surroundings mean for 
other creatures. In this sense, God Himself for His own sake is “man’s 
world”. Animals depend on their surroundings and are related to them, man 
lives in a “divine milieu”. Human beings depend not only on their 
surroundings, not only on human culture and on language or art, and the 
human being is not only incomparably dependent on God but called to know 
and to love God for his own sake. In this sense we see: world-openness is 
not the highest thing or vocation of the human person but God-openness 
which is completely different. And this absolute openness to being, this 
God-openness and call to full metaphysical, moral and religious openness is 
not only important as a means to reach full world-openness but, on the 
contrary, the experience of the world and all forms and attitudes of world-
openness have as their supreme task that of leading us beyond the world to 
God. Therefore we can retitle our work from the original “world-openness” 
to “openness”, and openness that entails the openness to all being of which 
Aristotle spoke and which is the backbone of metaphysics, and that 
culminates in God-openness. 
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